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The study investigates the role of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and, by 
extension, that of the African National Congress (ANC) in the period from 
1976 to 1990, in the far northern Transvaal. This era witnessed 
unprecedented political upheavals in the history of the liberation struggle in 
South Africa. It is generally acknowledged that the period commencing in 
1976 marked the beginning of a sustained onslaught on the South African 
government by the opponents of racial discrimination. Some of the themes 
of this study are: the 1976 student uprisings and their snowballing effects on 
students' political consciousness throughout the country; the revitalisation of 
the ANC in exile, particularly after the 1979 Vietnam visit, and the 
organisation's ability to link up with internally based political formations 
such as students and community-based organisations, and political activists; 
and the emergence of the independent labour movement inside the country 
in the 1980s. The integrative nature of the student, parent and community 
interactions and their ability to connect with the ANC/MK and take up the 
cudgels at the behest of these communities are hallmarks of the situation 
during this period. 
Sporadic and symbolic demonstrations of military prowess remained the 
thrust of MK operations throughout the years covered by this thesis. The 
thought cherished by the majority of the Black population in the years of the 
liberation struggle, that somewhere out there in exile existed an immensely 
powerful liberation force, sustained not only the ANC but most of the 
freedom fighters that were internally-based. It was this belief, the study 











exile, and the hope that liberation was within reach. Some of the adherents 
of this ideal such as Tlokwe Maserumule, Stanley Mathabatha, Ephraim 
Mogale, Amos Lubisi and countless others cherished the hope that MK 
would liberate them from the pangs of oppression. To this end, the study has 
been able to foreground the fact that this strong feeling that the ANC was 
alive and active transcended all the odds against the forces of liberation. 
Thanks to well-calculated symbolic military incursions, the ANC/MK did 
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Introduction and Research Overview 
The rural Northern Transvaal' encompassed a vast region in the northern 
part of the old South Africa. It was strategically located; particularly the 
area bordering Zimbabwe (Venda) and Swaziland (KaNgwane), yet the 
underground liberation struggles that took place in the region remain 
mostly unreported. The overriding aims that underpinned the Wankie and 
Sipolilo campaigns of 1967/8 were informed by the strategic significance 
of this area, which was accentuated by the liberation of the southern 
African countries such as Angola (1974), Mozambique (1975) and 
Zimbabwe (1980). The fact that these countries - together with 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland - harboured ANC members made 
them important role players in the crusade for freedom in South Africa. 
This study does not consider the activities of ANC members in Angola, 
Botswana and Lesotho because (with the exception of Botswana) these 
countries share no borders with the rural Northern Transvaal. 
Because only a minimal written literature exists on the significance of 
this region with regard to the role that was played by the African National 
Congress (ANC)'s liberation army, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the 
current study is multidimensional in character and constitutes an attempt 
to fill the lacuna in the historiography of this region, created by the 
scarcity of written historical materials. The study argues against the idea 
inherent in a number of writings that the liberation struggle in South 
Africa was urban-based. Such writings include the works of Tom Lodge 
(,The African National Congress in South Africa, 1976 - 1983: Guerrilla 
I See maps 1 and 2 as well as an adaptation of the maps of the region from Reader's Digest Association 
South Africa, Reader's Digest atlas of Southern Afi'ica [cartographic material], (Cape Town: Reader's 
Digest Association South Africa, c 1984) in the appendices. The Northern Transvaal in the study 










War and Armed Propaganda', Journal of Con temp 0 ralY African Studies 3 
(1 & 2), October 1983; 'The State of Exile: The African National 
Congress of South Africa, 1976 - 1986', Third World Quarterly, Vol. 9, 
No. I, January 1987, amongst others), Howard Barrell (,Conscripts of 
their Age: African National Congress Operational Strategy, 1976 - 1989', 
D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1993, and MK-The ANC's Armed 
Struggle, London, Penguin, 1990) as well as Thomas G. Karis and Gail 
M. Gerhart, From Protest to Challenge: A DocumentalY History of 
African Politics in South Africa, 1882 - 1990, Vol. 5, Nadir and 
Resurgence 1964 - 1979, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997). 
Other studies do acknowledge that rural settings were suitable areas for 
the launch of the armed liberation war. Peter Delius (A Lion Amongst the 
Cattle, Reconstruction and Resistance in the Northern Transvaal, 
Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1996), Joe Slovo (An Unfinished 
Autobiography, Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1995) and Heidi Holland 
(The Struggle: A History of the African National Congress, London, 
Grafton Books, 1989) argue that the national liberation struggle in South 
Africa had a rural orientation. They concede that the objective factors 
tilted the liberation struggle in favour of the urban settings. 
The study aims at gIvmg an account of the neglected rural struggles 
waged by MK in tandem with the rural communities of the Northern 
Transvaal. The tracing of this history should provide a degree of insight 
into a wide range of intricate and vibrant traditions of struggle, resistance 
and compliance. At issue throughout the research is the question of how 
MK recruited members carried out operations and kept the South African 
security forces paranoid and vigilant. MK managed to recruit, militarily 
and politically train and revolutionise cadres and communities that had 











belief that soldiers are trained for frontal military confrontation, to help 
defeat the South African government politically by mobilising the 
oppressed African majority against it. 
Literature Review 
Research on the subject of the liberation struggle in South Africa 
abounds. This proliferation notwithstanding, there has been little incisive 
study of, and intensive historical research into, the role of MK in South 
Africa, especially its role in the rural Northern Transvaal during the years 
of its clandestine status. While a number of historians and political 
scientists have carried out research on MK on a national scale, Peter 
Delius is one of the few to have focused on the rural Northern Transvaal. 
Among his conclusions are the following: 
The ANC was no stranger to Sekhukhuneland. It had a rich history of 
connection with the area, which stretched back to the first decade of the 
century and which cannot be done justice in context. In the 1940s attempts 
were made to revive the organisation in the area and there were a number of 
sympathetic chiefs and clusters of local supporters of the movement. 
Nonetheless, the ANC's relationship with the area remained primarily 
refracted through chiefs and the educated, Christian elite and it had limited 
grass roots support. As John Nkadimeng points out: There were ordinary 
people who were members but on a very small scale. The problem is that 
when the organisers went to organise they were inclined to speak to the 
chiefs. 2 
Delius provides a wealth of information on the resurgence of MK in the 
region after years of a military and political lull, and attempts to make 
available the 'missing link' that existed in the historiography of MK in 
, Peter Delius, 'Sebatakgomo: Migrant Organisation, the ANC and the Sekhukhune Revolt'. Journal of 
Aji-ican Studies, Vol. 15, No.4, October 1989, p. 598. See also Peter Delius's article. 'Migrants, 
Comrades and the Rural Revolt: Sekhukhuneland 1950 - 1987', Transformation 13 (1990) and A Lion 
amongst the Cattle: Reconstruction and Resistance in the Northern Transvaal, (Johannesburg. Ravan 











the regIOn by offering an account of how MK was introduced in the 
Northern Transvaal on the release of the first batch of MK leaders from 
Robben Island such as Nelson Diale, Peter Nchabeleng, Joel Ntsoane and 
others.3 By contrast, the present study shows how the seed of revolution 
germinated and eventually engulfed the entire region, particularly after 
the formation of the UDF in 1983. Delius's research does not draw on the 
first-hand input of MK cadres themselves, and his and other previous 
research tends to address the connections that were established between 
the exiled cadres of the ANC and MK and the communities in the 
Northern Transvaal superficially. Here I explore the connections and 
intricacies of the relationships that existed between the political activists 
who were domiciled in the urban areas and those who were rurally-based. 
Critical factors such as migration, the transport system and schooling and 
their interplay are some of the aspects that have not been scrutinised and 
analysed to expose how they impacted on the national liberation struggle 
in general. 4 This led to a situation where many people began to believe 
that the liberation struggle was urban-based. 5 This view is simplistic and 
does not take into cognizance the dynamics of the South African 
geographic landscape and social configurations. 
As has already been mentioned, little has been written on the liberation 
history of the Northern Transvaal. The chapter entitled "The Tum to 
armed struggle" in The Road to Democracy in South Africa Volume 1 
3 Peter Delius, A Lion Amongst the Cattle: Reconstruction and Resistance in the Northern Transvaal, 
Gp. Cit., pp. 173-174. 
4 Peter Delius's 'Sebatakgomo: Migrant Organisation, the ANC and the Sekhukhuneland Revolt', 
JOllma/ of Afi'ican Studies. Vol. 15. No.4, 1989, provides an interesting read but he fails to make a 
connection between those migrants who were not necessarily interested in tribal local politics and the 
bigger picture of the national liberation struggle seen in such cadres as Martin Matefo Ramokgadi and 
John Kgoana Nkadimeng. 
5 Sello Mathabatha's 'Missionary Schools, Student uprisings in Lebowa and the Sekhukhuneland 
Students' Revolts, 1983-1986' in Afi'ican Studies, 64, 2, December 2005 seems to argue that the urban 
areas influenced the rural revolts, whereas the present study argues that it was the meeting of the minds 











(1960-1970) traces the historical episodes that infonned the decisions that 
were taken to resist government laws (Bantu Authority, in the case of 
Sekhukhuneland) by armed resistance in the 1960s.6 The chapter 
contends that the ANC started discussing possibilities of the anned 
struggle after numerous requests for arms were made by rural people of 
Mphondoland and Sekhukhuneland. It avers, "Rural networks and revolts 
contributed both to the decision to pursue anned struggle and to the 
supply of recruits for MK once it was launched.,,7 In the second volume 
of the Road to Democracy series, on the 1970s, there is no mention of 
what happened to the overtures of anned resistance in the two prominent 
regions (Mphondoland and Sekhukhuneland) that spawned the idea of 
armed resistance in the 1960s. Prominent people who had secretly goaded 
and recruited people in the rural areas of Sekhukhuneland to resist the 
encroachment of the Bantu Authority in the region were arrested and 
some left the country. There is a pressing need to explore and chronicle 
what happened to the freedom fighters who either went underground and 
resurfaced later or were imprisoned and later released from jail. It is 
common knowledge that Elias Motsoaledi and John Kgoana Nkadimeng 
went to life imprisonment on Robben Island and into exile respectively. 
What became of Flag Boshielo is still shrouded in mystery despite the 
fact that Oliver Tambo told a gathering at the University of Lagos in 1971 
that Boshielo "had been wounded and captured.,,8 These three men with 
rural roots in the Sekhukhuneland in the far Northern Transvaal were 
prominent figures in the resistance politics since the 1950s. The current 
study maintains that an anned struggle was pursued in the region from the 
(, Benard Magubane. Phillip Borner, Jabulani Sithole, Peter Delius, Janet Cherry, Pat Gibbs and 
Thozamile April, The Tllm to Armed Struggle, in The Road to Democraq ill South Afi-ica Vo/ume I 
(1960-1970). (Cape Town, Zebra Press, 2004), pp. 53-145. 
7 Ihid, p. 61. 
K Gregory Houston and Benard Magubane. The ANC's Armed Struggle in the 1970s. in The Road to 











days of these three prominent political figures. The study aims to give a 
regional focus to MK cadres' contribution to the liberation struggle. 
While the region is mentioned in the second volume of the Road to 
Democracy book briefly (pp. 467-468), this study argues that reliance on 
individuals who were catapulted onto the national stage is not the 
sufficient way of writing a regional historiography. The present work 
includes case studies of MK cadres who operated underground without 
detection. 
The authors of the chapter on Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns9 in the 
Road to Democracy book argue that these campaigns were reactions to, 
" ... the mounting pressure from MK cadres in military camps in Tanzania 
on the ANC leadership to send guerrillas back to South Africa to fight the 
apartheid regime, and secondly, the barriers to successful infiltration by 
guerrillas." I 0 The chapter acknowledges the importance of the present day 
Limpopo (previously far Northern Transvaal) as a strategic point of entry 
for infiltrated MK cadres into the northern part of the country. The 
authors maintain that "Venda, a South African language spoken mainly in 
the far northern province of Limpopo, is similar to Shona and made 
communication between Shona-speaking ZAPU cadres and their MK 
colleagues easier. "II In contrast, the current study traces the routes that 
were used by military and politically trained MK cadres who were 
convinced that they carried the hopes of the majority of the people of the 
region. These cadres did not "mount any pressure" on the leadership to be 
deployed into the country. They knew that they had an obligation to set 
the oppressed popUlation free from the yoke of oppression. The far 
9 South African Democracy Education Trust, The Road to Defl1ocra(l' il1 50llfh Africa Volume J (1960-
1970). Gp. Cit. pp: 479-540. 
10 Ihid, P 481. 











Northern Transvaal was a suitable strategic entry point. The issue of 
language was secondary; the deployment of cadres into the country was 
not based on linguistic proficiency only. 
The political turmoil that engulfed most of the rural Northern Transvaal 
has not been put into its proper political context. It has hitherto been 
researched and analysed as a separate phenomenon by researchers such as 
Ineke van Kessel ( "Beyond Our Wildest Dreams": The United 
Democratic Front and the Transformation of South Africa, 2000) and 
Jeremy Seekings (The UDF: A History of the United Democratic Front in 
South Africa 1983-1991, 2000). Seekings argues that the June 1985 
Kabwe Consultative Conference of the ANC in Zambia concluded on the 
high note of the promotion of the "people's war" and as a result there was 
an increase in MK attacks after mid-1985. '2 Seekings and van Kessel's 
perception of MK in the military rather than the political sense lacks a 
proper awareness of the historical context in which MK objectives were 
crafted. Van Kessel confidently states, "In reality, MK never posed a 
substantial military threat to its formidable opponent.,,13 But Colonel Jack 
Buchner of the South African police conceded that the ANC's attacks 
were unstoppable. His words were, "When a flea starts biting you, it can 
bite you whenever and wherever it wants.,,14 
Unlike other studies on the subject, my argument is that the increase in 
military attacks had nothing to do with a "renewed confidence and sense 
of direction" after the Kabwe Consultative Conference but much to do 
12 Jeremy Seekings. The UDF: A HistOlY of the United Democratic Front in Sollfh Aji-ica, 1983-1991. 
(Cape Town: David Philip, 2000), p, 162, 
13 Ineke van Kessel, "Beyond Our Wildest Dreams ": The United Democratic Front and the 
Transformation of so lith Afi-ica, (Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 2000), p, 38, 
14 Steve Mufson, Fighting Years: Black Resistance and the Struggle for a NeH' SOllth Af6ca, (Boston: 











with high levels of political mass mobilisation and involvement by dint of 
active agitation, leadership, guidance and advising people in issues that 
troubled them. This study suggests that the ANC knew that its aims and 
objectives could provide solutions to the people's troubles. There was 
also a strong possibility of reprocity if the organisation could champion 
the people's rights and solve their problems. 
Siphamandla Zondi's Chapter 3 in The Road to Democracy in South 
Africa Volume 1: 1960 - 1970 (2004) offers a historical explanation of 
rural struggles in the Northern Transvaal since 1919. The chapter, which 
relies heavily on personal interviews deals with resistance in the two 
villages of GaMatlala and Zeerust in the Northern Transvaal and neglects 
to supply the threads that held resistance together when the chips were 
really down. The chapter concludes: 
The ruthless determination of both Malan and Verwoerd to impose 
apartheid laws on rural Africans succeeded in pushing rural activists to 
fatigue. However, it would be a mistake to dismiss the peasant struggle 
as a failure, given the impetus they provided for grassroots mobilisation 
and the pivotal role played by rural communities and networks during 
the underground and armed phases of the struggle for liberation. 15 
The chapter does not capture political developments that took place later 
after the suppression of the first political agitations of Zeerust, for 
example. In this study the point is made that Zeerust became an important 
place for recruitment not only because of its proximity to Botswana but 
also because many generations were schooled in the politics of resistance 
over the years. 
15 South African Democracy Education Trust, The Road to Democrac)' ill Soutil Afhca. Va!. 1 1960-











Following on the path adopted by Zondi are two theses, 'Succession 
Disputes, MaCongress and Rural Resistance at GaMatlala, 1919-1980', 
by D. M. C. Sepuru and M. P. Kgobe's 'Resistance to Bettennent in the 
Pietersburg Area: A Case of GaMatlala, 1940-1980,.16 These studies 
provide a rich historical background to the emergence of resistance in a 
rural area as a result of the government's intrusion into traditional rural 
communities. However, the fact that these theses, which are historically 
important, concentrate on a single village means that they contribute only 
a little to the regional historiography intended by this study. 
Howard Barrell carried out significant research on the role of MK in the 
national liberation struggle in South Africa from 1976 to 1986. 17 His 
thesis has some interesting observations but while this study concentrates 
on ordinary MK cadres, Barrell's mostly deals with the exiled national 
leadership of the organisation. The current study questions some of the 
conclusions Barrell reached. Barrell contends: 
At the most critical moment in its history, in the midst of the most 
serious uprisings in South Africa in which its name was being widely 
proclaimed a leader of a revolution; the ANC had held a conference 
and concluded it with no generally agreed formulation of strategy. I g 
Such a conclusion elicits a lot of questions. For instance: what made the 
ANC's name to be "widely proclaimed a leader of the revolution" in the 
first place if it could not [onnulate its own strategies and tactics? Is 
16 Sepuru. D. M. c.. 'Succession Disputes. MaCongress and Rural Resistance at GaMatlala. 1919-
1980'. BA Honours Dissertation. University of the Witwatersrand. 1992 and Kgobe. M. P .. 'Resistance 
to Betterment in the Pietersburg Area: A Case of gaMatlala, 1940-1980'. BA Honours Dissertation. 
University of the Witwatersrand. 1992. 
17 Howard Barrell. 'Conscripts to the age: African National Congress Operational Strategy', 1976-
1986', PhD. Thesis, University of Oxford, 1993. 











Barrell aware of the ANC's conference modalities where vanous 
commissions report back on their deliberations or he is suggesting that 
the commission on Strategy and Tactics at Kabwe Consultative 
Conference failed to agree on their deliberations? Why the conference 
was declared a Council of War? Does it suggest that notwithstanding the 
declaration there were no ways and means of waging that war? Such 
questions point to the need for further research. 
Barrell also published on MK,' 19 His research was carried out under 
suppressive conditions where no free flow of information existed, 
particularly with regard to the internal underground operations of the 
ANC/MK. His analysis of events in the country was based on the (mis) 
information which he was given, as regards some of the underground 
activities of MK. Lack of access to relevant information led him to the 
conclusion that MK had no reception committees inside the country, that 
it possessed no direct and sustainable link with the exiled ANC/MK 
leadership and that it carried out its erratic sabotage attacks on a "hit and 
run" basis. Barrell attributes the alleged failure of MK operations to 
confusion "over the absence of underground structures able to integrate 
and deploy those infiltrated; over what political role those infiltrated 
could play; over the poor quality of the political briefings they received 
before infiltration; and over whether there they were merely 'cannon 
fodder. ,,20 
Contrary to Barrell's assertions, area military committees existed where 
MK operations were launched. In the mid-1980s in Moutse, for example, 
19 Howard Barrell, 'ANC Conference: "All For The Front!'" Work 111 Progress, No. 38, August 1985, 
p. 9-13, 'Bash Your Neighbours Strategy', New African, July 1986, p. II - 12 and MK: The ANC's 
Armed Struggle, (London: Penguin, 1960). 
21l Howard Barrell, MK: The ANC's Armed Struggle, (London: Penguin, 1990), p. 389. Barrell 











an area military committee (AMC) accountable to the military and 
political wings in exile was formed to coordinate the struggles against the 
incorporation of Moutse into the Bantustan of KwaNdebele, in tandem 
with mass-based community organisations. Chris Hani deployed Jerome 
Joseph Maake to Moutse from exile after thorough consultations and 
preparation. 21 It is incorrect to blame MK for "hit and run" operations 
because that is the nature of guerrilla tactics. Mahwidi Lawrence 
Phokanoka, a veteran of the combined forces of MK and ZANU in the 
1967/68 Sipolilo and Wankie Campaigns and a Russian-trained MK 
cadre in the early 1960s, argues that: 
We should not even fight in guerrilla warfare. We need not fight the 
enemy. You run away from them. Your main task in guerrilla warfare is to 
train the civilian people, to recruit and when you fight. .. it would be .... it 
could only be two minutes. It means you had information. It means you 
are well organised to get information about it. You cannot ambush 
someone who you don't know where he is going to pass, which roads he 
is ... so; you need a lot of organisation. It is quite a lot. So, you had to do 
that. You are not fighting. You are defensive and you are running away 
most of the time when you see the enemies coming or hear the enemy 
coming. 22 
The current study provides examples, based on the accounts of people in 
the underground who were assigned particular roles, of how MK 
combatants carried out their missions with relative ease. Barrell is not 
alone in criticising MK for failure to lay down the groundwork for 
operational purposes. Thomas G. Karis and Gail M. Gerhart (From 
Protest to Challenge: A Documentary History of African Politics in South 
Africa, 1882-1990, Volume 5, Nadir and Resurgence, 1964-1979, 1997) 
similarly blamed MK for its lack of underground structures to receive and 
21 Interview with Jerome Joseph Maake, by the author, Polokwane. Limpopo Province, 4 November 
2003. 












support guerrillas when they arrived inside the country on vanous 
missions. This loophole, in their view, stemmed from the fact that no 
clear-cut policies had been laid down regarding strategies and tactics and 
the ultimate objectives thereof. Karis and Gerhart enquire: 
Was military action required to generate popular support or was popular 
support a precondition for effective military action'? Strategists 
envisioned a "people's war" that would be "protracted," and with the 
masses "armed," but the vision of ultimate victory was clouded. Would 
the eventual "seizure of power" be primarily military with popular 
support or political (perhaps the long-dreamed-of-general strike) with 
'1' ')23 mt ttary support .. 
The present study shows that there were links, reception committees and 
sustainable contact and communication with those concerned, both inside 
and outside the country. It also argues that Karis and Gerhart's supposed 
operational policy conflicts were in fact normal debates that were honed 
and perfected in the course of prosecuting the liberation struggle, whether 
military or propaganda-based. Popular support for the ANC/MK was not 
only predicated on military actions by MK but on a number of other 
factors that the thesis addresses. 
Compiling a literature review on a topic that has been accorded neither 
proper research nor thorough analytical commentary is not an easy task. 
Major political events from 1976 to 1990 have not been thoroughly 
examined by historians on a regional basis. Researchers have 
concentrated on national history and in the process the study of regional 
events has suffered. The paucity of literature in this case can be attributed 
to a number of reasons, as outlined. This study, unlike those of other 
researchers, will be devoted to the life histories of cadres who were 
23 Thomas G. Karis and Gail M. Gerhart, From Protest to Challenge. A DocufI1ent(l1:V History of 
A/i'ican Politics in South Afi'ica, 1882-1990, Volume 5, Nadir and Resurgence, 1964-1979, 











infiltrated back into the country, who carried out missions clandestinely 
and who survived, or were eventually arrested and sentenced to 
imprisonment, or were killed by apartheid forces in battle. A 
reassessment of the literature on the role of MK in the rural Northern 
Transvaal must conclude that while there is a broad body of literature 
relevant to the study (on a national scale), scholarship directly 
concentrating on the topic suffers from various limitations, and that there 
is a glaring need for specific research on the topic in the rural far 
Northern Transvaal. 
Sources 
The elucidations and OpInIOnS presented in the study emerge from a 
variety of sources. The major limitation of this research consists in the 
absence of a collection of trial records, as is the case with Michael 
Lobban's work. 24 His study deals with specific cases of "guerrillas who 
survived inside the country ... " (and) "often remained dependent upon 
external command, ordinance and intelligence. ,,25 I was not able to access 
the court records of the majority of my informants at the South African 
Court Records Centre in Pretoria. I solicited the services of the True 
Recall tracing agency in Polokwane to locate the court records that I 
needed, but to no avail. There is no access to court records, I was told. 
My overriding aim was to verify the nature of the activities that were 
committed by my informants in pursuance of the liberation struggle and 
not to rely on their word of mouth, given the notoriety of the courts in 
c4 See Michael Lobban. White Man's Justice: South A/i-ican Political Trials in the Black Consciollsness 
Era. (New Yark: Oxford University Press. 1985). 











extracting information under duress. 
The study has immensely benefited from cadres of MK in the Northern 
Transvaal who have been readily available to provide information on how 
people were politically conscientised, recruited, spirited out of the 
country, vetted in exile, introduced to ANC politics, militarily or 
politically trained and deployed back into the country for various 
missions prescribed by the MK leadership. I believe that the strength of 
this thesis lies in its access to these cadres' first-hand experience of how 
they were arrested, to what extent their missions were carried out before 
they were intercepted by police and how they managed to cross borders 
that were teeming with security police and informers, who in most cases 
masqueraded as drunkards in the small shops that are usually found in 
farmlands around the borders. The cadres that were interviewed provided 
the vital link needed to carry out the underground guerrilla struggle in 
South Africa. It is their story on which the present research is solely 
dependent. It will also draw upon the limited literature on the subject. 
Grele argues that oral history as part of social history provides an 
"opportunity to understand consciousness, to radically alter historical 
practice by bringing ordinary people into the study of history, to reshape 
the discipline, to create a public that is conscious of its own history.,,26 
The interviews that I have conducted with a number of interviewees have 
taught me that it is important to familiarise myself with" ... the dynamics 
of oral transmissions, the function and immediate context of performance, 
the conventions of the genre, the structural and stylistic laws of poetic 
C(' Studs Terkel, Hard Times: An Oral HistOlY of the Great Depression, quoted by Ronald Grele in 











form, the prevalent cultural imagery even the indigenous "world view.,,27 
I was fortunate in a number of ways with regard to my interviewees; 
suffice it to mention that I have a comprehensive knowledge of their 
"world view"; I have travelled the route that some of them travelled in the 
quest for freedom in South Africa. It is said that "History cannot be 
written unless the historian can achieve some kind of contact with the 
mind of those about whom he is writing".28 
The limitations of oral methodology are well-known and not worth 
repeating in great detail here, except to sum up by means of Ivan 
Berend's quotation of Aristotle's Poetics in the article 'History as a 
Scholarly Discipline and Magistra Vitae'. Aristotle distinguishes between 
history and poetry, arguing that, "Poetry is something more scientific and 
serious than history because poetry tends to give general truth while 
history gives particular facts.,,29 I conducted more than seventy interviews 
and throughout all these sessions there were special concerns facing the 
interviewer. The interviews revealed the extent to which informants can 
go in distorting and embellishing their life stories. In an interview with 
Lengoati (Ngoma) Dannyboy in Middleburg, Mpumalanga Province, I 
sensed a tinge of self-consciousness in his narration of his political 
involvement, and in the process he embellished his story. 3D Other 
interviewees, like Ben Mokoena, were able to debunk some of the 
inflated stories that were narrated by Lengoati. In subsequent interviews, 
Lengoati confirmed that he had lied even to the ANC in Nigeria about his 
C- Karim Barber, Discourse and its Disguises: The Interpretation o/A/i'iean Oral Texts, (Birmingham: 
Centre of West African Studies, 1989), p. 14. 
2, Carr, E. H, What is Histo/)'?, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 18-19. 
~q Quoted in C. Brady, Ideology and the Historians, (Dublin: Lilliput Press, 1991), p. 1'8.7 . 
. ,t) Interview with Lengoati (Ngoma) Dannyboy, by the author, Kilimanjaro Guest House, Middleburg, 











academic qualifications before he left the country.31 Other interviewees 
exuded gallantry and inspiration and seemed credible and chronologically 
accurate. The personal account of Patrick Thibedi (nom de guerre, 
Mabuza Chamusso Julius)32 gained recognition from Joe Slovo who had 
personally sent Thibedi on a mission to the SA SOL oil refinery In 
Secunda in the early 1980s.33 Alessandro Portelli argues that it IS 
impractical to exhaust the complete reminiscences of an informer and that 
the information usually obtained is the product of mutual rapport. 34 
Passerini's observation that "people's memories of their own past lives, 
what they can remember and what they forget, are shaped by their own 
expectation for the future and whether they have children or young 
people for whom they care and who may outlive them" is relevant to the 
two interviewees mentioned above.35 I tried to distance myself from 
direct involvement where I know the interviewees on a personal level. 
The idea was to afford interviewees an opportunity to air their own views 
without interference and interrogation. I managed to pretend that I knew 
nothing about some incidents that were narrated to me, with the intention 
of according ordinary people the opportunity of making history by 
retracing the steps that they took in their lifetimes. 
We have learnt much, over a long a period, about the roles of those in 
power, be they in the liberation movements or in government. As Mayer 
)1 Interview with Ben Mokoena, by the author, Kilimanjaro Guest House, Middleburg, Mpumalanga 
Province, 8 July 2002. 
)2 Interview with Patrick Thibedi, by the author, ANC Provincial Office, Nelspruit, Mpumalanga 
Province, 29 August 2002. 
)) Joe Slovo recommended that Thibedi's mission be recorded in a film and his daughters are currently 
busy with this project. 
)~ A. Portelli, 'What Makes Oral History Different?' in Robert Perks and Alistair Thompson (eds.), The 
Oral HistOlY Reader, (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 71. 
), L. Passerini, 'Memory and Totalitarianism' in International Yew"hook of" Oral Historr and Lif"e 










puts it in another context but similar circumstances, " ... relatively little 
attention has been paid to the ideas of the ordinary Black villages in 
South Africa in the context of their material conditions and subjective 
experience at different periods. Data about the ideas of the powerful, and 
the motives behind these, are generally more accessible than the 





Chapter One concentrates on outlining the background against which the 
first tentative steps towards armed propaganda warfare unfolded. It 
describes the conditions that prevailed at the time, such as the atmosphere 
of optimism as a result of the emancipation of the people of Angola and 
Mozambique. The chapter encompasses political developments that took 
place at the University of the North in the 1970s and the recruitment of 
potential MK cadres from this university. It examines the dangers 
inherent in the process of recruitment for an underground liberation 
movement. The chapter explores and juxtaposes these internal 
developments, such as the emergence of the legal trade unions and 
student formations, with the steps fostering revival that the ANC took in 
exile, in order to bring MK in tune with the mood that prevailed inside 
the country in the late 1970s. 
Chapter Two focuses on the collapse of the nascent political activities of 
agitation that were beginning to emerge in the late 1970s after the 
clampdown on what the government perceived as ANC-inspired 
.1(, Mayer, P, Towllsmen or Tribesmen: Conservatism and the Process of Urhallisation ill a SOllth 











structures. The chapter exposes the heavy-handedness of the South 
African government in dealing with Black political aspirations. The route 
that aspirant freedom fighters took into exile as a result of the unbearable 
pressure that was brought to bear by the security police forms part of this 
chapter. The chapter argues that the arrests of the cream of the leadership 
of student organisations and trade unions, the reservoir of MK 
recruitment, created a government-triggered implosion of organised 
opposition to the regime's policies. 
Chapter Three deals with the knotty question of rural versus urban 
debates alluded to in the Introduction. The locality of the liberation 
struggle constitutes a huge debate in South Africa's political history, in 
the sense that there are perceptions that the urban areas resisted the 
system of apartheid much more fully than rural inhabitants of South 
Africa. A similar debate is taking place today regarding the former exiled 
members of the ANC, those who were on Robben Island and those who 
stayed behind and waged the struggle for liberation inside the country. 
The chapter briefly covers the politics of exile as they impacted on the 
internal politics. The porous nature of the Zimbabwean border also comes 
under the spotlight in this chapter. 
Chapter Four deals with the interplay between MK and the internally 
based organisations aligned with the ANC. This includes the United 
Democratic Front (UDF) which masqueraded as a front for all 
organisations that were ANC-orientated. The chapter considers the 
movements, and various missions of deployed MK cadres, inside the 
country. In addition it describes the dangers that cadres faced once inside 
the country. The chapter does not purport to supply a blow-by-blow 











of how some of those missions were carried out. In the light of impending 
threats of prosecution for crimes committed during the struggle for 
liberation in South Africa, various informants withheld information that 
dealt directly with what they had done. They preferred to reveal how they 
had carried out their actions rather than "spill the beans" on what they 
did. 
Chapter Five explores the drastic measures taken by the South African 
government in an effort to cling to power. The legislative steps to contain 
the spirit of freedom and the responses of those who were on the 
receiving end of the government's legislative authoritarianism constitute 
the main features of this chapter. The declaration of a state of emergency 
and the contrasting responses that this unleashed from the oppressed 
communities represent some of the salient points of the chapter. 
Chapter Six seeks to recapitulate some of the hypotheses that are 
proposed throughout the study: that the banning and banishment of MK 
cadres such as Peter Nchabeleng and Nelson Diale to the rural areas of 
the Northern Transvaal assisted in forcing MK underground in the region; 
the rural versus urban debate; and the relative significance of exile and 
internal struggle. The aim is ultimately to justify the contention that 
ordinary people in the ranks of MK carried on the crusade of liberation 













The Morogoro Consultative Conference - The Turning-Point? 
South African historical writing IS awash with generalities concernmg 
broad theoretical issues pertaining to the political situation of the 1970s. 
This research in contrast focuses specifically on the particularity of actual 
issues in the rural Northern Transvaal during the period 1976 to 1990. It 
does so from interpretation and interrogation of primary sources, mostly 
personal interviews and, by implication, the first-hand experiences of 
those interviewed. Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger state: 
Wars are often summed up as the decisions of leaders and the movements 
of armies. It is often forgotten that all these depend on ordinary soldiers, 
who personally sacrifice to achieve advances and victories, and physically 
suffer the consequences of retreats and victories. But their experiences are 
usually obliterated in the manufacture of histories, and may even be lost to 
popular memory. The result is the propagation of an official mythology of 
J war. 
This chapter seeks to put in context the political climate of the late 1970s 
in South Africa with regard to the conditions under which the ANC and 
MK operated in the rural Northern Transvaal and in the country as a 
whole. 
After the disastrous years of the late 1960s in which the ANC had 
experimented with the Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns2, the 1970s were 
I Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger, (eds.) Soldiers ill Zimbabwe's Liberation War. (Harare: 
University of Zimbabwe), p. 6. 
:' See Rendani Moses Ralinala, labulani Sithole, Gregory Houston and Benard Magubane's Chapter in 
South African Democracy Education Trust. The Road to Democracy ill South Africa VolufIIE' I (1960-











years of transition and . 3 regroupmg. The watershed Morogoro 
Consultative Conference of 25 April - 1 May 1969 and the decisions that 
were taken4, such as the establishment of the Revolutionary Council 
(RC), remain some of the highlights.s The RC was mandated to carry out 
a sustainable strategy for the liberation of the entire South African people 
and the "overall planning, preparation and conduct of operations.,,6 This 
marked the beginning of years of self-reflection amongst the ANC; it also 
marked the commencement of the reconstruction of the dormant 
underground structures that were cowed into submission by the brutality 
of apartheid in the 1960s. Policies and strategies were reappraised and 
synchronised with the ANC and MK vision. One of these policies 
concerned the relationship between the military and the political 
leadership. The intention was to strengthen the relationship between MK 
and the political leadership under the ANC. Needing reappraisal were 
counsels attributable to Chairman Mao Tse-tung's creed that, "Our 
principle is that the party commands the gun, and the gun must never be 
allowed to command the party.,,7 The ANC wished to address the 
question of accountability in its prosecution of renewed efforts with 
regard to the armed struggle. Acts of armed struggle refers to those acts 
that were carried out to create positive attitudes in population toward the 
armed forces. 8 This also included the establishment of good relations and 
1 The first five years after the Morogoro Consultative Conference have been classified as the period of 
"Recovery and Regrouping." See Ian Phillips, 'No Peace under Apartheid', Paper presented to the 1987 
Biannual Conference of the Political Science Association of South Africa, Stellenbosch, 1-3 October, 
p. 21. 
4 See Nhlanhla Ndebele and Noor Nieftagodien's Chapter in South African Democracy Education 
Trust, The Road to Democracy in South Aji-ica Volume 1 (1960-1970), Gp. Cit., pp. 573-599. 
, For an elaborate structure of the RC and the powers it wielded see a paper titled 'The Proposed ANC 
Structure for the Effective Execution of the Armed Struggle in South Africa.' Umkhonto we Sizwe 
Papers, Jack Simons Collection, Manuscripts and Archives, University of Cape Town. 
(, Tsepe Motumi, 'Umkhonto we Sizwe - Structure, Training and Force Levels (1984 to 1994)', at 
fLrrp: '" ,v\,. i~s.cu.za. Pubs, ASR ADR 18, Motumi.html 
7 Abigail Urey Ngara, 'Mao's Legacy and Africa,' Aji-ica, No.62, October 1976, p. 37. 
x Houston, G, The National Liberation Struggle in South Aji-ica: A Case StllCZV o(the United 











mutual understanding between the masses and the armed forces. The 
leadership of MK grappled with the lessons learnt by responding to the 
protests of MK cadres in the camps in the late 1960s, particularly those in 
Tanzania who wanted to come home and prosecute the struggle on their 
home turf.9 As the ANC argued in 1979: 
Our struggle shall be prosecuted as planned, and we shall not be forced 
into adventuristic confrontations with the enemy in order to satisfy our 
critics or to [be] use[ d] as propaganda stunts. We accept the basic and 
well-proven tenet of guerrilla warfare: the guerrillas shall choose the 
time and the battlefield to seek out and destroy the enemy. 10 
In the aftermath of the Wankie and Sipolilo campatgns, the ANC/MK 
leadership reflected on what had happened. Chris Hani severely criticised 
the leadership for lack of adequate preparation and disregard for captured 
MK cadres, particularly those that were languishing in Southern 
Rhodesian jails. I I Hani was angry after he was arrested with 33 other MK 
cadres who took part in the Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns and served a 
two-year jail sentence in a Botswana prison. 12 The leadership's inability 
to analyse their preparations in the hope of being able to assess them and 
derive lessons that would make it possible for them to devise correct 
strategies and tactics in relation to the enemy was described by Hani as 
devastating. 13 Hani also went hammer and tongs at the leadership 
regarding its concentration on exile politics at the expense of the 
underground activities in South Africa. 14 His severe criticism epitomised 
9 For a comprehensive study on the Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns read Ralinala R. M., et aI, 'The 
Wankie and Sipolilo Campaigns', South African Democracy Education Trust. The Road to Democrac)' 
in South ,~frica, Volume], (1960 - 1970), Gp. Cit, pp. 479 - 540. 
III Southern Africa: Realities and Illusions, Sechaha, March 1979, p.6. 
II Ralinala R. M., et ul, 'The Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns', in South African Democracy Education 
Trust, The Road fa Democracy ill South Afi'ica, Volume 1, (1960 - 1970), Gp. Cit., p. 536. 
Ie Fish Keitseng, Comrade Fish: Memories of a Motswalla ill the ANC Underground. (Gaborone, Pula 
Press, 1999), p. 51. 
1.1 Vladimir Shubin, ANC, A Viewfi'om Moscow, (Bellville, Mayibuye Books, 1999), p. 86. 
I~ South African Democracy Education Trust, The Road to Democracy in South Afi-ica, Volume 1,1960 











the feelings of MK cadres in camps outside South Africa. Phokanoka, 
who was captured after he lost contact with the main group and was 
betrayed by members of the local community in Southern Rhodesia to 
whom he had gone to receive directions and food, is critical of the 
leadership for being awash with the theory of guerrilla warfare and for 
not relying on local knowledge. 15 His lament is that the leadership 
continued to: 
... use this knowledge of the theory of guerrilla warfare, which [it] never 
discussed with us. So, we [ were] having one thing in mind and they [were] 
having ... we don't know what else in mind and that is why we think that 
there were [ very] serious clashes in waiting that did not put some of us in 
their good books. 16 
Hani and Phokanoka's criticisms of the ANC/MK leadership's guerrilla 
warfare strategies and of how captured guerrillas in Botswana and 
Southern Rhodesia were ignored revolved on the interpretation and 
understanding of what is entailed by guerrilla warfare. The ANC/MK 
conception and definition of guerrilla warfare seemed to dovetail with 
what Hani and Phokanoka were lamenting; the only divergence being the 
difference in the implementation of guerrilla warfare theories in a 
practical war situation. The ANC/MK axis defines guerrilla warfare as: 
... a long drawn out war '" [which] strikes when the enemy is 
unprepared, and where the enemy is weak. These will not be the battles 
of armies face to face, but hundreds of surprise attacks by freedom 
fighters who will hit where the enemy is weak, retreat when he fights 
back, take cover to re-organise, and prepare to launch the next surprise 
attack. Guerrilla fighters are not armies in uniform, but fighters of the 
people, who melt into the people or the countryside when the enemy 
searches for them, and are hidden by the people, because they fight for 
the cause of the freedom of the people. 17 
I.' Interview with Lawrence Phokanoka, by the author, GaNchabeleng, Limpopo Province, 5 July 2003. 
I" Ihid. 











It was mainly in view of Hani 's biting criticism that the leadership of the 
ANC/MK decided to hold its Morogoro Consultative Conference (25 
April - 1 May 1969) in Tanzania, where two major decisions were taken: 
the drawing-up of the Strategy and Tactics Document of the African 
National Congress and the formation of the RC to prosecute the 
liberation struggle with renewed vigour. IS The Morogoro Conference 
sanctioned the policy of guerrilla warfare but emphasised that such a war 
could not occur in a political void. 19 A political struggle was crucial in 
pursuance of the armed struggle, the consultative conference 
recommended. 
The Sipolilo and Wankie campaIgns, although militarily disastrous, 
signaled to the South African government that the ANC/MK had not been 
completely obliterated from the scene. It was clear to the government that 
the northern part of the country was likely to be used by MK in its 
assaults. Military personnel were then concentrated along the northern 
borders of the country.20 It was now clear to the South African 
government that it had to establish anti-guerrilla units if ANC/MK was 
going to be kept at bay. This issue forms part of the following discussion, 
which shows that the northern part of South Africa was monitored by 
well-trained soldiers ready to act at the slightest provocation. 
In the aftermath of the Wankie and Sipolilo campaIgns, In 1969 five 
"anti-terrorist" camps were established specialising in counter-insurgency 
IX For details on Strategy and Tactics of the ANC document visit 
bJlr: \\,\\\\.Clnc.ur!l.za J.ncducs, historvstratact htm!. 
19 Hein Marais. South Afi-ica Limits to Change: The Political Economy o(1ransitioll, (London. Zed 
Books. c 1998). p. 28. 











and counter-guerrilla warfare. 21 In Sibasa (Venda) and Thabazimbi (in the 
present Limpopo Province) anti-guerrilla plans were devised involving 
about 5,000 and 2,000 men respectively, primed to defend the country 
from the infiltration of guerrillas advancing from the independent African 
countries north of South Africa. 22 These military exercises by a security-
conscious South Africa were informed by the apprehensions and 
misconceptions that effective anti-guerrilla operations needed to be 
implemented by units of Africans, who were then considered for roles in 
counter-insurgency warfare despite the fact that the Minister of Defence 
had stated in 1970 that black Africans would be employed by the 
department only as common labourers. 23 Forty-eight Africans were 
trained at Baviaanspoort in 1975,24 and at Lenz Military Base in 
Johannesburg and at about this time some of the Bantustan soldiers were 
also trained by the South African government in facilities like Lenz 
Military Base, Potchefstroom Cavalry School and Eerste Rivier near 
Cape Town. That Bantustan soldiers were trained by white South African 
military officers on secondment to the Bantustans, such as Brigadier Phil 
Pretorius (who was seconded from the SADF to the Transkei in 1974), 
ensured that SADF military doctrines were embraced by the Bantustan 
troopS.25 The Black South African soldiers who joined the SADF were 
not spared being indoctrinated that the country was under siege. Nor were 
they spared the misconception that the ANC was a "terrorist" 
organisation under the thraldom of the Soviet Union. These Black 
soldiers were fed the racist diet that any organised grouping inside the 
21 Francis Meli, 'Military Doctrine of the Apartheid Regime', The AMcan Communist, No. 69, Second 
Quarter 1977, p. 49. 
22 Ihid, p. 49. 
23 Kenneth W. Grundy, 'The Rise of the South African Security Establishment. An Essay on the 
Changing Locus of the State Power" The South Aji-ican institute of International Affairs, August 1983, 
p.6. 
24 Rand Dailr Mail, December 6, 1976. 
2' Francis M'eli, 'Military Doctrine of the Apartheid Regime', The Afi'ican Communist, No. 69, Second 











country opposed to government policies was "communist-inspired" and 
that it had to be extirpated from the face of the earth. The legacy and the 
deliberate distortion of the genuine demands of the people led to 
profoundly detrimental conclusions in, the minds of some Black soldiers: 
that the "communists" were arriving to persecute them for their support of 
the South African government. It became normal, over time, when the 
government became obsessed with its own security, to establish 
specialised security forces that wreaked havoc not only against the ANC 
and MK but also against the neighbouring countries which hosted them. 
The Reconnaissance Regiment based on the Bluff in Durban provided 
training and personnel for cross-border operations into the Frontline 
States, particularly in the 1980s, as in Gaborone (June 14, 1985), Maseru 
(December 9, 1982) Maputo (January 30, 1981) and the triple raids of 
May 19, 1986 into Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 26 In 1986 Trewits, 
a counter-revolutionary intelligence target centre, was established with 
regional committees in the Northern Transvaal, Eastern Transvaal, Far 
Northern Transvaal, Western Transvaal and the Northern Cape.27 
Brigadier Jack Cronje, Vlakplaas commander of the counter-insurgency 
unit between 1983 and 1985, told the amnesty hearings that these areas 
had been chosen because they were the nearest to foreign countries and 
could be used to carry out Trewits's primary purpose - to identify targets 
outside South Africa. Generals Jac Buchner, Bob Beukes and Johan 
Victor headed Trewits. Their actions were not limited to the mentioned 
areas only, since they moved out of those regions when necessary. 
21> The responsibilities of the Reconnaissance Regiment (also to become known as the Civil 
Cooperation Bureau (CCB or 'The Organisation") are summed up in Rocky William's 'Back to the 
Barracks: Changing Civil-Military Relations Under Botha and De Klerk', Paper Presented at the 22"d 
ASSA Conference, University of Cape Town, 30 June ~ 3 July 1991, pp. 25-26. 











The obsession with "guerrillas from the North" helps accounts for the 
reorganisation of the Bureau of State Security (BSS) (dubbed BOSS by 
the media) and its being given "super-powers of investigation, arrest and 
detention.,,2R The Public Safety Amendment Act of 1969 played midwife 
to BOSS as a "national, secret intelligence-gathering organisation. ,,29 The 
scene was now set for protracted confrontations in South Africa, with the 
South African government fully prepared to defend apartheid and all its 
ramifications. The ANC, on the other hand, was prepared to engage the 
South African government and give it sleepless nights. 30 
The significance of the northern part of the country as an infiltration entry 
point is dealt with in subsequent chapters, in which the turbulent years of 
the 1980s are discussed. It will be shown how MK managed to outclass 
and outmanoeuvre numerous roadblocks and high concentrations of the 
SADF and commandos that were armed to the teeth, waiting for an 
ANC/MK invasion inside the country. The aim of providing a short 
historical background on the Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns and the 
subsequent Morogoro Consultative Conference is to contextualise the 
events that unfolded after the reassessment of the ANC's operational 
policies. After the conference, the focus was to fall on cultivating home-
grown political activities that included the masses on the ground. The 
RC's mandate encompassed liaisons with the newly-released cadres of 
MK, particularly those incarcerated on Robben Island in the 1960s. The 
establishment of the MK underground presence in South Africa by means 
of propaganda and the infiltration of existing organisations became one of 
eX William J. Pomeroy. Apartheid Axis: The United States alld South Afi·ica. (New York. International 
Publishers. [1971]). p. 27. 
29 Hilton Hamann. Days oflhe Generals. (Cape Town, Struik. 200 I). p. 4. 
1() See the entire paper by Pauline Baker. 'South Africa and Its Neighbours'. Unpublished Paper 
Presented at the South African Institute of International Affairs World Peace Foundation Conference, 











the obligations of the RC. The stage was now set for a protracted war 
between MK and the defenders of apartheid. 
The Revolutionary Council (RC) 
One of the most important decisions taken at the 1969 Conference was 
the establishment of the RC, which was essentially mandated to carry out 
three main tasks: a) the development and revival of internal structures that 
had been 'cowed into submission' by the security police operating 
internally in South Africa or that had been struck by despondency and 
lethargy as a result of the lack of visible political activities; b) to operate a 
publicity campaign for the ANC and c) to wage the armed struggle with 
added determination.31 These objectives needed the support of the 
oppressed and struggling masses of black people in South Africa who 
were supposed "to study and master the methods of guerrilla warfare 
which enable[ d] oppressed people to fight and defeat huge imperialist 
armies.,,32 Of the above objectives, only a) and c) are relevant to this 
study. The RC fulfilled the mandate of overseeing military and political 
developments until it was replaced in the early 1980s by two separate 
military and political structures. These will be referred to fleetingly 
throughout the study. 
As an earnest of their intentions before the dawn of the new decade of the 
1970s the ANC formed the RC to rebuild the mass armed underground 
and revive the political struggle. The composition of the RC (1969 -
31 These RC objectives are summarised in 'Umkhonto we Sizwe: Building People's Forces for Combat 
War and Insurrection, Part 2', Sechaba, January 1987, p. 21. See also Ronnie Kasrils' paper 'Politics 
and the Armed Struggle: The Revolutionary Army,' Lusaka, Zambia. 14 February 1988, Umkhonto we 
Sizwe Papers. Jack Simons Collection, Manuscripts and Archives. University of Cape Town. 











1976) was also reflective of the enlightened intentions of the ANC/MK 
after the lesson of the 196718 Wankie and Sipolilo military adventures. It 
was also reflective of the combined military and political determination 
of the exiled leadership of the ANC, the South African Communist Party 
(SACP) and the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). 
Oliver Tambo (ANC) was elected its chairman; his deputy was Yusuf 
Dadoo of the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) and the South 
African Communist Party (SACP). The secretary of the RC was Joe 
Matthews until 1970, and thereafter replaced by Moses Mabhida. Sipho 
'Simon' Makana was elected an assistant secretary. Joe Modise bore 
responsibility for military operations inside the country. Additional 
members comprised John Gaetsewe, Jacob Masondo, John Motshabi, 
Mziwandile Piliso, Joe Slovo, JB Marks, Robeti Resha, Tennyson 
Makiwane, Moses Kotane, Duma Nokwe, Reg September, Andrew 
Masondo, Ruth Mompati, Gertrude Shope, Jackie Sedibe and Thabo 
Mbeki.33 
The RC's resolve to resuscitate dormant or cowed internal MK structures 
was accorded a new lease on life when the earlier members of MK were 
released from Robben Island in the early 1970s. Their release coincided 
with the RC's creation of a special Sub-Committee on recruitment and 
training, which was required "to co-ordinate its work closely with the 
Operations Committee" (OPCO).34 The RC further committed itself to 
establish contacts, collaborate with the newly released "comrades" and 
investigate their support and welfare. 35 The roles of both the special Sub-
31 Gregory Houston and Bernard Magubane, The ANC Political Underground in the 1970s, The Road 
to Democracy in South Africa Volume 2 (1970-1980), Gp. Cit, p. 407 
14 Vladimir Shubin, ANC: A Viewfrom Moscow, Gp Cit., p. 159. 











Committee and the Operations Committee will be dealt with later, In 
other chapters. 
In the context of this study these newly released "comrades" in the rural 
Northern Transvaal included Nelson Diale, Peter (Petrus) Nchabeleng, 
Joel Ntsoane, Morris Matsimela and others.36 Most of them had been 
sentenced to Robben Island in the mid-1960s for MK-related activities 
and when released in the early 1970s were banished to the rural areas of 
the Northern Transvaal.37 Diale, Nchabeleng and Ntsoane, for example, 
were arrested in Pretoria in the 1960s for sabotage and MK-related 
activities and sentenced to Robben Island for eight years. They were 
released in 1972 and banished to their hometowns of Sekhukhune (Diale 
and Nchabeleng) and Mphahlele (Ntsoane). The RC was aware of these 
releases. The sending of MK cadres into the country to reconnect with 
these activists was complemented by instructions given to the newly 
released comrades by the MK leadership incarcerated on Robben Island 
to recruit more members once they were out of prison. 3R On the other 
hand during the early 1970s the ANC had begun to despatch MK cadres 
inside the country on some military, but mostly political missions. The 
internal scene inside the country was also showing considerable agitation. 
Somewhere in the country attempts at resuscitating the networks of 
underground activities of the 1960s by Winnie Mandela, Samson Ndou 
and others and their subsequent arrests gave hope to the oppressed that 
there were still people who were prepared to sacrifice their lives for 
}6 Diale Nelson, Joel Ntsoane and Nchabeleng Peter 369/18/9/64 (case numbers) were charged for 
sabotage in Pretoria in 1964, University of the Witwatersrand, William Cullen Library Historical 
Papers section. 
}7 Interview with Diale Nelson, by the author, Diphagane, Sekhukhune, Limpopo Province, 28 May 
2002. 











freedom. 39 The arrests of trained MK cadres inside the country after years 
of a 'political lull', such as Cholo Theophillus Ranka40 and Alex 
Moumbaris,41 also assisted in reviving sagging morale amongst aspirant 
political activists. Cholo and Moumbaris were arrested while on a 
mISSIOn to enter the country with the intention of establishing the 
42 underground networks of the ANC/MK. 
A number of factors caused the ANC/MK leadership to reflect on its role 
in the liberation struggle: the deployment of cadres such as Thabo Mbeki 
to Swaziland in 1973 and Chris Hani to Lesotho in 1974 after a four 
months' stay in South Africa;43 and the events taking place inside South 
Africa such as the 1973 Durban strikes;44 the threatening student-
orchestrated political climate at the University of the North that 
eventually culminated in the expulsion of Onkgopotse Tiro in 197245 ; and 
the impact of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM) on the political 
landscape. The arrest of James April in particular and the documents 
found on his person alerted the South African government to the fact that 
the ANC and its allies were placing strong emphasis on re-establishing 
communications lines to South Africa. These and other events elsewhere 
YJ Madeline Fullard, State repression in the 1960s, in South African Democracy Education Trust, The 
Road to Democracy in South Af;'ica Volume 1 (1960-1970), Gp. Cit, pp. 341-348 . 
.)(1 Cholo Theophillus Ranka was arrested in 1971 by the South African police together with Justice 
Mpanza, Petrus Mthembu and Gardner Sijake and two 'accomplices.' Sean Hosey and Alex 
Moumbaris, in a daring mission to ship trained guerrillas into South Africa by using a ship called the 
Adventurer. They were arrested after one of the MK cadres who were infiltrated into the country was 
arrested and exposed the others. 
41 Alex Moumbaris was part of the Cholo mission who traveled before them to South Africa to form 
part of the reception team when they eventually landed on the Transkeian coast. 
.)c Tsepe Motumi, 'Umkhonto we Sizwe - Structure, Training and Force Levels, 1984 to 1994', African 
Defence Review issue, No. J 8, J 984, p. J. 
43 Howard Barrell, 'Conscripts to their Age " Gp. Cit. p. J 10. 
44 For a comprehensive study of the Durban strikes see the Institute for Industrial Education, The 
Durhan Strikes 1973: Human Beings with Souls, (Institute for Industrial Education, Durban, 1974), the 
entire issue. 












were encouraging signs that matters were heading in the right direction 
politically. 
The process and regeneration and regrouping was long and very arduous. 
In an attempt to move closer to the theatre of the struggle (South Africa) 
the ANC/MK leadership formed Regional Internal Political 
Reconstruction Committees (RIPRCs) in countries bordering South 
Africa46 under the stewardship of the RC; they were mandated to oversee 
the prosecution of the struggle in South Africa from their respective 
neighbouring countries. The role descriptions of the RIPRCs included the 
establishment and sustenance of links with the underground MK units 
inside the country. These RIPRCs were directly responsible to the 
Internal Political Reconstruction Committee (IPRC) chaired by John 
Motshabi, with Mac Maharaj as its secretary. Other additional members 
of the IPRC included Ruth Mompati, Dan Tloome, John Gaetsewe, Ray 
Simons and Reg September. The IPRC was in essence a working 
committee under the RC. 
The structure of the RC was well-organised so that when MK recruits 
were spirited out of the country they could be linked up with a RIPRC in 
a particular country. The fact that the same people shouldered different 
responsibilities in different organs of both the ANC and MK should not 
lead to confusion, although it was only after 1978 that the tasks of the 
RIPRCs became clearer. In Botswana the RIPRC consisted of Zakes 
Tolo, Dan Tloome, Marius Schoon, Jenny Schoon (Jeannette Curtis), 
Patrick Fitzgerald, Henry Makgothi and Magirly Sexwale and someone 
-Ie, The Regional Internal Political Reconstruction Committees (RIPRCs) and Internal Political 
Reconstruction Committees (lPRCs) were to a large extent, ad hoc committees that were formed for 












who preferred to be known by his nom de guerre of Negro. The Botswana 
RIPRC was responsible for everything that pertained to the liberation 
struggle not only in Botswana but also, because of their proximity to 
Bophuthatswana in South Africa, everything that involved the struggle in 
South Africa from this perspective. The organisation of RIPRC in 
Swaziland was streamlined in the same way as in Botswana. It comprised 
Joseph Mdhluli, Chiliza (Nkonyane), Jacob Zuma, John Nkadimeng, 
David 'Inch' Rwaxa, Albert Dlomo, Stanley Mabizela and Albert 
'Bafana' Duma. Their role was to provide MK cadres with logistical 
support and equipment whenever they were on a mission and to keep 
them abreast of developments both inside South Africa and without. The 
RIPRC's primary role was to work towards internal reconstruction of 
political units of the ANC instead of MK - a political task rather than a 
military task. (Joseph Mdhluli, Chiliza (Nkonyane), etc, were not part of 
the Swaziland RIPRC, but of forces based inside and outside the country 
up to 1976 that constituted the ANC machinery (not yet RIPRC) in 
Swaziland and political underground in Natal and the former Transvaal.) 
Joe Matthews, Robert 'Bob' Matji, Ezra Sigwela and Khalakhi Sello 
formed the RIPRC in Lesotho, carrying the same responsibilities as those 
in other neighbouring countries. Zimbabwe's RIPRC was to play the 
same role after independence in 1980.47 
However, problems occurred in the "frontline states" where MK was 
trying to establish its presence. Three examples of three countries that 
'hosted' the ANC will illustrate this point. The tum of political events in 
Southern Africa during the mid-1970s affected Swaziland despite her 
economic dependence on South Africa. King Sobhuza of Swaziland had 
4" See the role that was played by Refiloe Mudimu from Zimbabwe and his contacts inside South 











allowed the ANC an official presence in his country since 1975, but under 
restrictions in the sense that the ANC members were not allowed to carry 
arms, run official offices or travel freely.48 King Sobhuza was 
sympathetic to the ANC, as was manifested in March 1976 when South 
African security agents kidnapped Joseph Mdhluli and Cloepus Dlomo in 
Swaziland for recruiting people in Nata1.49 As a precautionary measure 
and in a display of sympathy for the ANC the Swaziland government 
'arrested' Albert Dlomo, Jacob Zuma and Thabo Mbeki after this event. 
The Swaziland government's contention was that the three men were on 
the verge of being kidnapped by South African security agents in 
Swaziland, just like their ANC colleagues.5o The changes that happened 
amongst the ANC leadership and the liberation movements of South 
Africa and Swaziland over the years comprise the subjects of subsequent 
chapters. 
The usurpation of power in Lesotho in 1970 by Leabua Jonathan ushered 
in antipathy for the ANC's objectives. The coup in Lesotho meant that its 
administration's relationship with the ANC was subject to review. The 
Secretary General of the ANC at the time (1970), Alfred Nzo, for 
example, condemned the usurpation of political power, the declaration of 
a state of emergency and the apprehension of members of the 
Basotholand Congress Party and its leader, Ntsu Mokhehle. When 
Lesotho aligned herself with the Socialist group associated with the 
Soviet Union she further alienated herself from South Africa. The South 
African homeland policy also created a source of friction between the two 
countries. The independence of Transkei in 1976 was a thorn in the flesh 
~~ John Daniel, 'A Comparative Analysis of Lesotho and Swaziland's Relations with South Africa', 
South Ali'jccw Ret·jcll' 11, South African Research Service, p. 235. 
~9 'Swaziland Protest Note to Pretoria', Afi·jca. No. 60, August 1976, p. 18. 











of the Lesotho government in the sense that the Transkeian government 
wanted Basotho citizens who wished to travel to Umtata to apply for 
visas in Transkei. Matters came to a head when the Lesotho government 
decided in 1977 to close the Quacha's Nek border post because of the 
Transkei 's persistence regarding the visa issue. Yet the RIPRCs were able 
to survive and function under relative conditions of hardship. 
The attitude of the Botswana government towards the liberation struggle 
in South Africa became clear after the outbreak of the 16 June 1976 
uprisings in Soweto. The President, Sir Seretse Khama, felt "a pan-
African obligation towards the victims of minority regimes" and 
appointed Lebang Mpotokwane, the former High Commissioner of 
Botswana to the United Kingdom, to be responsible for the management 
and organisation of government support to expatriates. 51 The Botswana 
government had received the highest number of refugees from South 
Africa. Generally in this period it is therefore clear that the RIPRCs in 
neighbouring countries were not operating unhindered in their host 
countries, which affected MK internal operations negatively. Lodge 
observed that, "Umkhonto operations and logistics are directed and 
administered through Botswana and other territories adjacent to South 
Africa, but the vulnerability of these countries and their government's 
attitude to Umkhonto rules out the development of large military bases by 
the ANC within its borders.52 
The RC' s mandate to direct operations inside South Africa lasted from 
1969 to 1983 when two committees, the military and the political, 
'I 'Botswana and Swaziland, Refugee Problems', A/dca, No. 63, December 1976, p. 73. 











replaced it. 53 Joe Modise chaired the first while the second was chaired by 
John Nkadimeng, the General Secretary of SACTU. The operations of 
these two committees were subject to the approval of the National 
Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC. The logistics of exile and other 
commitments inherent in the liberation struggle against the apartheid 
necessitated the establishment of a coordinating committee that was 
entrusted with the task of supervising the work of these two committees. 
The South African government was, conversely, aware of these 
developments or it anticipated them long before they could take shape. In 
the case of Botswana, for example: 
The assumption in Pretoria seemed to be that unamled exit to Botswana 
was the prelude to armed infiltration to South Africa under the sponsorship 
of a militant African organisation, such as Umkhonto we Sizwe, the 
military strike force of the outlawed African National Congress (ANC).54 
The (il-) logic of border control posts, travel permits and regulations, 
monitoring of South African airspace, aeroplane movements and the 
installation of electric fences that encircled South Africa stemmed from 
this fear expressed above, amongst other reasons. It is no exaggeration to 
conclude that MK was regarded as a threat to the South African 
government and Botswana's example supports that conclusion, which is 
based on the fact that there was no defence force in Botswana to oppose 
the South African government, as the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) 
was formed only in 1977.55 
There was clearly no RIPRC in Mozambique before the collapse of the 
'3 Tom Lodge, 'State of Exile: the African National Congress of South Africa, 1976-86', Third World 
Qllarfcr~v. Vol. 9. No. I, January 1987, p. 5. 
q Richard Dale, 'Between Pretoria and Praetorianism: Crafting a National Security Establishment and 
Policy For Botswana, Paper presented at the Thirty-First Annual Meeting of the African Studies 
i\ssociation. Chicago, Ill., October 28-31, 1988', (Atlanta: ASA, 1988) p. 7. 











Portuguese government in a military coup d'etat on the 25 April 1974 
carried out by the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement. The situation 
altered after the collapse of Marcello Caetano's government in Portugal. 
Mozambique was thereafter used throughout the years of the struggle as a 
base for the war of liberation in South Africa. Tom Lodge states that the 
exiled High Command of MK was, until the signing of the Nkomati 
Accord in March 1984, located in Maputo.56 Joe Modise, who was head 
of MK, and his supporting staff in MK' s Central Operations Headquarters 
were based in Lusaka and not in Mozambique during the period up to the 
signing of the Nkomati Accord. A major advantage of the collapse of 
Caetano's government was the hope that it brought to the liberation 
movement in South Africa, which assisted the RC III its two main 
objectives. Celebrations were organised in major cities throughout South 
Africa after the collapse of the Portuguese government, by internal 
political organisations, particularly those of students, whose educational 
training in Bantu education was no longer unchallenged. These students 
perceived the naked truth that "apartheid held no benefits for them and 
they were being 'brainwashed' into thinking that they were inferior, lesser 
human beings. ,,57 
The South African Student Organisation (SASO), the Black People's 
Convention (BPC) and the secondary schools' South African Student 
Movement (SASM) took up the cudgels at the behest of their respective 
constituencies by celebrating during the FRELIMO rallies. On 25 
September 1974 SASO-affiliated SRCs organised a prohibited rally of 
about 30 000 members in support of the transitional government III 
'I, Tom Lodge, 'State of Exile: the African National Congress of South Africa, 1976 - 86', Third World 
Qilartcrzv, Vol. 9, No. I, January 1987, p. 10. 
'7 Nancy L. Clark and William H. Worger, (eds) South Afi'ica: The Rise (l/Id Fa/! of Apartheid. 











Mozambique that took over after the collapse of the Portuguese colonial 
empire. 58 The majority of black communities celebrated with the 
Mozambicans on their first anniversary of independence in June 1975.59 
The student demonstrations on various tertiary campuses, organised by 
SA SO, reflected the mood of those who wanted freedom for South 
Africans. The message was quite clear on the students' posters: they were 
not only celebrating but had high hopes of their own freedom in their own 
country of birth. Some posters read: 
Frelimo fought and regained our soil, our dignity. It is a story. Change the 
name and the story applies to you. The dignity of Black Man has been 
restored in Mozambique and so shall it be here. Black must rule. We shall 
drive them to the sea. Long Live Azania. Revolution!! (Samora) Machel will 
help! Away with Voster Ban! WE are for Afro black Power!!! Viva Frelimo. 
Power! !! We shall overcome. 60 
It is logical to argue that these community-based organisations such as 
SASO, SASM and BPC were not engaging in politics in a vacuum. They 
managed to establish contacts with outlawed organisations such as the 
ANC and PAC and other minority splinter organisations that were in 
exile. The role of the RC became vital in linking up with these 
organisations and with individuals who could not find a political home in 
South Africa and had decided to leave the country. Subsequent chapters 
will demonstrate that many students who were attending tertiary 
institutions in the early and mid-1970s eventually found their political 
home in the ANC and MK as well as in other organisations of lesser note. 
It will also be shown that their political roots and the niches that they 
carved later in politics stemmed from the influence that they gained when 
<,< Dan O'Meara, For(l' Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of'the National Party. 1948-
1994, (Randburg, Ravan, 1999), p. 179. 
<'I Ihid, p. 179. 
('0 Robert M. Price, 'The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa, 1975 -
1990' in Nancy L. Clark and William H. Worger, (eds.) South Afi-ica: The Rise and Fall of' Apartheid, 











the political fortunes of Southern Africa changed in their favour. 61 These 
individuals, in line with the political philosophy of the time, Black 
Consciousness, became community activists at home and student activists 
at universities. The fact that the tertiary institutions became fulcrums of 
the underground struggles that were waged particularly in the northern 
part of the country was not actually surprising because it vindicated the 
fact that the ANC/MK leadership was committed to integrating political 
and military strategies for the struggle within South Africa as advocated 
by the RC.62 The process of the recruitment of individuals who 
established themselves politically either at community or tertiary level in 
the underground structures of MK may be traced to this period of the 
I 970s.63 
Southern Africa in the 1970s - An opportunity missed by MK? 
The South African government became very jittery about its influence in 
Southern Africa after the collapse of the Portuguese government and its 
colonial empire in Africa. Portuguese-controlled countries such as 
Angola, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique were liberated in 1974-75. In 
Zimbabwe the armed struggle had intensified since the mid-1970s. The 
balance of power in Southern Africa now tilted in the favour of newly 
liberated countries and South African government became concerned 
about its future. The government's attitude towards its neighbours was 
initially characterised by the policy of detente. The spirit of celebration 
that engulfed black southern Africa was dealt a severe blow when the 
"I Many political activists that fonn part of the material of this study, such as Dick Ralushai, Matthews 
Phosa, Ngoako Ramatlhodi and others, trace their roots to the Black Consciousness Movement. They 
were not necessarily members of the BCM but they shared most of the political frustrations of the time 
with it. 
,,= Thomas G. Karis and Gail M. Gerhart, From Protest to Challenge, Gp. Cit., p. 36. 











South African security forces invaded Angola in August 1975, to be 
stopped only by the combined forces of Angolan and Cuban troops in 
March 1976.64 The withdrawal of the South African troops from the 
outskirts of Luanda in March 1976 was regarded by Black South Africa 
as a military defeat of the South African security forces. O'Meara argues 
that, "it certainly helped precipitate widespread black defiance which led 
to the historic events of 16 June 1976.,,65 The outbreak of the Soweto 
upheavals barely four months after the humiliating defeat of the SADF in 
March 1976 demystified the myth perpetrated by the government, that the 
SADF was unconquerable. The 16 June upheaval was regarded as a 
glorious rebellion; those who died were seen as heroes and heroines of 
the struggle for liberation. More and more people began to look for 
greener military and political pastures outside the borders of South 
Africa. Under these conditions the RC together with its regional 
structures in the neighbouring countries became very necessary for those 
who were fleeing the apartheid bullets. 
MK's utilisation of countries such as Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland 
to carry out military and political missions implied that internal secret 
bases were needed where internal recruitment and operations could be 
planned and carried out. In the rural Northern Transvaal the University of 
the North became a nerve centre for MK recruitment activities; here, too, 
contacts were found for community leaders who were based in areas that 
were very remote from the university.66 One should ask why the 
University of the North was so unique in its location and composition that 
(," Dan O'Meara, Forty Lost Years, The Apartheid State and the Politics o(the National Party, 1948-
1994, Gp. Cit .. p. 179. 
(,) Ibid. p. 180. 
6(, Gregory Houston and Bernard Magubane, The ANC Political Underground in the 1970s Chapter in 
South African Democracy Education Trust, The Road to Democracy in South A/heel Volume 2 (1970-











it was singled out by MK recruits and the South African security forces in 
general. Southern Africa was in fact not lost to MK in the 1970s, 
particularly in the rural Northern Transvaal. The networks that had been 
established clandestinely since the early 1970s ballooned and engulfed 
the entire region in the 1980s.67 The establishment of ANC/MK 
underground networks was a complicated process that left many political 
activists behind and it has been observed that these organisations were 
"too underground." The level of distrust and secrecy penneated the 
underground political operations to such an extent that it was extremely 
difficult to be open about the underground work that was being done. 
Schools and villages in the vicinity of the University of the North were 
influenced by the political activities taking place at the university. Frans 
Mohlala, who never studied at the University of the North, for example, 
became a leading political light in the 1980s as a trade unionist and MK 
underground operative, after being influenced by his father who was a 
gardener at the university.68 The latter had been influenced by students at 
the university who would approach him for sanctuary when the security 
police were looking for them. His father's sympathy towards the students 
inspired Mohlala (junior) to join the liberation struggle. Similar 
experiences will be described in detail in the next section. 
The political landscape of the 1970s was npe for infiltration and 
recruitment into the underground military and political work of MK. No 
major recruitment drives took place on a large scale, however, for many 
reasons. Notable was the fact that most political actions were taking place 
h' For the complicated process of underground network establishment see the document 'The Creation 
of the Underground Units by MK' provides an interesting read. For details see Jack Simons Collection, 
Umkhonto we Sizwe Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, University of Cape Town. 











at tertiary institutions whose students stemmed originally from urban 
areas. Student activists of the time, particularly at the University of the 
North, such as Cyril Ramaphosa, Mosiuoa "Terror" Lekota, Pandelani 
Nefolovhodwe and many others, had a degree of urban sophistication 
which they brought to the University of the North in the 1970s. Secondly, 
rural areas are, predominantly, abjectly poverty-stricken and as a result 
not many families could afford to send their children to tertiary 
institutions like the University of the North. It is necessary therefore to 
examine in great detail the uniqueness of the University of the North that 
made it a target for both the security police and MK cadres on recruitment 
mISSIOns. 
The University of the North: A cauldron of the struggle since the 
early 1970s 
The South African government's determination to implement separate 
development was taken a step further by the passing of the University 
Education Act (no. 45) of 1959, which was intended to make tertiary 
education racially exclusive. The Minister of Bantu Education and 
Administration was empowered by this Act to establish university 
colleges for non-whites. As a result four such colleges came into being: 
those of the North, Zululand, Durban Westville and the Western Cape in 
the tradition of their predecessor, Fort Hare. The University College of 
the North was intended for the North-Sotho (Bapedi), South-Sotho, 
Tsonga, Tswana and Venda national units. In terms of Section 22 of the 
same Act admissions of Africans from other ethnic groups were allowed 











granted permission.69 Readmission was not automatic and the council 
reserved the right to approve an application for readmission. 70 The 1969 
Act (No. 47) of Parliament proclaimed these university colleges 
autonomous. 
The University of the North was established in terms of Act no. 47 of 
1969 as an institution in its own right, having first been established as a 
University College in January 1960 under the guidance of the University 
of South Africa. The founding of the university college (and all other 
university colleges for that matter) was not well received because of the 
interference of the South African government in their affairs. The 
opposition's concerns were that this interference would compromIse 
academic freedom and autonomy. The fact that the university councils 
were white and government-appointed also represented a source of 
conflict since this composition was interpreted as paternalistic. On the 
basis of these sentiments the student's representative council (SRC) of the 
University of the North organised a boycott of the installation of the 
chancellor in 1970. 71 The SRC's contention was that if the university 
college was indeed meant for black students it should be managerially 
black as well. The students argued, furthermore, that the content of the 
courses (disciplines) offered at the university college should also reflect 
the aspirations of black people. The SRC also preferred that members of 
the white community who were on the management council should rather 
take their positions in the advisory council and not the other way round. It 
was at about this time, incidentally, that students at tertiary institutions all 
(,<) 1. G. E. Wolfson, Turmoil at Turfloop: A Summary oitlIe Snyman and Jackson COlllmissions of 
Enquiry info fhe University of the North. (Johannesburg, South African Institute of Race Relations, 
August 1976), p. 6. 
7i1 Ihid, p. 6. 
71 A NUSAS National Campaign pamphlet, South African History Archives (SAHA), AL 2457, 











over the country gathered together to fonn SASO, whose exclusive black 
membership somewhat confirmed the motives of separate development as 
regards racial exclusivity. SASO's constitutional preamble reads: 
Whereas, we the Black students of South Africa, having examined and 
assessed the role of Black students in the struggle for the emancipation of 
the Black people in South Africa and the betterment of their social, political 
and economic lot, and having unconditionally declared our lack of faith in 
then genuineness and capability of multi-racial organisations and individual 
Whites in the country to effect rapid social changes ... do commit ourselves 
to the realisation of the worth of the Black man, the assertion of his human 
dignity and to promoting conscious and self-reliance of the Black 
. 7~ 
commumty. ~ 
SASO's stand on black membership was infonned by the fact that they 
had broken away from the National Union of South African Students 
(NUSAS), arguing that NUSAS, which was predominantly white, was not 
catering for their aspirations as black students. SASO argued that in the 
South African political context there was no middle road: one was either 
part of the system of apartheid or against it. SASO's attitude was also 
influenced by the prevailing climate of the time. South Africa was 
gripped by the Black Consciousness philosophy, a result of which 
manifested itself at the University of the North when black and white 
members of the staff association who had belonged to the same 
association previously went their separate racial ways.73 
Unequal treatment based on grounds of skin pigmentation was the cause 
of heightened racial consciousness and the eventual breaking-up of the 
staff association into racial categories. In 1971 black members of the staff 
association fonned their own association, called the Black Academic 
Staff Association (BASA). The recognition applied for by BASA from 
7c 'SASO Constitutional Preamble', cited in J. G. E. Wolfson, Turmoil at Twlloop, Op Cit. p. 12. 











the management council of the university was received in 1972. Against 
this background and around this time Onkgopotse Abram Tiro delivered 
his famous speech as the ex-president of the SRC in April 1972, during a 
graduation ceremony. As a starting-point Tiro referred to lB. Vorster's 
assurance that "No black man has landed in trouble for fighting for what 
is legally his.,,74 Tiro's scathing speech landed him in trouble: the 
university suspended him the next day for bringing it into disrepute. In 
solidarity with Tiro the entire student population (of about 1 146 
students) went on a mass protest after they had embarked on a sit-in that 
was abruptly dispersed by the police using tear gas. 
The university's reaction was to expel the entire student population, 
which infuriated not only the students at the university but those at almost 
all black universities. Different communities were also enraged by the 
university's suppression of the freedom of speech on the campus. More 
than two thousand people in Soweto alone took to the streets in protest 
against this decision. 75 The University of the North later rescinded its 
own decision and ordered the students to reapply for readmission on an 
individual basis. The motive was to refuse Tiro readmission and to 
suspend the SRC and all its subcommittees. When Tiro reapplied his 
reapplication was declined. On 2 June 1972 the students returned to the 
university only to find that 22 of their members, including the entire SRC, 
had been refused readmission despite promises of admission on 
reapplication. 76 This led to a second strike, upon which the university 
expelled all its students, who refused to leave; on June 6, 1972, the police 
7-1 G. M. Nkondo, Turfloop Testimony: The Dilemma of a Black University in South Ajioica, 
(Johannesburg, Ravan. 1976). p. 91. 
7' Ihid. p. 4. 
7(, Colin Legum, 'A Republic in Trouble', Aj;oica Contemporary Record Current Affairs Series, Vol. 5, 











removed them using dogs. 77 This was to become a trend at the University 
of the North until the dawn of the new political dispensation in the 1990s. 
Tiro's suspension and eventual expulsion followed what the university 
called "proper channels", in the form of a meeting by the University 
Management Council (UMC) on 15 May 1972 in Pretoria at which it was 
decided that a Commission of Inquiry be appointed from members of the 
Management Council. Two other members of the Advisory Council (AC) 
were co-opted onto this commission, whose mandate was to investigate 
the causes that had led to the unrest at the university and to recommend 
measures that needed to be taken to remedy the situation. 
Notwithstanding other recommendations, two important ones were made 
that are relevant to the present study: that SASO should not be banned 
from the campus but rather be assisted in sublimating its efforts to 
organise black students' activities. It was further recommended that BC 
should be encouraged because it carried with it the possibility of paving 
the way for the eventual implementation of the homeland system, for 
black people only. 
Incessant student unrest followed and a new SRC with a revised 
constitution insisted on by the management council was installed in 
September 1973. It was this management-approved SRC that was 
eventually forced to resign when the local branch of SA SO was formed 
on the 16 March 1974, following Pandelani Nefolovhodwe's proposal 
that it do so. Nefolovhodwe, who replaced Muntu Myeza as President of 
SASO, was also elected the president of the new SRC at the university. 
Muntu Myeza replaced Henry Isaacs when the latter was banned in 1973 











as SASO leader under the Suppression of Communism Act. The expelled 
Tiro became a permanent organiser of the SASO and the president of the 
Southern African Students' Movement (SASM) before unbearable 
conditions forced him to flee the country into exile in Botswana. The 
South African security police devised a parcel bomb which eventually 
killed him on 1 February 1974, a day before he was to meet with the 
ANC for possible talks concerning unity.78 When Tiro was murdered in 
Botswana the students at his Alma Mater organised a memorial service 
for him on the 17 February 1974 that was attended by black members of 
the staff and the students. SASO worked in tandem with BASA, which 
became evident when 22 August 1974 was set aside "to mourn for our 
Black brothers and sisters who have been killed by direct and indirect 
forces of oppression.,,79 The chairperson of BASA chaired the platform 
together with SA SO 's speakers during the SASO week (20 - 22 
September 1974), of which the theme was "Building the Nation for the 
Struggle"; on this occasion preparations for the pro-FRELIMO rallies that 
were to be held on the 25 September were announced. The Minister of 
Justice decided, on 24 September 1974, to ban these rallies. On the day of 
these celebrations, countrywide meetings of students and community 
political activists went ahead despite banning orders. About 1 000 people 
gathered at Curries Fountain in Durban for the celebrations, the police 
decided to baton-charge the revellers and several people were arrested. 
Students and members of the BASA were also assaulted for refusing to 
disperse when ordered to do so by the South African security police. 
Countrywide arrests of suspected political activists followed. 
7X Mbulelo Vizikhungo Mzamane, Bavusile Maaba and Nkosinathi Biko, The Black Consciousness 
Movement. in The South African Democracy Education Trust. The Road to Democracy ill South Africa 
Volume 2 (J 97()-198()), Op. Cit, pp. 152-153. 











The University of the North continued to be plagued by student uprisings 
in the early 1970s despite the implementations of the Commission of 
Inquiry in 1972 and the "doctoring" of the SRC's constitution by the 
university management council to suit the latter's stand. The South 
African government was aware that there was no way in which tertiary 
education could function smoothly when the political situation outside the 
university campus was literally explosive. Out of ignorance of some of 
the contributory factors the government appointed a one-man commission 
under Mr. Justice 1. H. Snyman to investigate comprehensively the causes 
of student unrest at the University of the North and to make 
recommendations. The Snyman Commission was appointed after the 
Chairman of the University Council, Professor J. H. van der Merwe, had 
requested the Minister of Bantu Education and Administration to 
investigate the events of 25 September in particular. Events however 
overtook van der Merwe. During the university recess after the aborted 
celebrations the security police arrested Gilbert K. Sedibe, the president 
of the SRC and Pandelani Nefolovhodwe, the immediate past president of 
the SRC and the then newly elected president of SASO.80 When the 
university reopened on the 16 October students held a mass meeting that 
was reportedly attended by about 1 400 students in which a decision to 
march to the nearest police station of Mankweng was taken. In the 
memorandum which they delivered to the police station the students 
demanded the release of Sedibe and Nefolovhodwe. During this melee 
Cyril Ramaphosa, the local SASO chairperson, was arrested, which 
sparked further class boycotts until the intervention of BASA culminated 
in the return of students to their lecture rooms. 81 
X() South African Institute of Race Relations, A Survey of Race Relations in SOllth Africa. J 974, pp. 373-
374. 











The Snyman Commission, appointed in 1974, was SUSpICIOUS of the 
University Christian Movement (UCM), which had paved the way for the 
establishment of SASO. The Commission felt that "UCM's secret 
objective was to train Black people of South Africa for an armed 
revolution against the Whites. ,,82 Spawned in 1968, a year after the 
formation of the UCM congress, SASO only thrived for a few years and 
disbanded in 1971. However, the Student Christian Movement (SCM) 
absorbed most of SASO's membership. Secondly it was recommended 
that BC should be encouraged, as it would eventually lead to support for 
the homeland system that was then being forced on South Africa. 
Interestingly, SASO and its BC adherents denounced the homeland 
system and its leaders at a five-day conference held at St. Peter's 
Seminary in Hammanskraal in January 1974. They criticised in a 
resolution any "purported representation of the Black struggle in the 
country by the so-called leaders of the Bantustans. ,,83 The same criticism 
was repeated by SASO in July 1974 at a conference at St. Ansgars near 
Wilgerspruit in which SASO noted "with grave concern and disgust the 
growing false feeling of relevance of the homeland leaders, the Coloured 
Persons' Representative Council (CPRC), and the S.A. Indian Council 
(SAIC) in Black politics.,,84 The Snyman Commission concurred with the 
students in recommending that the university should be handed over to 
the Blacks to control. 85 This never occurred. 
The political situation at the University of the North was volatile and 
open to political manipulation. The scene was set for infiltration of ANC 
recruits into the university. As a prohibited organisation, how was MK 
Xc 1. G. E. Wolfson, Tllrmoil at Turf/oop. Op Cit., p. 12. 
:: South African Institute of Race Relations, A Survey of Race Relations in SOllth Afi'ica 1974. p. 377. 
Ibid, p. 377. 











able to recruit members, particularly students, here? John D. Brewer later 
suggested that banned organisations which were opposed to the South 
African government had only two options for mobilising inside the 
country. "The first is to piggy-back on those organisations which survived 
the clampdown or whose political activity was not expressly forbidden; 
the second is to utilise some of the platforms and initiatives established 
by the state. ,,86 Cadres of MK earmarked individuals at tertiary 
institutions for recruitment into military and political operations. The 
University of the North was one such institution. s7 In the 1970s the 
overwhelming majority of students at tertiary institutions held only vague 
ideas about the ANC and its underground operations. There were also 
concerns that the BC adherents would usurp the 'lacuna' in internal 
politics and this feeling was fanned by the BC's attitude that "" .the ANC 
was a conservative and apathetic organisation whose non-racial politics 
were inimical to the liberation of black people."s8 
The recruitment of underground MK operatives began in earnest at the 
University of the North in the late 1970s, not only amongst the students 
but also the staff, particularly members of BASA. The fact that 
connections existed among BASA, SASO and different SRCs also 
contributed to the creation of an atmosphere of political awakening and 
interaction. Thabo Makunyane, Collins Chabane, Louis Mnguni, Joyce 
Mashamba, George Mashamba, Peter Mokaba, Jerome Joseph Maake, 
Norman Mashabane, Ngoako Ramatlhodi, Matthews Phosa, Cyril 
Ramaphosa, S'bu Ndebele and Terror Lekota represent some of the 
staff/student leaders who established links with the underground 
Xh John D. Brewer, Critical Choices for South African Society: Black Strategies for Change in a 
CO/lstrained Society. (Cape Town, Institute for the Study of Public Policy, 1989), p. 8. 
X7 See 'The State versus S.J.T.D Ndebele and 3 Others, Case No.51176 in the Supreme Court of South 
Africa, 28 June 1977', National Archives, Pretoria. 
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structures ofMK in the far Northern Transvaa1. 89 University lecturers and 
community activists in the vicinity of the university campus, such as 
Joyce and George Mashamba, Joyce Mabhudafasi and Ndebele, worked 
in tandem with students and members of the community to further the 
objectives of the liberation struggle. They held secret meetings at the 
university campus and discussed the recruitment of students, particularly 
c 
those who held leadership positions in student politics, and ways of 
spiriting them out of the country for training in military combat work 
(MCW) during the university recess. The intention was that they should 
be able to influence others when they returned from military and political 
training in exile without being detected by the police, and also to carry 
out underground political work without attracting any attention. One 
method of carrying out underground political work for MK was to recruit 
members without adopting an overt political posture in student politics. 
Work underground and keep a low political profile - that was MK's 
motto. The individual roles of some of these people will be explained in 
the course of the entire study. In the final analysis, the role that the 
University of the North played was summed up by Colonel Willem 
Johannes van der Merwe of the Pietersburg security branch when he 
made his submission to the TRC Amnesty Committee in 1997. He 
explained: 
In this context the University of the North was the flash-point in the sense 
that a large group of students were concentrated there and it housed a large 
number of students, more than it was destined for and there was a lot of 
political activity taking place there and more specifically undermining 
political activities, and this was aimed against the state.90 
Wi These people were not necessarily students simultaneously at the University of the North but studied 
there in the 1970s. 
911 Colonel Willem Johannes van der Merwe, TRC Amnesty Application WJ 4380/96 Truth and 
Reconciliation COlllmission Amnesty Hearing, 1997 at 











Student recruitment into the ranks of ANC/MK 
At the University of the North, therefore, in the mid-1970s the struggle 
for liberation inside the country was planned and waged by the 
underground cadres of MK in tandem with the regional IPRCs in 
Botswana and Swaziland.91 This is not to imply that no struggles were 
waged in other parts of the country. The major question that needs to be 
answered is: how were the links between exiled organisations such as the 
ANC and MK and operatives in underground cell formations established 
in the first place? How were those linkages sustainable and how was it 
possible for members, who had recently been released from Robben 
Island under severe banning conditions to serve in the underground 
struggles as cogs in the liberation wheels? 
In answenng all these questions it is important to bear in mind Boris 
Ponomarev's advice. Ponomarev, of the Central Committee Secretariat 
(CCS) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), warned 
Moses Kotane and Yusuf Dadoo who were in Moscow to attend the 22nd 
CPSU Congress in 1961 that: 
It is necessary not to counterpoise one form of struggle to the others but to 
combine skilfully all these forms. The armed struggle is a struggle of the 
broad people's masses. It means that in the conditions of the preparation 
for the armed struggle the political work to win the masses acquires 
decisive importance. Without consistent political and organisational work 
among the masses to your side and preparation for the armed struggle are 
two side of the same ~uestion. Both these tasks should be accomplished in 
close interconnection. 2 
The active participation of students and community activists exposed 
them to recruitment into the ranks of MK. The profile that political 
91 Interview with Matthews Phosa, by the author, NeIspruit, MpumaIanga Province, 30 January 2004. 











activists assumed in their various fields in life somehow determined their 
political destinies. Ngoako Ramatlhodi, for example, maintains that the 
change of tactics, from open political engagement to debates and protest 
poetry, at the University of the North where he was a student greatly 
assisted them in warding off the attention of the security police.93 
Accordingly, Clive Glaser advances the argument that, " ... debating 
societies, Christian youth groups, SASM and a cluster of young ex-
Turfloop teachers influenced by Black Consciousness ideology were all 
crucial ingredients in this process.,,94 Ramatlhodi later left the country at 
the tum of the 1970s for Lesotho, where he met Tito Mboweni and Chris 
Hani. Ramatlhodi would travel to Botswana to meet with his MK 
commander, Mongane Wally Serote, for briefings and debriefings. 
Serote, a well known protest poet, advised Ramatlhodi to mask their 
political missions by poetry. 
Just how were recruitments undertaken? Though the stories of recruits 
moving into exile and in a few cases being reinfiltrated into South Africa 
are very intricate and differentiated, some broad patterns can be detected 
and depicted. The first category of recruits comprises those who 
underwent a process of broad political conscientisation before they made 
their decisions to move into exile. Phosa, Makunyane, Ramatlhodi and 
those recruits that enjoyed the privilege of studying at tertiary institutions 
fall into the first category. They were exposed to politics at these 
institutions and when they eventually left the country they had made 
contacts and knew what was in store for them on the other side of the 
fence. Makunyane, for example, was not able to leave the country but 
93 Interview with Ngoako Ramatlhodi, by the author, Polokwane, Limpopo Province, 24 February 
2004. See also Peter Delius, Mpllmalanga: HistolY and Heritage, p. 248 
9~ C. L. Glaser, -Youth Culture and Politics in Soweto, 1958 - 1976', PhD Thesis, University of 











knew ANC members in Lesotho and Botswana.95 When he was arrested 
in 1979 in Venda and sentenced to eight years on Robben Island he was 
distributing ANC leaflets that were denouncing the impending 
independence of the Venda Bantustan.96 Phosa served as an underground 
commander of MK units in and around the Bushbuckridge and Nelspruit 
areas.97 In some cases those MK recruits who left for exile with tertiary 
qualifications or experience (since some were expelled before they could 
finish their studies) were not dispatched back into the country because 
they were needed in the internal structures of both the ANC and MK in 
exile. Another problem was that some had well-developed careers; Phosa~ 
for example~ had enjoyed a distinguished legal career in Nelspruit before 
he left for exile in 1985. Owing to these considerations and others it was 
not always possible to send MK cadres with such profiles back into the 
country as they might be apprehended before they could execute a single 
mISSIOn. 
In some instances political conscientisation took place as a result of~ in 
most cases~ a politically conscious relative~ and a contact with an ANC 
cadre on a recruitment mission~ or a generalised experience of apartheid 
and all its wrongs (mostly engendered by forced removals or police 
brutality). Staying with Makunyane for a while~ he also stemmed from a 
politically conscious family. His mother~s relative Tolamo from 
Sekhukhuneland was in exile with the ANC and she spoke glowingly 
about him. 9R Makunyane~s father was a medical doctor and experienced 
9' Interview with Thabo Makunyane, by Siphamandla Zondi, Polokwane, Limpopo Province, SADET 
Oral History Archives, II May 2002. 
9(, Interview with Ephraim Mogale, by the author, Bronkhorspruit, Gauteng Province 26 & 27 April 
2003. 
97 Interview with Matthews Phosa, by the author, Nelspruit, Mpumalanga Province, 30 January 2004. 
9X Interview with Thabo Makunyane, by Siphamandla Zondi, Polokwane, SADET Oral History 











discrimination in his efforts to practice medicine. Secondly, other 
individuals at some point had been obliged to decide to move into exile. 
The events preceding or informing such a decision are sometimes very 
interesting. Some decisions were taken without any clear idea of what 
actually occurred in exile, and, in the broader sense, of what the ANC 
stood for. The defining feature of this major life decision was most often 
chance and inevitability, rather than extensive deliberation; the need to 
escape the attentions of the security police, for example, was often more 
pressing than an intellectual commitment to the ANC. Tlokwe 
Maserumule left the country under these conditions when his life was 
• 
threatened by the sectIrity police from Middleburg. Unable to track 
Tlokwe down, the security police left a note with his mother which read, 
"Jy praat te veel. Ons het jou gehoor".99 A loose translation would be 
"You talk too much. We have heard you". Tlokwe left for exile in 1981 
without knowing what was in store for him. He was quite sure that he was 
escaping danger from the security police, only to be arrested in 1984 
while on a recruitment mission in the rural far Northern Transvaal. 100 The 
details of this event are related in other chapters. 
Thirdly, in every case, recruits were obliged to make the actual, hair-
raising trip into exile. It is these narratives that are often the most 
gripping, being tales of secrecy, evasion and lurking danger. Fourthly, in 
almost every case, rec~its were received in exile without any clear idea 
of where they were or of what organisation they were joining. As such, 
they all underwent a dual process of screening and political education. 
This became the regular procedure after the poisoning of MK cadres in 
training camps in Angola during the late 1970s. The twin processes were 
99 Interview with Tlokwe Maserumule, by the author, GaMatlala, Limpopo Province, I I July 2002. 











calculated to ward off enemy agents and foster political reorientation after 
years (in some cases) ofBC exposure. 
There was a tendency in MK, particularly owing to the changing political 
fortunes in South Africa, not to overuse any category of recruitment too 
frequently for the purposes of reinfiltration. MK was highly unlikely 
before the late 1980s to reinfiltrate recruits who were known to have had 
a political profile inside the country before they went into exile. 
Operation Vula 'o" which will be discussed later, comprised an exception 
to the norm. This also applied to double agents who happened to leave the 
security police after suspecting that their cover was going to be blown. 
Malaza Siphithi Vincent was an underground MK operative working for 
the South African security police, under the guardianship of Eugene de 
Kock of the notorious Vlakplaas unit.
,o2 
Malaza was a regular visitor to 
the ANC in Swaziland, not knowing that his colleagues in the security 
police were watching him. In the late 1980s Malaza disappeared from the 
security police while on a mission in Swaziland to lure his contacts in 
MK to a trap set up by Eugene de Kock, amongst other top brass of the 
Vlakplaas security police unit. The details of his double loyalty and its 
repercussions will be discussed in relevant sections. 
Combinations of recruitment strategies were employed at different times 
for different people. Individual experiences of recruitment into 
underground political activism consequently vary. A major discovery of 
underground ANC/MK operations in the rural Northern Transvaal took 
[01 For a brief discussion of Operation Vul 'indlela (Operation Vula) see Barrell's "Conscript to Their 
Age: ANC Operational Strategy, 1976-1986", PhD Dissertation, Gp. Cit, pp. 445-6. 












place on the arrest of S 'bu Ndebele in May 1976. Ndebele was a librarian 
at the University of Swaziland where he worked in the same capacity at 
the University of the North before he was "deployed" to the University of 
Swaziland to serve as a link with the Swaziland-based RIPRC and other 
recruits from all over the country. Ndebele had been a student activist in 
SASO politics at the University of Natal before he was employed by the 
University of the North in 1973 as a librarian. His connections with the 
people of the rural Northern Transvaal in the underground revolutionary 
struggle, such as Joyce and George Mashamba, and Patrick E. Tshabalala, 
had been established before his deployment in Swaziland. ,o3 George was 
a lecturer in the philosophy department while his wife (Joyce) was a 
student at the time. Rejoice Mabhudafasi was employed as a librarian at 
the University of the North and also collaborated with Ndebele in the 
underground cells of the ANC. 104 Frequent visits to Swaziland by the 
Mashambas for consultations with the ANC were facilitated when 
Ndebele relocated to the University of Swaziland. Ndebele and his 
contacts at the University of the North, such as the Mashambas and other 
members of the community, were eventually arrested for creating 
underground cells and recruiting people for military and political training 
under the banner of the outlawed ANC. 105 Secret meetings on the ANC 
and underground political work were held together with George. 
The importance of the arrests ofNdebele, George Mashamba and his wife 
Joyce lay in the fact that they revealed that much organisational 
111.1 For Ndebele's role see Gregory Houston and Bernard Magubane's Chapter The ANC Political 
Underground in the 1970s in The South African Democracy Education Trust, The Road to Den10cracT 
ill South AIi'iea Vo/uflle 2 (1970-1980), Gp. Cit, pp. 429-430. 
10.) Interview with Rejoice Mabhudafasi, by the author, Johannesburg International Airport, Gauteng 
Province, 16 March 2004. 
10' National Archives, 'State Versus S J T Ndebele and three others, Judgment in the Supreme Court of 











underground work was taking place in the rural Northern Transvaal. It 
was vital for the organisation to be able to make use of Ndebele who 
hailed from Natal, with connections in the rural Northern Transvaal based 
in Swaziland. The constant trips undertaken by the Mashambas to 
Swaziland to liaise with the ANC culminated in the recruitment of many 
people who also recruited others into the internal underground structures 
of the ANC in the Northern Transvaal. The advantageous position of the 
Mashambas at the University of the North assisted them in liaising with 
people such as Obed Tshukudu (also known as Super), Molefe Patrick 
Lemmy Mogodi and others such as Louis Mnguni, who became 
prominent in the UDF in the 1980s. 106 Their arrest was a temporary 
setback to the underground operations in the region. 
Matters were beginning to move faster outside the university as well. The 
arrest and subsequent trial and conviction of Tokyo Sexwale and eleven 
others in 1977 brought to light the existence of networks of MK cadres 
who were already recruiting people for military training, even in the 
heartland of the rural Northern Transvaal, and particularly III 
Sekhukhuneland. 107 The fact that newly released former Robben Island 
prisoners such as Nelson Diale and Peter (Petrus) Nchabeleng were 
amongst those charged in Sexwale's case as co-accused was a clear 
indication that an underground network existed. Naledi Tsiki was a 
member of that underground network who was arrested together with 
Tokyo Sexwale, for blowing up the Pietersburg-Pretoria railway line in 
106 Interview with Louis Mnguni, by the author, Arcadia, Pretoria, Gauteng Province, II February 
2003. 
107 Michael Lobban, White Man's Justice: South Afi-ican Political Trails in the Black Consciousness 
Era, Op Cit .. p. 200. See also, National Archives, 'State versus Sexwale and eleven others, the 












the rural Northern Transvaal village of Dikgale on 26 October 1976: a 
clear sign of MK activities in the area. The success of Tsiki' s mission 
even during the heightened security situation after 16 June 1976, offered 
another clear indication that meticulous assessment of the situation and 
planning had been carried out. The question of how the ordnance used by 
Tsiki in sabotaging the railway line in Pietersburg arrived in the country 
will be answered later when the mechanisms for storing weapons are 
described. 
The high concentration of community leaders such as academics, ex-
Robben Island political prisoners and student leaders in one area of the 
rural Northern Transvaal assisted in the reawakening of suppressed 
political sentiments. At the University of the North leaders were produced 
not from the hallowed lecture rooms but in the dimly lighted rooms of 
residential hostels and neighbouring villages. From the university student 
leaders were able to interact with members of the CaSAS as early as 
1979, after the formation of that student formation and other 
organisations that were ostensibly non-political. 108 These interactions 
amongst ANC-aligned organisations became the norm in the 1980s, 
during which new methods of replenishing arrested activists were also 
crafted and perfected. 
In summary, the role that the University of the North played in 
radicalizing people in the region contributed to the success of most of the 
MK underground operations in the rural Northern Transvaal. As R. W. 
Johnson argues, "There is no recorded instance of a guerrilla war being 












successfully waged without the benefit of a sanctuary;"ID9 hence the 
University of the North could be regarded as a "sanctuary" and reservoir 
for MK underground cadres for the whole of this region. The fact that the 
majority of people who ended up in the ranks of MK were at some stage 
of their lives students, or members of either the administration or 
academic staff at the University of the North, lends credence to this 
assertion. IID The environment as regards recruitment was aided by the 
realization, which became predominant in the 1980s, that the primary 
concern amongst political activists was the defeat of apartheid rather than 
ideological purity. No ideological contradiction existed when a BCM 
adherent joined either the ANC or the PAC because: 
The BCM was explicitly non-aligned politically. Apart from the fact that it 
was legally dangerous to do so, the BCM consciously avoided favouring 
either the ANC or the PAC. It saw itself as a movement to regenerate and 
regroup internal resistance. The secret allegiance of affiliated members 
were (sic) irrelevant as long as they committed themselves to forging black 
. 111 Unity. 
This is not to deny that ideological conflicts did culminate in clear 
divisions amongst the student and staff population at the University of the 
North. Like the rest of the country, the northern part of South Africa was 
populated by variant political formations opposed to the ANC. 
MK recruitment methodologies 
Anyone with any practical knowledge of guerrilla warfare knows that it is 
relatively easy for the individual to take to the jungle, immensely more 
difficult for him to come out again - unless it is as a defector, with the 
!II'I R. W. Johnson. How LOllg Will South Africa Survive? (New York. Oxford University Press. 1977). 
p. 301. 
1111 Almost all members ofMK in the study interacted in some way with the University of the North at 
some stage of their political awakening and maturity. 











. f h . C 112 conl11vance 0 t e secunty lorces. 
Douglas Hyde's assertion runs contrary to MK's recruitment strategies in 
many ways. Recruitment was not necessarily a prelude to the "jungle". It 
depended on the objectives. The recruits could enter and leave the 
"jungle" with relative ease, not relying on collusion with the security 
forces. People were recruited internally to distribute pamphlets, to paint 
slogans or write graffiti on a voluntary basis. Recruiters were not obliged 
to explain the liberation organisation or political message that was 
conveyed. The crux of the ethos is pertinently described by Raymond 
Suttner thus: 
People worked on the principle of 'need to know', that is, one person may 
have interacted with X with regard to one activity, but X ought not to have 
known that that person also related to Y but in connection other 
. .. 113 
activities. 
Capability, commitment, interest and loyalty in the execution of these 
tasks would normally lead to further discussions, until the recruiters were 
fully convinced that they could move into other stages of recruitment, 
such as engaging the recruits in potentially threatening conditions, by 
way of example, the revelation of the recruiter's political affiliation or 
ideological persuasion. For instance, some people were recruited into the 
structures of MK without being told that they were part of MK.114 This 
was not an aberration but an operational requirement that was informed 
by the material conditions of the time. The extent and scope of the 
missions assigned to potential recruits varied and in most cases depended 
112 Douglas Hyde, The Roots ofGlIerrilla Warfare, (Sydney, Bodley Head, 1968), p. 150. 
I" Raymond Suttner, 'The Character of ANC/SACP Underground Work - Possible Imprint on the 
Present'?' Unpublished Paper, Conference on 10th Years of Democracy, University of South Africa, 
Pretoria, August 2004, p. 4. 











on the level of (assumed) commitment that recruits demonstrated m a 
particular situation. This explains, for instance, why Edward Feit 
(although he was referring to the period 1960-1964) arrived at the 
conclusion that no particular patterns were rigidly adhered to, although 
time and again the leadership would lay down some general guidelines as 
dictated by the local conditions. I IS Manifestly, the recruitment process 
was more complex than Hyde intimates. The primary cause of this 
complexity was the mistrust and lurking dangers that surrounded the 
entire process. Those cadres who were assigned the tasks of recruitment, 
amongst other obligations, did not readily trust those whom they tried to 
recruit. Suttner again elucidates: 
The process of recruitment and deployment generally did not provide or 
allow the opportunity for monitoring operatives on a personal level. People 
may have changed over time and in the response to what they experienced. 
They may have experienced psychological difficulties. A process of 
disillusionment or demoralisation may have rooted itself somewhere 
within some people's consciousness and those who deployed particular 
operatives may have been unaware of this. A problem may have been 
lurking or emerged unobserved, only to have decisive effect in moments of 
d 
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stress or anger or mactIvlty or alter arrest. 
No hard and fast rules existed concernmg the choice of potential MK 
cadres who were to be recruited. There were, however, standard 
requirements that recruits were expected to meet depending on the task 
that recruiters had in mind for them. It did not matter whether the recruits 
were needed for operations that were not directly planned from exile. 
Internal operations carried out by units of MK were in most cases carried 
out without the supervision of the MK leadership, for many and varied 
reasons. The struggle needed to be carried forward; and to expect daily 
II' Edward Feit, Urhan Revolt in South Afi·ica. 1960 - 1964, (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 
1975), p. 217. 
116 Raymond Suttner, 'The Character of ANC/SACP Underground Work - Possible Imprint on the 











instructions on events that were unfolding rapidly inside the country was 
practically counterproductive and not feasible. This does not signify that 
MK took no accountability for operations. Caution was always needed in 
such cases so that the security of missions and MK cadres was never 
compromised. MK had guidelines on mission inside the country but 
common sense was always encouraged when MK cadres were on 
mIssIOns. 
Jean Middleton avers that inasmuch as it was difficult to recruit people 
into banned organisations, there were mechanisms also in those 
organisations where recruits were carefully observed before they would 
be ultimately enlisted. 117 Middleton further reveals that the cadres who 
were responsible for recruitment would sometimes approach those whom 
they knew for this purpose. I IS This explains why in most cases, people 
who knew each other swelled the ranks of the liberation movements. 
However, another facet of this phenomenon is evident where, in some 
cases, members of the same household ended up in the ranks of the 
liberation movement because the police force harassed them in pursuing 
one member of the family who may have joined the liberation 
movement. I 19 
The internal process of recruitment of cadres for military training was 
mostly undertaken in secrecy because MK was an outlawed organisation. 
Recruitment was also fraught with serious risks that involved loss of limb 
or life. It is reasonable to assume that no government will ever exist that 
II' Jean Middleton. COllvictions: A Woman Political Prisoner Remember. (Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 
1998). p. 12. 
IIX Ihid, p. 12. 
lie) The point was made clear by Cassius Motsoaledi whose father was on Robben Island; the security 
police persecuted the family and ordered Motsoaledi to report to the local police station every day 











will complacently observe people recruiting against it. Recruitment for 
internal operations that were propagandistic in nature did not require 
extensive and elaborate discussions about organisation manifestos and 
policies, nor lengthy debates about the mechanisms of and the dangers 
immanent in such secret undertakings. A high degree of moral 
commitment and integrity kept recruits going for they knew the dangers 
of lapses in security precautions and discretion, particularly those who 
had joined the struggle in pre-Rivonia trial times. Robben Island, death 
and a life of being maimed constituted the immediate possible destinies. 
Nevertheless, people risked their lives in the face of these life-threatening 
hazards. The determination of MK cadres to wage armed warfare against 
the South African government was summed up by its first commander, 
Nelson Mandela. Addressing a conference of the Pan-African Freedom 
Movement of East and Central Africa in Addis Ababa in January 1962, 
Mandela clarified: 
It was now clear that this was a political demonstration of a formidable 
kind. It was still a small beginning because a government as strong as 
South Africa can never be induced to part with political power by bomb 
explosions in one night and in three cities only. But in a country where 
freedom fighters frequently pay with their very lives ... planned acts of 
sabotage against government installations introduced a new phase in the 
politic~l si.tuation .and are a demonstration of the p~?Rles' unshakable 
determinatIon to Win freedom whatever the cost may be. -
The sentiments expressed by Mandela reflected the balance of the forces 
that had locked horns in the protracted South African war: the South 
African security forces with their sophisticated military weaponry versus 
MK's unshakable political determination and minimal weaponry. On the 
one hand, the South African government followed internationally 
lell 'Comrades in Arms.' Work ill Progress. Number 62 & 63 (double edition), November/December 











acceptable recruitment procedures coupled with military conscription for 
those who refused to join the national defence force, while on the other 
MK clandestinely recruited those who took it upon themselves to join the 
crusade against the obnoxious system that was founded on racial 
prejudice, sustained by racial hatred and perpetuated by racial bigotry -
apartheid. 
Recruitment into the ranks of MK had usually differed from one unit or 
individual to another since its inception. The following examples will 
demonstrate this point. Feit states that the South African Council of Trade 
Unions (SACTU) became a reservoir for MK's underground activities in 
the early 1960s after the banning of the ANC. He maintains that, "the 
Management Committee of SACTU and the NCC had agreed that 
SACTU was to be responsible for steering the recruiting campaign 
through factory committees, the campaign to be a national one.,,121 The 
NCC was the National Continuation Committee formed after the banning 
of the ANC in 1960 to continue the work that the ANC had been doing 
before the banning. It comprised the Indian Congress, Congress of 
Democrats, Coloured People's Congress and SACTU. The fact that 
SACTU would organise for MK at the factory level left the entire work of 
organising outside the factories to the Congress Alliance (CA). It was on 
this basis that SACTU took a decision at its 1961 conference to make the 
recruitment of people into the structures of MK a priority. 122 Also at that 
conference the modalities of recruitment were discussed. It was decided 
that every sector of the community should be approached, with the 
intention of recruiting people for training. The formation of local 
committees, area committees, regional committees and what would now 
121 Edward Feit, Workers without Weapons: The South African COl1gress of Trade Unions and the 
Organi::ation of the A/i'ican Workers, (Connecticut, Archon Books, 1975), pp. 162 - 163. 











be called provincial committees were also discussed. The power assigned 
to each structure was commensurate with the level that each structure 
occupied in the hierarchy of MK. This all-encompassing approach to 
recruitment became fashionable in the 1980s until the demise of 
apartheid. 
When MK was officially launched on December 16, 1961, the National 
High Command, Provincial Command, Regional Command and so forth 
wielded power in that order. There was no way in which a local unit of 
MK could take a major decision with far-reaching consequences without 
the approval of a higher structure. However, the level of secrecy under 
which the struggle was waged allowed aberrations in this pecking order. 
Individual decisions were sometimes taken depending on the material 
conditions prevailing in a particular environment. The pressing issue was 
not how to organise MK properly but how to arrange for members to 
continue the sabotage campaigns and to train abroad. 123 This situation 
altered when the MK leadership operated from exile, directing missions 
inside the country. 
The biggest issue concerned the kind of people needed for training. The 
National High Command of MK had declared in 1962 that only potential 
recruits whose ages ranged from sixteen to thirty years and who 
possessed the minimum qualification of a Junior Certificate (JC) were 
needed. 124 This educational requirement proved to be a tall order as few 
African men had been educated to that extent during those years. When 
Joe Qgabi visited Natal at the beginning of 1963 he was informed that the 
only difficulty in recruitment was the educational regulation; hence he 
I" -' Bruno Mtolo, UlI1khonto we Sizwe: The Road to the Left, (Durban, Drakensberg Press, 1966), p. 34. 











subsequently advised the Natal Regional Command that they could 
overlook such a requirement. 125 The underlying motivation behind it was 
the fact that if the National High Command recruited everybody for 
training abroad the language might prove a barrier as a result of an 
inability to comprehend and speak in English. Only when interpreters 
were obtained was this requirement waived. This educational requirement 
could not be strictly adhered to, for obvious reasons. What does one do 
with a person who arrives at a camp in exile with no educational 
qualifications, yet having evaded the security police that were suspecting 
him of MK membership? Some of these recruits in fact left South Africa 
without any form of formal schooling but distinguished themselves in 
combat with enemy agents or their surrogates in neighbouring 
. 126 countnes. 
The security police clampdown on political activities hindered the 
process of recruitment as outlined above. The enactment of the "90 days 
law" in May 1963 assisted the South African government to arrest 
suspects for acts of sabotage and inadvertently heralded a new phase of 
MK recruitment that was relatively sophisticated. 127 Other means of 
recruitment were embarked on, including individual approaches. Several 
such anecdotes exist. Flag Boshielo recruited John Nkadimeng into the 
ANC and SACP and they later worked in MK.128 Through contacts like 
these Nkadimeng came to playa prominent role during the late 1970s in 
Swaziland when he became a member of the regional IPRC there after he 
Ie' Ibid, p. 215. 
I eh Shepherd Malinga who left for exile as a young boy fits the description quite well. For details see 
about his military bravery see Makhanda Senzangakhona et aI, 'Umkhonto we Sizwe: Within Living 
Memories (Part 3), Umrabulo. No. 15, July 2002, p. 60. 
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le~ Interview with John Kgaona Nkadimeng, by Sifiso Ndlovu and Siphamandla Zondi, SADET Oral 











had left for exile in 1976. Nkadimeng was not new to the liberation 
struggle. Salient points in his political career include the following: his 
seminal role in the formation of the Sebatakgomo Movement in 
Sekhukhune in 1953; his secretaryship of the ad hoc committee that was 
tasked by the ANC to coordinate all rural revolts inside the country; his 
attendance at a consultative meeting with the ANC in Lobatse, Botswana, 
in 1961 in which he met with Chris Hani and Andrew Masondo amongst 
others and learnt how to wage the underground struggle under conditions 
of illegality; and his imprisonment in 1964 at Stofberg prison in the Free 
179 State for two years. ~ 
The dangers of recruiting people without circumspection are patent and 
the High Command of MK was well aware of them. It was suicidal to 
disclose the intentions of the recruitment campaign to every person who 
was approached with recruitment in mind. For instance, Mogaramedi 
Godfrey Sekhukhune, an MK cadre in the rural Northern Transvaal area 
of Sekhukhune, recruited Christopher Tolo for military/educational 
training from this area in the early 1960s. Sekhukhune was working in 
consultation with Elias Motsoaledi who would either arrive personally to 
collect recruits or dispatch an emissary.130 Tolo developed cold feet on 
the day of the appointed departure when MK officials came to collect him 
and others from Jane Furse Memorial Hospital in 1963. 131 This was very 
disturbing. The MK officials threatened that if he told anybody what he 
had learnt about his recruitment they would come back for him. This 
admonition was not good enough. What if Tolo revealed the whole story 
Ie'! Ibid. 
1311 Elias Motsoaledi became one of those who were eventually arrested after the apprehending of the 
National High Command in 1963 at Rivonia, Johannesburg. He was sentenced together with others to 
life imprisonment on Robben Island. 
111 Interview with Shadrack Moetanalo, by the author, Madibong, Sekhukhuneland, Limpopo Province. 











of who recruited him, with whom he had been recruited, where he was 
going and for what reason? These are some of the factors that were not 
taken into account when Sekhukhune recruited Tolo, Shadrack 
Moetanalo, Brian Kabini, Tumi Matabane, Michael Mashupye and Moses 
Basset. Sekhukhune was not aware that Tolo would renege on his 
commitment to take up the cudgels against apartheid. However, it is 
probable that Tolo was not told the whole truth. This assumption is borne 
out by his would-be colleague Moetanalo's experience. They were 
recruited together by Sekhukhune and it is unlikely that Tolo could have 
known a lot about MK more than Moetanalo because Moetanalo was a 
"personal assistant" of Sekhukhune. '32 It is possible that both of them 
knew relatively little about MK and its operations at the time. Besides, 
this period was still an early phase in the life of MK. 
Moetanalo left the country in 1963 in the hope that he would be back 
within six months after training. Unbeknown to him he would live in 
exile until 1990, when the ANC was unbanned by the South African 
government. The ANC did not prevent him from returning; in fact, he 
was expelled for supporting Tennyson Makiwane's "Gang of Eight.,,'33 
Moetanalo did not return home after his expulsion because he suspected 
that the South African government would not believe his story of 
expulsion, and besides it was unlawful to leave the country as he had 
done. Basset and Mashupye died on the battlefield while Kabini and 
Matabane are still alive and active in ANC politics. 134 Tolo's case and the 
reservations of Sekhukhune in recruiting him were not unique. The 
132 Ihid. 8 October 2002. 
13.' The "Gang of Eight" was a group of senior ANC/MK officials who were expelled by the ANC for 
bringing the organisation into disrepute. 












ANC/MK axis was beset with the same problems throughout its years of 
military and political engagement with the South African government. 
Underground political work, as Middleton observed, allowed one little 
opportunity to study and discuss political doctrines. 135 
The 1970s brought a new approach to MK recruitment along with the 
release of MK cadres from Robben Island in the early 1970s such as 
Nelson Diale, Peter Nchabeleng, Morris Matsimela, Joel Ntsoane and the 
return into the country of individuals on recruitment missions. The 
upsurge in political awareness and police brutality in the 1970s as a result 
of the government's inability to contain political anxieties brought with it 
new patterns of recruitment of people who were bound for military 
training in exile. As one example, an MK recruiter called Ike approached 
Stanley Mathabatha and Tito Manthata at Boapara-Nkwe School for the 
Sons of Chiefs. 136 Ike knew Tito because his (Tito) mother stemmed from 
Botswana and Tito had relatives in Swaziland too. Both Ike and Tito had 
met in exile when Tito was visiting his mother's relatives. Tito invited 
Ike to visit him at Boapara-Nkwe when he was inside the country on a 
recruitment mission. Tito also invited his friend, Stanley, to meet his 
"cousin". Boapara-Nkwe was a school in the former Lebowa Bantustan 
that catered for male sons of chiefs only. Although Stanley is not a direct 
heir to the throne of the Mathabatha chiefdom in the present-day 
Limpopo province he qualified for the school on the basis that his 
ancestral roots are traceable to the Mathabatha nobility. His father's 
position as an educator of note in the area might also have contributed to 
his admission to this exclusive school. Tito was an heir apparent of the 
Manthata chiefdom in the rural Northern Transvaal. 
1.,< Jean Middleton, Convictions: A Woman Political Prisoner Rememhers, Op Cit., p. 63. 











When Tito and Stanley spoke with Ike over a container of morula 
(traditional beer) in Makompong at the Tompi Seleka College of 
Agriculture in the early 1970s (both the School and the College were in 
the same vicinity) Ike delivered a political lecture to them as a way of 
recruiting them into the underground structures of MK. He knew that 
there would be no danger in doing so because Tito had met him 
previously. Tito and Stanley were able to travel during the school 
holidays, with the assistance of Ike, to eMawelawela in Swaziland for 
MCW. 137 Stanley learnt later that Ike had died in Swaziland, while Tito 
became a highly trained MK cadre who was later arrested at the 
beginning of 1984 after entering the country on military and political 
missions. '3R Tito's arrest coincided with that of Tlokwe: they were 
dispatched together into the country using different routes but the plan 
was to meet later inside South Africa and take stock of their missions. 
However, Stanley remained, to act as a hub for the underground 
operations of MK in the rural Northern Transvaal particularly in the 
1980s but was eventually arrested in the late 1980s (amongst other 
arrests) as part of Operation Vula. '39 His underground roles included 
facilitating the missions of deployed MK cadres inside the country by 
assisting them to locate dead letter boxes (DLBs); meeting with MK 
stalwarts and reputable community leaders who might assist in the 
struggle without formally joining the ANC/MK; and recruiting new 
members, not necessarily for MK only, but also for the ANC-aligned 
political formations, particularly in the 1980s. 
I.,C Ibid. 2 August 2002. 
I." Interview with Tlokwe Maserumule, by the author, GaMatlala, Limpopo Province. II July 2002. 











MK now embarked on individual recruitment amongst people who 
somehow knew each other or whom the recruiters without their 
knowledge had earmarked. This was the case with Amos Lubisi (Charles 
Ngidi) of Tonga, Komatipoort who had been recruited by his nephew 
O'Lubisi Vladimir Kyich Ulvanov Raul as early as 1974. 140 As in most 
cases the recruitment of Lubisi by his nephew was not as cautious as it 
should have been. Lubisi would be relied upon when taking MK recruits 
out or inside the country but would not know about them or their 
missions. Raul, a member of the underground MK operations infiltrated 
into the country, wished to use his uncle's knowledge of the routes to 
Swaziland and back to spirit recruits out of the country and to assist those 
who were returning on military/political missions to carry out their tasks 
with relative ease. 141 After working underground for a stint Lubisi left the 
country unprepared when three MK cadres (Tokyo Sexwale, Robert 
Manci and a third person whose identity remains shrouded in secrecy) 
were caught in a "Bordergate incident" in which Constable Brits and 
Sergeant Khoza were injured when Sexwale threw a hand grenade at 
them. The MK men were being transported in a police Land Rover after 
refusing to open their luggage under the pretext that they had no keys.142 
Lubisi left the country abruptly when all three escaped into Swaziland 
and was given a lift by Norman Tshabalala who was driving a Combi 
from Alexandra; the latter was a member of a unit that was transporting 
recruits out of the country into Swaziland. Lubisi was to stay and work on 
the Mazimbu and Mbeya agricultural farms in Tanzania until 1995 when 
he returned to South Africa. 
14(1 Interview with Amos Lubisi, by the author, eMankwene, Komatipoort, Mpumalanga Province, 4 
October 2002. 
141 Peter Delius, Historl' and Heritage., Op. Cit., p. 246. 
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Thousands of people were not recruited into the ranks of ANC/MK but 
found themselves destined to join these forces largely because of the 
intolerable conditions brought about by police brutality. This tendency 
occurred well into the late 1980s, when the ANC/MK decided to 
discourage recruits from going into exile. After 1986 the focus changed 
from external to internal training. 143 The receiving environment was 
beginning to burst at the seams and as an alternative internal 
military/political training was encouraged. Another category of people 
allegedly committed crimes that had nothing to do with politics. When 
they were about to be charged in court as suspects it was fashionable to 
cross the borders into exile. For example, a pickpocket and an 
Ensindisweni Primary School learner from Mhluzi Township In 
Middleburg, Mpumalanga province, Dannyboy Rufus Lengoati (also 
Ngoma), left the country in 1976 for an exile completely apolitical. 
Dannyboy lied about his academic qualifications when he chose to 
continue with his education in Nigeria and eventually suffered 
"depressive psychosis" in exile. To this end Dannyboy reveals: 
... and this uncle of mine, Ben and company, they were in SASM, the 
South African Student Organisation (sic). So, you see. I too was arrested. I 
came out with a bail of two hundred rand. But then my uncle told me that 
we should leave the country in December. We should run away. So, we 
left the country in 1976, you see. We (were) supposed to have gone to 
court on the 19th of January 1977. And on the 19th of January (1977) we 
were arriving in Tanzania from Mozambique, you see. There I studied in 
Nigeria until I completed my matric. There after I went to East Germany 
where I was intending to study pedagogics (pedagogy). But unfortunately 
I got the mental breakdown in Germany in 1981, January ... 144 
1-1' Maphai Vincent. Resistance ill South Afhca: Azapo alld the Natiollal ForulI1. ([S.I.:s.n.l. 1987). p. 4. 
1-1-1 Interview with Oannyboy Lengoati. by the author and Sella Mathabatha. Kilimanjaro Guest House. 











Ben Mokoena, to whom Dannyboy is referring, confirms that indeed 
Dannyboy was arrested not for any political reason but owing to his 
criminal pit-pocketing activities, for which he was to appear in court. 145 
When the Mhluzi group (Ben Mokoena, Dannyboy Lengoati, Tsietsi 
Tolo, January Masilela, Vuvu Mndebele, Vusi Sindane, Solly Makwakwa 
and many others from Middleburg's township of Mhluzi) left for exile in 
two batches (1975 and 1976) difficulties were experienced that could 
have scuppered the entire mission of going into exile and coming back to 
fight the war of liberation. Solly Makwakwa was sent back home to 
Mhluzi, Middleburg to take into exile a youngster who had been left 
behind when the rest of the group departed. '46 It was feared that if the 
police apprehended him he would spill the beans about those who were 
still inside the country recruiting others to leave it for military training. 
Richard Moale failed to leave with the 1976 group of Ben Mokoena and 
Jabu Sindane because he did not tum up as had been agreed. It was 
possible that the police were aware of their impending move into exile 
and had pounced on him in his sleep before he could leave the next day in 
1975 or 1976. Ben Mokoena and Jabu Sindane were obliged to leave 
"unceremoniously" to avoid what was probably happening to Richard 
Moale. 
When the 1975 group left for Swaziland the whole of Mhluzi Township 
was abuzz with the news that January Masilela and company had 
departed; the police, knowing that they had friends in the area, started 
persecuting the latter. When this behaviour failed to elicit any positive 
I~' Ibid .. 8 July 2002. 












response from the suspected recruits the security police entered 
Swaziland themselves and arranged with the Swazi royal police that the 
Mhluzi township group recruits should be brought back to South Africa 
so as to be united with their parents. Before the death of King Sobhuza 
(1983) the Swazi royal police were lenient with the South African 
political refugees. They would nonnally hand them over to the United 
Nations agency responsible for political refugees in Swaziland. The South 
African police traveled to Swaziland together with some of these recruits' 
parents to convince them to abandon their dreams of joining the liberation 
crusade. 147 The South African police failed, even though they had 
organised free transport for the recruits to come home. 148 None other than 
some members of the Swaziland royal police discouraged the recruits 
from returning to South Africa with the South African security 
policemen, fearing the worst for them. 
Conclusion 
The dawn of the 1970s signaled a new beginning in the fight against the 
system of apartheid. It was a decade of many major political events that 
were unfolding in Southern Africa. The attainment of freedom by 
Southern African countries such as Mozambique and Angola opened the 
floodgates of enthusiasm for joining the liberation movements in exile. It 
was also in the early 1970s that the South African government started 
releasing people who were serving on Robben Island for political 
14" Interview with Mdebele Vuvu, by the author, Middleburg South African National Defense Force 
(SANDF). Provincial Headquarters, Mpumalanga Province, 26 February 2003. 











activities that were administratively classified as criminal. 149 On a 
national scale the political trial of Winnie Mandela, Samson Ndou and 22 
others at the end of the 1960s and early 1970s heralded a new beginning 
for South African resistance politics. The arrests of James Edward April, 
Alexander Moumbaris and Ranka Theophillus Chokwe also impacted on 
the "political lull" that had engulfed the country until then. These arrests 
rekindled the faltering hope that had engulfed the South African political 
scene after the apprehension of the first MK High Command at Rivonia 
in the early 1960s. Matters, however, changed for the better with the 
ANC's establishment of the RC in 1969 after the Morogoro Consultative 
Conference. Criticisms that the exiled leadership of the ANC and MK 
were accustomed to the comfort of exile and were therefore neglecting 
the liberation struggle on the home front jolted the movement into 
action. 150 Throughout the years the regional structures of MK in 
neighbouring countries were able to give an account of their activities and 
operations. 151 The processes of recruitment for MK underground 
activities were tried and tested throughout the 1960 and 1970s. The 
concentration of students at the University of the North and their contacts 
in exile assisted in the process of MK underground recruitment. The 
rapport that existed between the students and some university staff such 
as George Mashamba and Rejoice Mabhudafasi as well as their 
interaction with the University of Swaziland based S 'bu Ndebele assisted 
in casting the recruitment net wide in the rural Northern Transvaal. Care 
was taken to regard one process as perfect for fear that the security police 
I~" Archival records classify "political crimes" committed by members of the liberation organisations 
under the criminal category. 
15(1 For criticisms of the ANC and MK see Nhlanhla Ndebele and Noor Nieftagodien's Chapter, 'The 
Morogoro Conference: A Moment of Self-Reflection' in South African Democracy Education Trust, 
The Road to Democracy in South Aji'ica, Volume 1, (l96()-197()), Op Cit., pp. 587-9. 
1'1 For example, the' 1987 Military Report' and the' 1988 Annual Military Programme' attest to the 
fact that MK took stock of operations that were taking place in the Frontline State. For details see Jack 











were going to know about it and use it against MK potential recruits. 
However, recruitment trends were established in the rank of trade unions, 
family members and people who left for exile after fearing for their own 
safety in South Africa. 
The outbreak of the Soweto uprising in June 16, 1976 and its subsequent 
spill-over effect into other areas, the increased level of political 
consciousness and the disruption of people's lives as a result of police 
brutality raised political awareness to such heights that MK recruiters 
experienced a field day.152 This explains why most of the people who will 
be discussed in the following chapters were recruited into the 
underground structures of MK and continued to serve the organisation 
until the turn of the 1970s when most of them left the country to pursue 
their political aspirations. These future MK cadres graduated from the 
University of the North's underground political cells and were able to 
link up with community organisations in their respective localities. A 
contingent of MK cadres was able to identify and recruit these student 
activists and teach them the strategies and techniques of operating the 
liberation struggle clandestinely. 












The Shattering of a Hope and the Road to Exile - the Late 1970s to 
1983 
The mood of optimism that had gripped South Africa after the political 
emancipation of Angola and Mozambique,IS3 the turning point in the 
political fortunes of Black people as a result of the outbreak of the 
Soweto student uprisings on June 16 1976 and the tentative steps towards 
armed propaganda warfare came to an abrupt end when the government 
clamped down on these political aspirations. The South African 
government was no novice in its brutality towards her political 
opponents. Portents of this had been noticed by the international 
community before 1976. It was no surprise that the then Tanzanian 
President, Julius Nyerere, told a meeting at Oxford University in England 
in 1975 that South Africa was a tyranny. He went on to state that it was 
not the only tyrannical police state in the world, or even in Africa, there 
were too many of them. The difference was that South Africa's brutality 
against its political opponents was legislated and therefore carried out 
with impunity. Hardly a year thereafter, Oliver Tambo, the acting 
president of the ANC, had reflected on the situation in South Africa, 
particularly after the 1976 Soweto student revolts. Tambo acknowledged 
the difficult period ushercd in after this episode. He lamented, "We are 
entering a very difficult period in our history. Many more of our people 
will be called upon to make the supreme sacrifice. The enemy himself 
will throw in everything he has in order to ensure our destruction. 
15; See the description of the mood of jubilation in Sampie Terreblanche's A History of inequality ill 











Victory, however, IS certain.,,154 Tambo could not have been more 
accurate. 
Pursuant to Tambo's premonitory statement, this study traces the steps 
taken by individual political activists in the late 1970s when the 
underground world collapsed on them. In the rural Northern Transvaal 
most of these political activists of the banned ANC/MK were still 
students at the University of the North. There were also those rurally 
based political activists who had links with other MK cadres operating 
under the same conditions elsewhere in urban areas. Regarding these, 
poignant questions abound. What happened to the cadres in this melee 
that was unleashed by the 16 June 1976 insurrections? How did they 
manage to reach their destinations in exile? How did those who chose to 
remain inside the country survive in their clandestine obligations to 
pursue the liberation struggle? Additionally, the study explores (albeit 
superficially) the situation in exile with regard to the operations of the 
RC and how it counteracted the South African government's stratagems 
and tactics. Was the RC ready to carry out its tasks or was it caught 
napping by the events of 1976 onwards? This question constitutes the 
focus of this chapter. 
Those ANC recruits who left the country knew that the heart of the 
liberation struggle was inside South Africa. They went into exile for 
military and political training purposes. They were informed in exile that 
the masses of the oppressed people inside the country represented the 
cogs of the liberation struggle. Trained MK cadres were merely the 
1'4 Romesh Chandra, The Soweto Uprising - Heralding South Afi'ica '.I' Da \\'/1 , World Peace Council and 











wheels that propelled the freedom struggle towards its destination. 155 In 
this chapter the role of individuals or groups of people in the 1970s and 
early 1980s is outlined, with the intention of pointing out the extent to 
which the ANC/MK was deeply rooted in the masses. When the 
ANC/MK deployed its cadres inside the country to politicise the people 
and take up the cudgels against the South African government, there was 
also a move, conversely, by the RC in exile to prepare itself for any 
eventuality with regard to MK actions inside the country. The writer 
intends demonstrating how the complementary work of the RC in exile 
dovetailed with its professed intentions inside the country. The RC's 
intentions of reviving the underground structures inside the country were 
indeed realised, albeit on a small scale, in the 1970s. Manifestly the 
decade was largely one of painstaking reorganisation and mobilisation in 
terms of armed propaganda warfare: a slow and arduous process that 
needed constant and painstaking attention and refinement. 
One of the exiled leaders of the Soweto student upnsmgs, Tsietsi 
Mashinini, blamed the ANC and PAC for the torture that the students had 
endured at the hands of the South African police as a result of allegations 
that these two organisations had directed the student revolts. 156 Both the 
ANC and South African government concurred that the ANC was 
involved in the student riots; a fortnightly journal in France, AfriqueAsia, 
published an admission by Oliver Tambo that the ANC was indeed 
involved in the Soweto student uprisings, and to prove to the whole 
world that the ANC was communist-inspired, the Minister of Police, 
Jimmy Kruger, gave permission for newspapers to quote and publish 
1« Various ANC/MK documents (some of them are included in the study) on the nature and role of the 
masses attest to this statement., for example see confirmation on Tebaga Kgobe, 'Is South Africa 
Suited for Guerrilla Warfare?' The African Communist, Number 117, Second Quarter, 1989, p. 28. 











Tambo's statements, hoping that, "His statements confinn the 
Government's view that the recent disturbances in Soweto and elsewhere 
were not about language alone but that the ANC was also busy with 
agitations,,,157 that were allegedly communist inspired. It was felt in 
government circles of the time that every political agitation had 
communist inspirations in it. This explains the befuddlement that 
afflicted the government in response to the political agitations that 
occurred after the 1976 student uprisings. The government saw bannings 
and imprisonments as the answer to "communist inspired agitations". 
The ommous clouds gathering on the horizon eventually opened the 
sluice gates of repression in the rural Northern Transvaal. The arrest in 
1976 of S'bu Ndebele and his underground ANC unit members, George 
Mashamba, Joyce Mashamba and Percy Tshabalala at the University of 
the North impacted negatively on the underground work in which they 
were engaged. The fact that the state's allegations against Ndebele and 
his co-accused mentioned widely separated localities such as Turfloop, 
Swaziland, Madadeni (KwaZulu), the University of Zululand, Tzaneen 
and other places demonstrated the scope of the underground struggle not 
only in the rural Northern Transvaal but throughout South Africa. lss 
Ndebele's unit and its contacts in the region such as Obed Tshukudu, 
Patrick Kabelo Mothobi, Isaiah Ndambi, Maxwell James Shivundlane, 
Stanley Keith Makwakwa, to name a few, sent shivers down the South 
African government's spine and placed it under the international political 
spotlight. The government was aware that draconian steps in curbing 
countrywide unrest and intennittent MK activities were affecting her 
image very negatively. Equally, the ANC/MK was also aware that 
1<; 'Tambo Failed - Kruger', Rand Daily Mail, 3 July 1976. 











whoever gained the allegiance of the people was gomg to wm the 
national political liberation struggle. For its part, the ANC/MK argued 
that, "It [was] naIve to believe that the oppressed and the beleaguered 
people [could] not temporarily, even in large numbers, be won over by 
fear, terror, lies, indoctrination and provocation to treat liberators as 
enemies.,,159 The obligations entrusted to the RC and its sub-committees 
were geared towards the containment of this concern. 
Under these conditions of repression and confusion the cord that held the 
underground political struggles together was temporarily snapped or 
weakened; this state repression in turn partly affected the speedy 
deployment of trained MK cadres inside the country. The establishment 
of effective lines of communication with those political activists who 
managed to evade arrest and concealed themselves inside the country was 
also put in abeyance. This state of affairs was compounded by the lack of 
friendly borders around South Africa even though some of the host 
countries had been liberated. The newly independent countries of 
Southern Africa were still struggling to find their feet in the 1970s. The 
fact that some of those countries, particularly Botswana and Swaziland, 
were somewhat dependent on South Africa for their economic survival 
compromised their willingness to contribute towards the emancipation of 
the majority of South Africans. The outbreak of civil wars such as those 
in Angola and Mozambique also negatively affected the plans by the MK 
leadership to make use of these countries as springboards for forays into 
South Africa. Hence the sanctuary given to the liberation movements was 
limited by the stringent conditions set by these host countries. 
1'9 African National Congress, Fonmrd to Freedom. Strategy. Tactics and Programmes o(the A(rican 











The disarray, however, never affected the people's expectations of the 
ANC/MK and their ability to live up to these. Sceptics about the armed 
propaganda liberation struggle, such as Dale McKinley, have commented 
that the ANC's armed campaign and the accompanying symbolic appeal 
of MK heroism erected a mere favade of legends concerning the armed 
struggle. The expectation was prevalent that MK would be able both to 
protect the people as well as to act as insurance for the fundamental 
transformation of South Africa, Dale McKinley asserted. 160 In his 
conjectures, McKinley seems to forget that people joined the liberation 
struggle not because they found dialectical materialism appealing to them 
but because the ANC/MK was broadly perceived in South Africa to 
constitute the only exiled pressure group capable of waging armed 
propaganda war against the South African government. 161 It was this 
confidence of the oppressed people of South Africa that the ANC 
desperately wanted to win in pursuing the liberation crusade. For its part 
the government wanted to pulverise that image and those expectations 
that served as a link between the ANC and the oppressed people. 
The RC's internal role cut out? 
The steps being taken by the RC in exile to revive suppressed political 
aspirations and to establish links with 'old comrades' who had either been 
released from detention or whose banning orders were about to expire 
were mostly complemented inside the country, albeit largely indirectly, 
by efforts to foster political awareness spearheaded by adherents of the 
BCM. The level of political maturity was very high, since no ideological 
Ih() Dale T. McKinley. The ANC and the Liberation Struggle: A Critical Political Biography. (London. 
Pluto. 1997). p. 106. 











confusion existed between the BCM-orientated organisations and those 
that subscribed to the policies of the ANC, which in tum led Karis and 
Gerhardt to conclude that, "Some regarded ideological fine points as a 
secondary consideration; others did not. Members seeking guidance on 
how to leave the country safely and what to do after leaving regularly 
approached SASO and BPC leaders.,,162 It was a very complex process 
even to begin to unmask the truth concerning who was really a member 
of the BPC, SASO or the ANC. How would any SASO or BPC leader 
know about escape routes to exile when these organisations were not 
encouraging people to skip the country for the purposes of educational 
and military training? The fact that certain members of these 
organisations knew something about the ANC was indicative of the 
ANC's renewed efforts at infiltration of the other political organisations 
that were operating, at least officially. It also indicated the extent to 
which the ANC took conscious decisions to recruit people for the 
eventual dislodging of the South African government, disregarding their 
ideological affiliations. 
The exclusivity of the BPC and SASO was somewhat diluted by the fact 
that recruited ANC members in their ranks, such as Nkosasana Zuma, 
were instructed by the ANC to recruit people and influence debates and 
discussions within the Black Consciousness world. 163 Thabo Mbeki 
recruited Nkosazana Zuma on her visit to Swaziland in 1975. However, 
as mentioned earlier, these immediate spin-offs were short-lived. The 
BPC, which was formed at the instigation of SASO in 1972 and banned 
in October 1977, never developed into a mass-based community 
1(,2 T. Karis and G. Gerhardt, From Protest to Challenge. Gp. Cit, p. 149. 











organisation. 1M The art of defeating the apartheid government's 
techniques of bannings was, however, perfected. The banning of SASO 
spawned the Azanian Student Congress (AZASCO) in 1979, which was 
heavily influenced by the underground ANC and in 1981 adopted the 
Freedom Charter, later changing its name to the South African National 
Student Congress (SANSCO) in 1986. 165 The focus from then onward 
was to build community-based organisations by means of overtly 
sectarian organisations such as COSAS. The idea was to politicise all 
sectors of the community, even though the same people doubled in their 
obligations as students and community leaders thereafter. 
The first inaugural conference of COSAS on 31 May 1979 at 
Wilgerspruit, Johannesburg, ensured that the political fortunes of the 
BCM began to decline. Ephraim Mogale, the first COSAS National 
President, managed to secure delegates from the rural Northern Transvaal 
as well as the Eastern Transvaal to attend. Mogale had been previously 
requested to make arrangements for people to attend the conference, 
among whom were keynote speakers Helen Khuzwayo and Nthato 
Motlana. Mogale had initially been attracted to the ANC's policies and 
principles after the Soweto uprisings. He was conscientised in an unusual 
way, in the sense that while he was attending the political trials of the 
1976 student leaders he became politically conscious. 166 He first came 
into contact with the ANC in 1979 in Orlando East, when he attended the 
memorial service for the slain MK cadre, Solomon Mahlangu. 167 During 
16J Vincent Maphai, 'The Role of the Black Consciousness in the Liberation Struggle', Cited in Ian 
Liebenberg, et aI, The Long March: The StOlY of the Struggle/or Liberation in South Aji-ica, (Pretoria, 
HAUM, 1994)p. 126. 
16' State Strategy: Divide and Rule. Repression and Reform. Octoher Elections A Recipe/or Conflict! 
NUSAS, SRC University of the Witwatersrand, Central Print Unit, 1988, p 12. 
166 Interview with Ephraim Mogale, by the author, Bronkhorspruit, Gauteng Province, 26 & 27 April 
2003. 











this service Mogale consulted with Joe Qqabi and they took the decision 
that the need existed for a national student body which would also 
champion the rights of the general populace. 
The formation of CaSAS was not necessitated by the vacuum created by 
the banning and imprisonment of student leaders such as those in the 
Soweto Student Representative Council (SSRC); it was owing to the 
reason outlined above. As a matter of fact, the SSRC was supplanted by 
the Soweto Student League, which in tum was short-lived because of the 
formation of CaSAS as a national student umbrella body.168 In the late 
1970s high-profile student leaders in SA sa and of SRCs at various 
tertiary institutions began inviting Mogale to address their meetings. This 
strategy was adopted at the University of the North where students such 
as, inter alia, Thabo Makunyane and Ngoako Ramatlhodi in particular, 
and later, Collins Chabane, Matthews Phosa, Jerome Joseph Maake, and 
Joe Phaahla (who was then studying at Wentworth Medical School III 
Durban), would request Mogale to address mass student meetings at 
tertiary institutions. Chabane, Maake, and Ramatlhodi and many others in 
various communities in the region subsequently left the country for 
military and political training in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Their 
colleagues in the underground stayed inside the country and were able to 
link up with their exiled compatriots by various means. This point will be 
discussed further in subsequent chapters. 
In these student mass meetings at tertiary institutions Ephraim Mogale 
meticulously articulated the views of the underground ANC because 
those student leaders in attendance did not feel free to express their own 











views for fear of reprisals. 169 Mogale was absorbed into the underground 
operations of the ANC in which he had a specific role to play. He, for 
instance, was tasked in 1979 to distribute pamphlets denouncing the 
independence of the homeland of Venda, as well as pamphlets supporting 
bus boycotts in Seshego and supporting resistance to the enforced 
removals of the Batlokwa community in Botlokwa. Outside the confines 
of tertiary institutions Mogale's efforts also produced dividends, as for 
example, in 1980 when about 100 University of the North students 
marched through Mankweng Township (Turfloop) remonstrating against 
the removal of Makgato (Botlokwa) tribesmen. 170 The Makgato 
community under Chief Machaka, in Botlokwa, was supposed to relocate 
to Kromhoek, 100km away, in 1979 but resisted the government's 
171 move. 
The attempts by Mogale and his unit in the rural Northern Transvaal did 
not go unnoticed by MK, particularly regarding the attempted forced 
removals of the Botlokwa community outside Polokwane. The ANC/MK 
thus issued a statement in which they rejected the South African 
government's explanation of the Batlokwa removals as offered by the 
deputy secretary of the Department of Plural Relations, Mr. Serfontein on 
15 November 1978. The ANC/MK argued that the removal of the 
Batlokwa was aimed at creating a so-called "white corridor" to the north 
of the country, for the security forces. The MK attributed this removal to 
the fact that "the Northern Transvaal [had] witnessed a number of armed 
clashes between the white racists and units of Umkhonto we Sizwe and 
IhY Interview with Ephraim Mogale, by the author, Bronkhorspruit. Gauteng Province, 26 & 27 April 
2003. 
17(1 A NUSAS National Campaign pamphlet. South African History Archives (SAHA). AL 2457, 
University of the Witwatersrand Historical Papers Library. 











the racist minority regime [was] afraid that armed struggle in the region 
[was] spreading like wild fire."I72 When the government openly 
expressed the desire to create this "white corridor", it was very obvious 
to MK that other strategies in using the same route were needed to avoid 
frontal confrontations with the South African soldiers. 173 The strategies 
and tactics involved were not aberrations but standard practices in 
guerrilla warfare. Subsequent chapters further explore these strategies 
that were employed by MK yet never detected until the suspension of the 
armed struggle in 1990. 174 The reliance of the security forces on the 
statistics provided by farmers in the region might have contributed to the 
heightened state of vigilance in the region that culminated in the desire to 
create such a "white corridor" for the security forces. Alarmists such as 
Koeks T erblanche, chairperson of the Soutpansberg branch of the 
National Farmer's Union of the Northern Transvaal, misguidedly 
attributed the fact that whites no longer lived on 58% of the farms in the 
region to increased guerrilla threats in the region. 175 
In one of his escapades Ephraim Mogale traveled to Venda with Thabo 
Makunyane on an underground political task to distribute pamphlets in 
the Sibasa and Makwerela areas, protesting against the South African 
government's homeland policies and the tentacles of the latter in the form 
of the Venda homeland. While on this mission, Makunyane was arrested 
by the security police after a security slip-up and betrayal in which 
Mogale and Nwedamutswu "Mumsy" Mamabolo Phillip, an underground 
1 7 ') • 
- lhtd. p. 9. 
171 Interview with Retiloe Mudimu, by the author, Navy Headquarters. Pretoria. Gauteng Province. 21 
January 2005. puts this observation in context particularly with respect to the use of the same route in 
the 1980s by MK couriers from Zimbabwe. 
174 Interview with Refiloe Mudimu, by the author. South African Navy Headquarters. Pretoria. Gauteng 
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MK contact person in Venda, escaped separately. Nwedamutswu was 
driving a getaway car and, in the confusion that ensued after the arrest of 
Makunyane, he ran away and left behind Mogale who had not yet been 
apprehended at the time. Mogale made an attempt to return to the 
University of the North, where Makunyane had been based before his 
arrest, to quickly retrieve incriminating evidence he feared would 
implicate the latter. On his way back Mogale picked up Thupana in 
Botlokwa. Thupana was a teacher and also a contact in the underground 
political struggle, based in Botlokwa, the community threatened with 
removals. However, the police had already raided Makunyane's room (at 
the University of the North) and found, amongst other items, a letter that 
Mogale had written to Makunyane outlining some of their underground 
operations. Mogale described this as "a very compromising letter.,,176 At 
the same time a commemoration was being held at the University of the 
North to mark the second anniversary of the banning of perceived 
enemies of the government on 19 October 1977. Realising that 
Makunyane's room had been raided and documents seized, Mogale 
attended and addressed the audience during the commemoration service 
held on 19 October 1979. Mogale was arrested on 10 November 1979 in 
Warmbaths after his narrow escape, for alleged complicity in 
underground MK operations. He and Makunyane were sentenced to eight 
years each. Their sentence was reduced to five years on appeal when they 
were already serving time on Robben Island. Nwedamutswu escaped into 
exile, where he remained until the unbanning of the ANC in 1990. 177 
Before this period Makunyane had made contact with Chris Hani in 
Lesotho and had thus been able to disseminate whatever information he 
176 Interview with Ephraim Mogale, by the author, Bronkhorspruit, Gauteng Province, 26 & 27 April 
2003. 
177 Interview with Nwedamutswu "Mumsy" Mamabolo Phillip, by the author, SADET Oral History 











had gained to his cells at the University of the North.'n After the arrest of 
Mogale, the South African government made a determined attempt to 
smash COSAS, arresting almost all its leadership on suspicion of 
contacts with the banned ANC, as allegedly proven in Mogale's case. 
Mogale disputed this perception and argued that they had only been 
convicted of the possession of prohibited ANC literature. '79 
The decline of the BCM-inclined entities conversely gave rise to the so-
called Charterist-orientated organisations: those which aligned 
themselves with the Freedom Charter of the ANC and its fraternal 
structures. The Charterists' revival was largely attributable to the 
formation of COSAS because of its embracing of the Freedom Charter, 
the policy document of the ANC. The birth of COSAS helped to return 
the ANC to the driving seat of South African resistance politics.' RO 
Similarly, the organisations who were ideologically BCM-inclined also 
found a political home when the Azanian People's Organisation 
(AZAPO) was formed in 1978. However, AZAPO remained on the 
fringes of resistance politics and is now moribund. The establishment of 
COSAS later spawned a number of community-based youth 
organisations such as the Soweto Youth Congress (SOYCO), founded in 
July 1983 following the COSAS annual congress that was held in Cape 
T own. Here a resolution had been adopted to create community-based 
organisations that would cater for the political aspirations of the youth 
who had been excluded from the membership of COSAS. The formation 
of COSAS and the subsequent establishment of youth congresses marked 
I7X Interview with Ephraim Mogale, by the author, Bronkhorspruit, Gauteng Province, 26 & 27 April 
2003. 
I") Ihid, 26 & 27 April 2003. 
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the beginning of the revival of ANC-aligned organisations and the 
establishment of sustained contacts with the ANC in exile by those who 
had stayed behind in the country. 181 Those who remained served as a link 
with those recruits who eventually left the country. The ANC apparently 
encouraged the formation of organisations inside the country, stating: 
... Consequently, we welcome the formation of any organisation whose aim 
is to oppose oppression and racism, even if that opposition is in the first 
instance confined to the specific issues such as high rents, low wages, inferior 
education, land hunger, the pass laws, the absence of freedom of worship, 
and the right to conscious objection. 182 
Tambo's statement signalled a new vision in the ANC. It was important, 
therefore, for the MK to realise that revolutionary guerrilla warfare 
comprised mainly a political conflict supported by unorthodox military 
and political methods. As Sarkesian advises, revolutionary guerrilla 
warfare cannot succeed unless it is based on the social grievances of a 
particular society.IS3 The formation of ANC-aligned organisations at the 
community levels was informed by this understanding that the struggle 
for liberation could not be predicated on policies and principles only. For 
it to be effective, it needed to be imbued with community-based issues. 
There was no emphasis on the military at the expense of the involvement 
and politicisation of the masses. In fact, "[ when] talking about 
revolutionary armed struggle, the ANC is careful to point out that it is 
talking about political struggle which includes the use of force."ls4 The 
use of force was minimal, as various historical sources will demonstrate. 
IXI Interview with Mogale Ephraim, by the author, Bronkhorspruit, Gauteng Province, 26 & 27 April 
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When asked about the defensive nature of MK Ronnie Kasrils' response 
was: 
There are revolutionary movements, which at their foundation addressed 
the question of seizing state power. They immediately recognised and 
analysed the use of state power and the need to develop a force to seize 
state power. With us that was not the ethos. So the blows of Umkhonto in 
the early period were directed at reinforcing mass stmggle and securing, 
h h 
. . 185 
rat er t an at selzmg power ... 
The tempo of political conSCIOusness was kept alive under difficult 
conditions by the events taking place at the University of the North. 
Students, lecturers and members of the administrative staff all played a 
pivotal role after the 1970s as a rallying point for opponents of the status 
quo. Plagued by student uprisings from its inception in 1969, the 
University of the North became a conduit for the political activities that 
were being carried out in the rural Northern Transvaal. 
The University of the North was situated in the now-defunct homeland of 
Lebowa. The point is made in order to demonstrate that Lebowa had no 
jurisdiction over the university and what was happening in it. Hence the 
attitude of Lebowa as a government will not be described. It is also 
argued that Gazankulu, Lebowa, KaNgwane and Venda homelands were 
sideshows and that what was occurring inside those territories was 
peripheral and is therefore unimportant to the study. Most important, 
however, are MK activities at institutions that were based in these 
territories, which were referred to in 1969 by the then Deputy Minister of 











Bantu Affairs III the South Africa government as '"superfluous 
appendages." I R6 
Neighbouring boarding schools (neighbouring to the University of the 
North) in the region were not spared of the resurgence of underground 
political work. Protests by learners at boarding schools were mainly 
attributable to the fact that these schools were in the neighborhood of the 
University of the North, where students were, relatively speaking, highly 
involved in politics. They were boarding schools that catered for students 
from all over the country. It is in this context that this study may appear 
to focus on the University of the North at the expense of others. Other 
institutions of higher learning covered by this study such as the (then) 
Mgwenya Teachers Training College in the KaNgwane homeland 
(Eastern Transvaal) also experienced a number of students' protests and 
property damage in excess of R50 000 at a particular point but these pale 
into insignificance when compared to the culture of resistance at the 
University of the North.IR7 
The Internal Domino Effect 
The bannings on Wednesday October 19, 1977 (alias Black Wednesday), 
coupled with the death in detention of BCM leader Steve Biko, 
widespread detentions and the escape into exile of thousands of people 
heralded the general demise of community leadership and in particular 
IXh International Defence and Aid Fund, This is Apartheid: A Pictorial introduction, (London: IDAF. 
1978). p. 18. 
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that of the BCM. ISS Many people who had been politically active in the 
rural Northern Transvaal were either in prison, on the run or in exile. 
Nonetheless, the smouldering ashes of liberation were not completely 
extinguished, as had been the intention of the government when it 
arrested and banned most political organisations and many individuals. 
The South African government failed to realise the dismal truth that it 
could arrest, imprison and exile its opponents but it could not put an end 
to the desire to be free. This unending desire led to many manifestations 
of resistance to the government's determination to suppress opposition to 
its racial policies. 
BCM politics laid the foundation for the revival of other political 
formations. From the ashes of the BCM emerged AZAPO, as already 
stated. Those adherents of the BCM who were not in detention, prison or 
exile reconstructed AZAPO and it was launched in April 1978, 
effectively to replace the BPC. This new entity was soon beset with 
internal leadership-related problems. The national council of AZAPO 
expelled Curtis Nkondo from its presidency for an alleged "breach of 
principles", which resulted in the Azanian Students Organisation 
(AZASO) severing relations with AZAPO and joining forces with 
COSAS. Established in November 1979, the AZASO was initially 
ideologically inclined towards AZAPO. IS9 The ANC-related Soweto 
Civic Association (SCA) was formed in September 1979 and from then 
onwards many townships and rural areas founded their own civic bodies, 
bent on tackling their own peculiar problems at the local level. The 
government was consequently faced with a Phoenix-like reaction to its 
I X,< Harry Mashabela, People all the Boil, Reflections on Soweto, (Johannesburg, Skotaville, c 1987) p. 
105. 
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oppreSSIve racist policies, where the banning of an individual or an 
organisation would result in the emergence of another, constituting a 
trend well into the late 1980s. A case in point is the Azanian Students 
Movement (AZASM), the black consciousness entity which emerged in 
1983 after COSAS and AZASO had joined the ranks of the ANC-
inclined organisations and there was a need for a Black Consciousness 
student organisation. The National Forum; also a predominantly black 
consciousness grouping that emerged in June 1983 was also formed to 
bring together Black Consciousness organisations into a front. The UDF 
was formed three months later, as a front to oppose the constitutional 
reforms that gave rise to the tricameral parliament. In pursuance of this 
mandate, it brought under one umbrella scores of organisations, including 
the trade unions. The banning of the UDF in the late 1980s led to the 
emergence of the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM). 
Clearly, the South African government was faced with the mammoth task 
of suppressing the political aspirations of the majority of the citizens of 
South Africa but was always outmanoeuvred by the very citizens in that 
mind game who sporadically re-emerged elsewhere as something else. 190 
It became increasingly clear to the South African government in the 
1980s that banning orders did not represent an effective mechanism for 
dealing with increasing political conscientisation. This explains why 
other methods, such as "state of emergency" regulations, were favoured 
in the 1980s. 
The internal domino effect was felt (by the government) when 
imprisoned political leaders were able to be replaced. There was renewed 
1l)() • 











determination on the part of the new generation of political leadership 
that there should not be a return of political lull accessioned by the swoop 
on the ANC of the 1960s. This renewed hope and vision was indirectly 
given a boost (as well) when Martin Mafefo Ramokgadi, a seventy-seven 
year old veteran, was appointed the ANC's underground chief internal 
organiser. '91 Ramokgadi was able to link up with previous prison mates 
(from Robben Island) in the rural Northern Transvaal, such as Diale and 
Nchabeleng, who were relatively younger than him. '92 MK veterans were 
able to establish links with other younger members of MK and went on to 
recruit new members for the organisation. A number of political 
prisoners who had been imprisoned on Robben Island and elsewhere 
were quietly released in the 1970s, which offered a renewed hope of 
resistance and mature political underground work in the rural Northern 
Transvaal, even though there was little publicity about their release, and 
the communities to which they were banished viewed them with 
trepidation and distrust. In spite of this, "legal" political formations inside 
the country such as student movements and BCM-related organisations 
were able to locate the ex-prisoners and then link them up with 
clandestine operations that survived the eagle eye of the government. 
This situation was, however, ephemeral since the fledgling political 
movements were dealt a severe blow when the nuclei of the underground 
political work were damaged in the mid 1970s. Nevertheless, the seed of 
rebellion had been deeply planted in the minds of the majority of the 
oppressed people, and the 1980s provided the opportunity for new 
approaches to the liberation struggle. 
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Trade unions: conveyor belts for MK? 
The formation of black trade unions is not closely related to the topic of 
this study; however, it is important to underscore the fact that, as it had 
done in the past, the ANC continued to recruit people for MK from the 
ranks of the labour movement. It is maintained that "no political 
organisation could hope to master any support without the cooperation 
with the (workers) unions.,,]93 The ANC's history is replete with 
examples. The recruitment of MK from the ranks of trade unions was not 
a new development since SACTU had been used in the early 1960s as a 
conveyor belt for MK recruits. 194 However, SACTU was unable to recruit 
people of other ethnic origins in factories owing to statutory prohibitions: 
the provisions of the Industrial Conciliation Bill (ICB) of 1954 prohibited 
the formation of mixed unions. In this context, therefore, racially based 
unions were formed, one after the other. The TUCSA had catered for 
white workers' aspirations well into the late 1960s, when the 
government's taking into custody and suppression of trade unionists in 
factories drove trade unions underground. Their emergence in the early 
1970s was highlighted by strikes in cities such as Durban; hence a short 
discussion of the emergence of the labour unions in the 1970s to the early 
1980s is provided. Such a discussion is relevant, as it was during the 
1980s in the rural Northern Transvaal that the underground structures of 
MK encouraged the formation of labour organisations which could wage 
economic struggles at the factory level. Some of those who were 
eventually apprehended for MK activities were discovered with bundles 
of fake bank notes: a clear indication that an element of economic war 
I'll Maphai Vincent. Resistance in South Africa: Azapo and the Natiollal Forum. Op. Cit .. p. 3. 
I'I~ Edward Feit. Workers Without Weapons: The South Afi'icall Congress of Trade Uniolls alld the 











was present in MK's armed propaganda warfare. 195 In the late 1960s and 
1970s SACTU faded into inactivity as a trade union organising for MK, 
but individual members continued with little success. 
The political awakening during the early 1970s is largely attributable to 
trade unionism, particularly in Durban and surrounding areas. 196 Together 
with its student constituency the ANC was able to continue to recruit 
members for underground operations in the 1970s. The recruitment drive 
was accorded a new lease on life by the independence of Mozambique 
and Angola in the 1970s, which also" ... made violent resistance seem 
thinkable and feasible for many who had previously endorsed non-
violence.,,197 The Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) 
in 1978 was intended to bring together different small trade unions that 
were operating without a national body. The establishment of the Council 
of Unions of South Africa (CUSA) in 1980 "symbolised the emergence 
of new national centres of African trade unionism, unwavering to set their 
own agenda and priorities for both political and economic action to 
advance the interests of their worker membership."I9R The interests of the 
workforce were in the main political and only secondarily economic. 
The 1979 Wiehahn Commission Report under Professor Nic Wiehahn to 
some extent indirectly assisted the realisation of the workers' dreams in 
the short term. The Commission was given the mandate of examining all 
the laws that were being administered by Fanie Botha, Minister of 
Labour. It was appointed in 1977 by the South African government as a 
195 Interview with Tlokwe Maserumule, by the author, GaMatlala, Limpopo Province. 11 July 2002. 
1% See Institute for Industrial Education, The Durban Strikes, 1973, (Durban: I.I.E. in association with 
Ravan Press 1974). the entire issue. 
19
7 
'After Soweto - Part I 1', Af;'ica News, June 20, 1977, Vol. V Ill. No. 24. p. 10. 
I'IX Sheridan Johns and R. Hunt Davis Jr., Mandela, Tambo, and the Aji'ican National Congress. The 
Struggle Against Apartheid 1948 - 1990: A Documentary Survey, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 











result of, amongst other reasons, rapid economIC growth that would 
impact negatively on the manpower situation if discrimination was still 
going to be pursued. Although no commissioner acted as a representative 
of black workers' interests, the report suggested in general that the 
essential workers' rights embodied In the International Labour 
Organisation's (ILO's) principles should be preserved in labour 
legislation and should be applicable to all workers without regard to race, 
colour or sex. 199 The three black members of the Commission were Chris 
Botes (TUCSA unionist), Ben Mokoatle (an academic in Wiehahn's 
Institute at the University of South Africa who later became a personnel 
manager) and Gopie Munsook (TUCSA unionist and member of the 
South African Indian Council).20o They did not represent any labour 
aspirations of the black working force. The recommendations were 
however diluted by the rightwing pressure in government that regarded 
them as major concessions to the demands of the black labour force. 201 In 
the eyes of the black working force the commission remained largely 
suspect as it was not informed about the aspirations of those whom it 
purported to represent. The spirit of trade unionism was coterminous with 
that of the liberation struggle. It was also ideologically inclined towards a 
particular political philosophy. This explains why some trade union 
members eventually left the country while others stayed on and faced the 
government only on the level of ideology. The 1980s vindicate this point 
sufficiently, as may be observed in the formation of the Congress of 
South African Trade Unions (COSA TU) on the one hand and an 
amalgamation of BCM-related trade unions on the other. 
l'i'i D. M. J. Ncube. The influence of Apartheid and Capitalism 011 the Development of Black Trade 
'!lliOIlS ill South AIi'iea, (Johannesburg, Skottaville, cI985). p. 117. 
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The struggle for freedom was not the exclusive territory of students, trade 
unions and the university community. In various communities in the rural 
Northern Transvaal, political activists who could be perceived as 
"nonentities" in terms of the above cohort groups equally waged the 
armed underground propaganda liberation struggles. The political 
struggles that were waged in tandem with various communities were 
nothing new because the ANC had been engaged in such combat for 
many years. Individual activists who became prominent in community-
related activities were recruited to join the ranks of MK. The most 
important factor to consider was to champion the rights of the 
communities and spearhead any move towards the resolution of their 
problems. In the final analysis, the ANC argued for the integration of its 
political aspirations with those of the affected communities inside South 
Africa because "The ANC has often stated that MK combatants trained in 
camps outside South Africa are only its officer corps. The main combat 
forces are within South Africa itself.,,202 Abdi Said Yusuf concurs with 
T ebogo Kgobe regarding the locality of the liberation struggle. He states 
that the ANC and the PAC were involved in a liberation struggle globally 
and within the country, "[but] both the ANC and the PAC believed the 
heart of the struggle to be in South Africa.,,203 The involvement of the 
masses was the ultimate objective of the ANC/MK. 
This aIm accounts for the genesis of what came to be known as the 
"people's war.,,204 Tebogo Kgobe advances the view that the people's 
war comprises armed resistance by the people themselves, organised in 
2(12 Tebago Kgobe, 'Is South Africa Suited for Guerrilla Warfare?' The Afj'ican Communist, Number 
117, Second Quarter, 1989, p. 28. 
2113 Abdi Said Yusuf. '1942-, Racial Belief Systems of Nationalist Movements: A Case Study of Angola 
and South Africa', University of Denver,' PhD Thesis, 1976, p. 156. 
2(14 See the entire issue of Scchaba, 'African National Congress 1976 - 1986, Building People's Power', 











different ways by the inhabitants of villages, apart from the guerrilla 
forces but complementary to their actions. The same sentiments inherent 
in this interpretation of the "people's war" were recognised by leading 
defenders of the apartheid system such as special security police officer 
Gideon Nieuwoudt of CCB infamy.205 Testifying before the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) amnesty committee he explained that 
the ANC's 1980 Vietnam visit culminated in the initiation of a people's 
war in which the masses were mobilised and armed. 206 The masses of the 
oppressed population in factories were strongly encouraged to become 
involved in their own struggles. 
It is essential to explain briefly how the term "struggle" was conceived in 
the ranks of MK. It must be detached from its militaristic subtext and be 
left with its political connotations, which implied two results in practical 
situations: a) MK recruits who were deployed inside the country were 
ordered to contribute towards the building of the ANC underground 
capacity there, and b) those that were entrusted with military-specific 
tasks were instructed to engage in armed propaganda warfare.207 These 
acts of propaganda were specific to a particular era - the period from the 
late 1979 to the end of 1982. These tasks could not be launched without 
the assistance of the communities. It is in this context that the concept of 
the involvement of the masses in the "struggle" should be analysed and 
understood. It was incumbent on MK cadres to infiltrate and complement 
community actions against the state if MK were to change its image of 
having been "... long rendered virtually impotent by bureaucratic 
clio TRC Amnesty Commission, 25 September 1997, Case Number 3820/96, Port Elizabeth. 
211(, Janet Cherry, 'No Easy Road to the Truth: The TRC in the Eastern Cape', Paper presented at the 
Conference entitled The TRC: Commissioning the Past, 11 - 14 June 1993, University of the 
Witwatersrand, p. 7. 
cll7 Rocky Williams, 'The Other Armies: Writing the History of MK', Cited in The Long March: The 











communist leadership ... ,,208 To shed this burden of its apparent extinction 
MK needed to become actively involved in community issues, which 
would not be achieved by blazing guns on every street comer but by 
committed people directing and defending communities affected by 
problems of neglect and oppression. "The failure or success of a guerrilla 
movement is ultimately determined by its acceptance or rejection by the 
local population. It is thus essential that inhabitants of the region see fit to 
support the guerrilla cause", Colonel de Vries and Lieutenant McCaig 
. 209 cautIOn. 
Consequently, acts of armed propaganda struggle were in line with the 
maxim that guerrilla outfits operating underground were in danger of 
extinction if they did not popularise themselves. The armed propaganda 
struggle of MK was intended to rebuild the ANC's political wing by 
doing SO.210 The bombings of police stations, railway lines and other 
government institutions were influenced by this aphorism. MK relied 
upon plenty of international experience in its armed propaganda struggle 
against the South African government. These valuable experiences were 
much appreciated in the ranks of MK, but it was constantly pointed out 
that "they [could] not be mechanically applied to our situations.,,211 Each 
and every sector clandestinely organised by the ANC had its own task to 
perform. The working community was obliged to organise itself and 
thereby defend the gains achieved on the factory floors. It was expected 
to politicise and replenish the incarcerated MK cadres who had ended up 
20X Correspondent (London), Sunday Times, 'Eight expelled Men Plan to Put New life into ANC', 
Sunday Times, 4 January 1976. 
20') Col R de Vries and Lt G I McCaig, Mobile Warfare in Southern Africa, ISSUP Strategic Review, 
University of Pretoria, August 1987, p. 18. 
210 Tom Lodge, 'The African National Congress: Kabwe and After', International AfTairs Bulletin, Vol. 
10, No.2, 1986, p. 5. 












in the hands of the security police. It was impossible therefore for the 
ANC to rely on its own expertise and disregard the international 
experience of guerrilla warfare struggles waged elsewhere. This self-
introspection led to the Vietnam visit. 
The Vietnam Visit 
In any liberation struggle where armed forces contest for political 
territory, it is necessary that the contestants return to the drawing board 
from time to time. The intention is to replenish worn-out ideas, hone and 
perfect fresh strategies and tactics that are necessary and relevant to the 
successful prosecution of the liberation struggle. The ANC was no 
exception to this need for self-introspection. Its tradition of non-violence 
and prohibitions on the indiscriminate injury of innocent civilians led 
people to various conclusions about its efficacy in sustaining military 
resistance in South Africa. John Brewer, for instance, concluded that the 
ANC's commitment to political mobilisation and non-violence had 
hindered it in the past from embarking on military resistance. 212 When the 
ANC leadership realised the need for an alteration in strategy and tactics 
it dispatched a high-profile delegation to Vietnam in 1978 to study the 
journey that the Vietcong guerrillas had taken in their struggle against 
France and the United States of America (USA). This high-powered 
delegation was decided upon after the years of low-key political activities 
that had characterised the early 1970s. It was, "however, after the 1976 











youth uprising in Soweto, [that] the ANC and MK were reactivated.,,213 
The Vietnam visit therefore took place at a crucial time. 
"Why the sudden need for MK reactivation?" one may ask. The majority 
of the obstacles that had hindered MK all these years in waging the 
armed propaganda struggle against the South African government still 
loomed large. A case in point is to be noted in the following factors: 
South Africa still possessed the most highly developed network of 
communication systems in Africa - roads, railways and airstrips -
covering almost the entire surface area of the country; the lack of vast 
expanses of unoccupied territories or forests where surplus equipment 
dumps, training camps and rest areas could be established; the existence 
of a highly developed industrialised economy, supported to the hilt by 
Western imperialism and equally highly developed and well-equipped 
armed forces supported by an armed and militaristic white civilian 
population of over three million. Consequently, the ANC leadership took 
conscious decisions to sustain the momentum generated by the outbreak 
of the 1976 student revolts and the general atmosphere of Uhuru 
(freedom) by launching an intensified armed propaganda warfare 
campaign which would influence other initiatives that were also being 
revived. 
As stated, the motive of the Vietnam delegation was primarily to study 
the strategies and tactics that the Vietcong military had used in its 
struggle against the French and United States forces. The focus was 
placed on the linkages of the Vietcong with the masses, the relationship 
:'13 w. 1., Breytenbach, The ANC: Future Prognosis, (Stellenbosch, Institute for Future Research. 











between the anned struggle and the political struggle, as well as on how 
the people were engaged in that struggle.214 It was hoped that the trip to 
Vietnam would assist in the invigoration of the underground structures of 
the MK that were in existence, but not as militarily and politically 
effective as initially envisaged. After the 1978 Vietnam trip the emphasis 
had fallen on the strategy of armed propaganda and resuscitating the 
underground political work. All these internal manoeuvres with respect to 
political consciousness notwithstanding, there was a need for mass 
mobilisation so as to assist the MK cadres to operate effectively within 
the politicised communities on a sustainable basis. The successful 
execution of missions by the MK depended on the involvement of the 
masses in providing the cadres with safe houses, infonnation on the 
movements of security forces, food, identification of targets and any 
other logistical and essential support. It is this scenario that saw the 
anned revolutionary propaganda strategy becoming the hub of the 
liberation struggle. This role was particularly heightened after 1976 when 
many political refugees such as students, religious people and "ordinary" 
members of the South African communities left the country for 
educational and military training. This is not to imply that political 
mobilisation had received less attention in the past. The new wave merely 
imparted additional zeal. 
The Vietnam trip proved to be a catalyst for MK's anned propaganda 
campaign. Oliver Tambo was at the helm of the ANC delegation, which 
remained in Vietnam for twenty-one days. On its return, the deputation 
submitted a report for discussion in a joint workshop of the National 
cl4 For details on the Vietcong activities see Giap, 'To Arm the Revolutionary Masses, To Build the 
People's Army', pp 298 - 307 in Ben Turok's Revolutionary Thought in the Ni" Ccntlll)" (London, 











Executive Committee (NEC) and the RC in Angola, which ran between 
27 December 1978 and 1 January 1979.215 Major resolutions were 
adopted, amongst which were the following: a) the ANC was to mark 
January 8 of every year with an official statement on the history and 
relevance of the organisation with regard to the South African liberation 
struggle, b) certain days of common historical importance in South 
Africa would be commemorated, c) there was to be a heightened annual 
focus on ANC activities, and d) attention was to be paid to every sector 
of South African society. In pursuance of these resolutions the ANC 
declared 1979 the Year of the Spear in acknowledgment of the gallant 
battle of the Zulu army at the Battle of Isandlwana and of the cadres of 
MK who were engaging the South African government in reconstructed 
guerrilla warfare. The process of political awakening and mobilisation 
inside South Africa was catered for by the January 8 Statement and the 
declaration of special years by the ANC. 
Moses Mabhida and Joe Slovo were given the responsibility of thrashing 
out the lessons of the Vietnam visit. A Politico-Military Strategy 
Commission set up the Luanda Meeting in Angola; its members 
comprised OR Tambo, Thabo Mbeki, Joe Modise and Joe Gqabi. This 
Commission reported its deliberations on a number of issues in August 
1979. Among some of the vexing questions addressed was whether the 
commission felt that the armed struggle would assist in engendering a 
nation-wide mass insurrection or whether a long-drawn-out people's war 
was the better option. The commission settled for the latter, but did not 
cl5 Document 114. Report of the Political-Military Strategy Commission (the "Green Book") to the 
ANC National Executive Committee, Parts One and Two with two annexures. August 1979 in Thomas 











rule out the possibility of a nation-wide insurrection that would be 
predicated on political developments inside the country.216 
The incidental benefits of this visit, such as characterising the Vietnam 
struggle as rural or urban, were deliberately avoided because of the 
limited time that the commission had at its disposal. This study will 
expatiate on the rural versus urban location of the liberation struggle. The 
commission pledged to undertake a study tour of Vietnam which would 
in fact encompass the study of the Vietnam War in its totality, and that 
the envisaged tour would cover the issue of migrant labour and the extent 
to which these migrants relied on subsistence farming undertaken by their 
immediate families for survival.217 It was important for the ANC/MK to 
study this phenomenon: the backbone of many a guerrilla movement. In 
South Africa, Tom Lodge observes, migrants and peasants were tightly 
controlled as the government depended on them for its own survival.218 
Lodge's remark notwithstanding, the South African struggle was not 
entirely dependent on anyone individual or strategy. Both sets of 
participants on either side of the combat line (rural and urban, in this 
context) knew that it was incumbent on them to carry the struggle 
forward under any conditions. The peasantry was limited in power and 
infrastructure, while the urban cadres were slowed down by repression in 
the city. Consequently it was, from the onset, thought that the armed 
struggle should be spread between the cities and the countryside where 
the masses could be armed and the enemy's resources stretched. In the 
light of all these teething problems and lessons learnt from the Vietnam 
visit that plagued the liberation movement in the 1970s, Joe Slovo was 
21(, Ihid, pp. 724 -729. 
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singled out to shoulder the responsibility for orgamsmg an effective, 
steady build-up of arms caches and an embryonic guerrilla network 
inside South Africa in the 1970s that would eventually be relied upon in 
the 1980s.219 
A few points need to be accentuated in relation to mass participation in 
the liberation struggle. The nature of the struggle for liberation and the 
theory of armed guerrilla warfare negated the involvement of the masses 
in the day-to-day execution of the struggle in the strictest sense of the 
word. Some far reaching decisions remained the preserve of the 
leadership and those that were assigned to carry them out. Mass 
involvement carried its own seed of self-destruction if applied strictly as 
implied. It is true that: "the revolution is the work of millions of people, 
of the popular masses who stand up to overthrow the ruling classes, the 
classes commanding a colossal machinery of violence together with other 
material and spiritual means.,,220 Equally true is the fact that these 
"millions of people" are not always kept abreast of developments as they 
continually unfold in the liberation struggle, which is in line with the 
theory of guerrilla warfare that operates on a need-to-know basis. The 
question of how these "millions of people" participate in the revolution is 
extremely important. The extent to which they are engaged in the 
execution of the revolution is left to a few. This suggests therefore that 
even if popular revolutionary consciousness exists in a liberation 
struggle, military decisions and missions are not communicated to the 
masses. Contemporary South African history is sated with examples that 
substClntiate this point. A few white soldiers and security personnel who 
cl9 South Africa: ANC Vibrations, Afi-ica Confidential, Vol. 22, No.3, January 28. 1981, p. XX. 
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"confessed" their roles in sustaining apartheid during the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) hearings argued that they were merely 
carrying out the orders of their military and political masters: they were 
not involved in the crafting of policy formulations and adoptions. As 
soldiers they were expected to carry out orders mechanically without 
moral scruples. The same principle can be attributed to MK cadres and 
other extra-parliamentary forces of the time on the other side. 221 Hence 
sensitive information on military matters, for example, was mainly 
imparted to a few people for fear of torture by the security forces, and 
organise, conscientise and politicise the leaders of the people on a small 
scale rather than the masses of the oppressed people. This was not 
supposed to represent the norm but was an act taken in terms of a 
practical situation. The same reasoning nullifies the arguments advanced 
by Howard Barrell that MK was not effective because of: 
... the absence of underground structures able to integrate and deploy 
those infiltrated; over what political role those infiltrated could play, over 
the poor quality of the political briefings they received before infiltration; 
", and over whether they were merely 'cannon fodders. ,~~~ 
Reception committees for deployed MK cadres, detailed plans of mission 
inside the country and hence assertions about "cannon fodders [sic]" are 
luxuries that clearly have no place in armed propaganda warfare. An 
infiltrated reception committee, for example, would scuttle the entire 
miSSIOn as those cadres that would have been received would reveal 
detailed information if they had been sufficiently and qualitatively 
briefed before they left their military or political masters in exile. Certain 
MK cadres were deployed inside the country specifically to service 
221 The distinction is that liberation movements were motivated by the desire to attain freedom for all 
citizens while the other side (SADF) was prepared to die for the perpetuation of the system of apartheid 











varIOUS units on varIOUS mISSIOns as their core responsibility. These 
service units were trained in the art of secret communications, like 
communicating with somebody whom one does not know. Just passing a 
particular spot at a particular time or wearing certain clothes which 
would communicate a message to whomever was supposed to see them 
comprised one of these techniques. 
Contrary to popular misconceptions MK ran varIOUS units under its 
umbrella that carried different responsibilities: for example, the Mass 
Mobilisation Unit, Propaganda Unit, Intelligence Unit, Recruiting Unit, 
Reception Unit, Workers Unit, and Reconnaissance Unit. 223 The 
Reception Unit was responsible for the provision of accommodation for 
deployed MK cadres, the gathering of information in relation to their 
deployment and acquainting them with their surroundings as well as 
assisting with the "maneuverability and camouflage" of the resources at 
h . d' 1 JJ4 t elr Isposa.--
Conclusion 
The spirit of optimism that was generated by epochal political events 
such as the 1973 Durban strikes, the liberation of some Southern African 
countries from the yoke of colonialism, and the 16 June 1976 students 
uprisings in Soweto and their spill over into other areas was dealt a 
severe blow when the South African government used draconian 
measures to quell all anti state activism. Political activists' hopes were 
dashed when the South African government clamped down on their 
223 See The Creation of the Undergrollnd Units pamphlets, Jack Simons Collection, Umkhonto we 
Sizwe Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, University of Cape Town, pp. 3 - 4. 











nascent political aspirations. The banning and imprisonment of people 
after the Black Wednesday (19 October 1977) shattered the hopes of ever 
challenging the government meaningfully with bare hands and stones. 
Youths left the country in their droves to join liberation movements, 
particularly the ANC in exile for military and political training. Members 
of the work force also took the advantage that they were legally allowed 
to operate on work floor so they organised workers on behalf of the 
ANC. This was a culture that was adopted in the early 1960s by SACTU 
in which workers were recruited to swell the ranks of MK. In exile, at the 
same time, the ANC was also beginning to reorganise itself. Various 
internal structures of the organisation were reactivating themselves and 
their roles were being more integrated and streamlined. The role of the 
RC in exile, in reorganising itself to deal effectively with the influx of 
political refugees from South Africa, has been examined. The RC's 
efforts at reviving internal organisations inside the country were 
beginning to take shape. 
The political trials underway in the 1970s, of the leadership of the BCM, 
BPC, SSRC and COSAS later, towards the tum of the decade, 
rejuvenated the resolve of those who had managed to leave the country 
and join the exiled political organisations. During 1977 alone, for 
example, ninety-five trials were held under the security laws, a 
manifestation both of the intensification of the struggle and of blunders 
made by the liberation movement. The charges concerned ranged from 
recruiting people for military training (as in the case ofS'bu Ndebele and 
his University of the North connections) to the creation of cells, 











activities for the purposes of armed propaganda. 225 Some of those who 
were jailed and those who left for exile were relatively young and 
"politically unconnected." In the nature of the underground liberation 
struggle activities were carried out circumspectly and surreptitiously; this 
may have created impressions of political unconnectedness. 
The discovery of S 'bu Ndebele's underground unit at the University of 
the North came too late to curb the supposed "damage" that underground 
political activism was doing to the psyche of most people who came into 
contact with the unit. The fact that its members refused to plead guilty to 
"two charges of taking part in terrorist activities" was an indication of 
their resolve to wage the struggle against all odds. 226 Their arrest and that 
of many others countrywide created a political mood that was desperately 
needed by MK in exile. As a consequence, the activists who were not 
university-based were roped into the underground world of the struggle. 
Tactically, most of these activists left for exile to join the liberation 
movements. 
The present chapter advanced arguments concerning the genesis of the 
regional struggle as evidenced by the concentration of MK recruits at the 
University of the North, and how the struggle ballooned into exile. Those 
recruited at the University of the North, mostly under the tutelage of 
BeM adherents, loom large in the story of the 1980s, as we shall see. 
MK recruits were expected to be multifaceted in terms of their 
resourcefulness, like Nchabeleng, who was described as having " ... 
embodied three aspects of the struggle - the rural, national and class 
ee' Mary Benson. Nelson Mal/dela. (London, Panaf, 1980), p. 197. 











working struggles. ,,227 The next chapter investigates the debate regarding 
the locality of the struggle, whether it was mainly urban or rural in 
nature. 












Urban or Rural? From the 19708 to the 19808 
One of the most interesting debates taking place in the South African 
historiography of the liberation struggle concerns whether the liberation 
struggle was mainly rural or urban. It is therefore of great importance 
from the onset to delve somewhat into the history of the ANC and 
consider how it carried out its objectives. The intention is to demonstrate 
the futility of the rural versus urban debate. The historic conference of the 
ANC in 1912 represented a wide spectrum of the South African 
population. This variety included the indigenous population, ranging from 
the kings and leading chiefs of the day, to the intellectuals, workers, 
peasants, women and practically everybody.228 It is logical to conclude 
that the inclusion of kings and paramount chiefs as well as everyone else 
in the 1912 ANC conference sent a clear signal that the ANC had no 
intention of confining the struggle to a particular setting of the Union of 
South Africa, whether rural or urban. One of the overriding aims of the 
introduction of the Bantustan system in the mid-1950s was underpinned 
by the misconception that (at least in theory) "one third of the entire 
African population lives in Bantustans. ,,229 However, the Bantustans 
eventually became dens of resentment and organisational resistance, 
rather than fostering the tribal affiliations for which the South African 
government had hoped. The Pondoland and Sekhukhuneland revolts 
provide valuable experience in this respect. 230 The Bantustans were 
22X 'Interview with Oliver Tambo, President of the African National Congress of South Africa', Afi'ica 
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designed to undennine African nationalism, Since nationalism 
contradicted apartheid. Rural terrain, the peasantry and guerrillas were 
therefore essential to a successful prosecution of the political struggle.23I 
Luli Callinicos claimed that, "rural resistance to the 1951 Bantu 
Authorities Act ... put anned struggle on the agenda.,,232 Initially, though, 
the ANC showed a lack of commitment to making use of rural areas 
because of logistical shortcomings and the practical implications that the 
rural environment presented, such as those observed by Callinicos, who 
points out that MK's concentration on the "peasantry in the rural terrain 
[meant that MK] had not only suffered heavy losses in their attempted 
incursions into the country via the homelands, but [was] nowhere near the 
townships when the countrywide urban uprisings spread".233 This failure 
to link rural revolts with urban tunnoil did not dissuade the ANC from 
placing rural problems onto the national agenda, and eventually collapsed 
the dichotomy between rural and urban struggles. An ANC representative 
later confinned the geographically widespread nature of the liberation 
struggle when addressing the United Nations: 
Our bases are amongst the people of South Africa in the urban and rural 
areas and throughout the length and breadth of our country, which we are 
determined to liberate. It was from these bases that our armed combatants 
struck twice at the Koeberg nuclear power station, a thousand miles from the 
border; it was from these bases that we hit Voortrekkerhoogte, the regime's 
military headquarters on the outskirts of Pretoria; and it is from there that we 
are hitting hard targets all over the country such as police stations, oil-from-
Organisation, the ANC and the Sekhukhuneland Revolt', Journal ofSouthcm African Studics, Vol. IS, 
No.4, October 1989. 
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2J2 Luli Callinicos, Olivcr Tambo Bcyond the Engcli Mountains. Cape Town, David Phillip. 2004), pp. 
366-367. 











coal plants, electric power stations, and the regime's air force headquarters 
. p . nt 
In retona.-
This statement discredits the myths nurtured by the security-conscious 
officials of the South African government's defence machinery that the 
borders of the country should be tightly guarded so as to ward off MK 
insurgents from neighbouring countries. It also confirms the fact that the 
liberation struggle later became widespread and all-encompassing and 
was not confined to the urban settings of South Africa. The attack on 
government installations, as the ANC statement points out, affected a 
number of different areas of the country. Urban targets hit by MK 
operatives were selected on the basis of such considerations as the 
accessibility to those targets, the possibility of disappearing into crowds 
of people after carrying out a mission, the probability of not being 
identified before performing the mission and other advantages that urban 
settings provided. After all, the principle underpinning the approach to 
the liberation struggle was that if the South African government security 
forces were concentrated they would lose the wider territory and if they 
were scattered they were likely to lose strength. This is a tried and tested 
military strategy in guerrilla warfare theory. It was necessary that the 
armed propaganda liberation strategy be nationwide and in the hands of 
many people so that the security forces would be obliged to deal with 
widespread resistance. The military strategies of MK were quite varied, in 
a constant state of adaptation and in line with the theories of guerrilla 
warfare that guerrillas should be able to be swallowed up and protected 
by the masses ifneed be.235 The concentration of the liberation movement 
214 'ANC Representative Addresses the United Nations'. Sechaba, June 1984. p. 9. 
21' Comparative rural studies confirm that a properly politicized peasantry can serve as both a conduit 
and source of personnel for any guerrilla movement. See specifically Robert Buijtenhuijs, The 
Remlwionary Potential of' Afi-ican Peasantries: Some Tentative Remarks. (Leiden. African Studies 











on urban areas was informed by these practical concentrations rather than 
by any conscious policy decision. The system of racial segregation 
artificially devised urban areas that were much more fully resourced than 
the rural ones. Hence it was in this context that the scale of the revolts 
was tipped in favour of the more infrastructured urban areas. 
The "rural versus urban" debate has a history in that the ANC had never 
paid much attention to the rural struggles that were being waged long 
before the armed propaganda strategy could be thought of, which might 
have created the impression that the urban setting was preferred to the 
rural one. The historical background to this impression, particularly in the 
rural far Northern Transvaal, is to be observed in the impact of 
Proclamation No. 67 of 1958 which banned the ANC in Sekhukhune, 
Zeerust, Marico's Reserves and Ramokgopa, hence possibly contributing 
to the ANC's lack of adequate attention to rural areas. Joe Slovo made the 
observation that, "but, although many of the leaders of the rural upsurge 
sought advice and material help (including weapons) from the ANC, it 
would be an exaggeration to claim that the events were either led or 
organised by our movement." Slovo stated further in the same publication 
that, " ... our weakness as an organised force in the rural areas persists up 
to today and is even more serious in the light of the regime's Bantustan 
offensive.,,236 Notwithstanding Slovo's concern, the ANC never 
abandoned the plan of using rural areas adjacent to the border area as 
entry points. This entailed securing infiltration routes by means of trusted 
contacts and monitoring the movements of the security forces who might 
waylay MK cadres into traps. The ANC stated, "The plan was to continue 











to infiltrate MK cadres into the most receptive rural areas adjacent to the 
borders of South Africa.,,237 
The battles between the GaMatlala communities from 1919 to the 
1980s23R and the priority accorded by the ANC during the initial stages of 
the formation of MK to training people in rural areas to support the 
guerrillas, as encapsulated in Operation Mayibuye in 1961, offer 
examples that indicate that no preference was accorded to either the rural 
or the urban settings in the liberation struggle. 239 The Matlala 
communities, for instance, engaged each other in fierce battles over local 
issues and allegiance to the ANC.240 The point is that no attempt was 
made by the ANC to confine the struggle to a particular locale, although 
the fact that most of the ANC leaders were urban-based contributed to 
this perception of the struggle as likewise focused on urban areas. These 
leaders entered these areas primarily for work-related reasons rather than 
political activities; when they encountered the system of apartheid, they 
took part in the politics of liberation in their places of abode: the urban 
areas. They continued to keep contact with their rural backgrounds and 
problems. 
In the case of the rural far Northern Transvaal, before the commencement 
of the more sustained liberation struggles of the late 1970s, the links 
between the rural and urban environment were to be found in the migrant 
workers, who mostly stemmed from the rural areas. These workers later 
23" Luli Callinicos. Oliver Tambo, Beyond the Engeli Mountains, Op. Cit .• p. 364. 
23X See D. M. C. Sepuru, 'Succession Disputes. MaCongress and Rural Resistance at gaMatlala. 1919-
1980'. B.A. Honours Dissertation, University of the Witwatersrand. 1992 and M.P. Kgobe. 'Resistance 
to Betterment in the Pietersburg Area: A Case of GaMatlala, 1940 - 1980'. BA Honours Dissertation. 
University of the Witwatersrand, 1992. 
239 Holland Heidi. The Struggle: The HistDlY of the Aji'ican National Congress, (London. Grafton, 
1989). p. 145. 
2 .. 11 The Star. February 7 1980 and The Citizen, February 9 1980 make it quite clear that the ANC was 











served as a pool of recruitment for MK activities. 241 The argument 
remained valid, though, that, "Even when presented with the opportunity 
of linking up with organic protest movements and incorporating activists 
thrown up by rural struggles, the urban based ANC leaders proved 
remarkably slow to respond.,,242 The reason(s) had to with practicalities 
rather than the willingness to engage. In rural areas until the advent of the 
1980s it was logistically highly risky to support rural struggles from 
without. The unreliable modes of transport, such as railway, bus and train 
services did not facilitate the rapid movement of MK cadres. The advent 
of the taxi industry and the hiring of cars expedited the interaction 
between rural and urban political activists. 243 Many examples may be 
adduced of political activists who were arrested in rural areas because 
they could not convince the authorities of the reasons why they were 
present in such settings during political upheavals. They were arrested on 
spurious grounds such as an accent, for example, that "betrayed" them in 
an environment where they had not grown Up.244 It is logical to conclude 
that the introduction of influx control measures was calculated to regulate 
the movement of people, with the expressed hope of containing the 
spread of political ideas.245 The political landscape altered throughout the 
years in South Africa and problems such as those mentioned above were 
soon overcome. The migration of students from urban schools to 
boarding schools, tertiary colleges and universities in rural areas affected 
the political status quo. There was a perception in the minds of most of 
the parents in the urban areas of South Africa after 1976 that their 
children would be better educated in the rural boarding schools. The 
c~1 Peter Delius. A Lion Amongst the Cattle, Reconstruction and Resistance in the Northern Transvaal, 
(Johannesburg, Ravan Press. 1996), p.133. 
c~c Matthew Chaskalson, 'Rural Resistance in the 1940s and 1950s', Trans/ormation, No.3, University 
of Natal, Durban, 1989. p. 57. 
c~; In the 1980s it was easy to hire cars and carry out MK-related activities without detection. 
c44 Interview with Cassius Motsoaledi by the author, Erasmuskloof. Gauteng Province, 16 May 2005. 











distinction between rural and urban struggles became blurred in the 
process, particularly in the 1980s. In addition, MK's training 
methodologies took the entire range of South African topography into 
cogmzance. 
In ANC guerrilla training camps outside South Africa, specialised 
training in rural or urban warfare was determined by the individual's 
choice and the mission at hand, as determined by the military and 
political leadership. Tom Lodge alludes to this fact in his explanation that 
in those training camps different programmes were arranged for rural and 
urban settings.246 Material conditions therefore dictated the pace and 
texture of the struggle in a particular locale. The assumption is that no 
single part of the rural areas had escaped the impact of land alienation, 
labour migration, taxation, tampering with traditional authority structures 
by the government. In this context the rural far Northern Transvaal 
experienced political upheavals, like the rest of the country. The 
movement of political activists from one spot to another should not be 
misinterpreted as the confinement of the struggle to that particular 
geographic locality. Rural areas were relatively "politically stable" and 
therefore relatively "safe" for political activists to hide from persecution 
by police in urban areas. This had nothing to do with the concentration of 
the liberation struggle in either locality, but everything to do with survival 
strategies. It was simpler to hide in rural areas because of the 
homogenous nature of the settlements, the inaccessibility of some rural 
terrain and the veneer of tranquility associated with such areas. More 
importantly, rural communities, being united, could easily ward off any 
2-1(, Tom Lodge, 'The State of Exile: The African National Congress of South Africa, 1976 - 86', Third 











attempts by the security police to infiltrate them and ultimately arrest 
political activists who had been given sanctuary by them. 247 
• 
If the ANC held the VIew that the national liberation struggle was 
countrywide and influenced by the material conditions that negatively 
affected the oppressed communities, why the controversy about the 
locality of the liberation struggle? To answer this germane question, a 
brief historical perspective on the rural and urban South African settings 
is necessary. Also essential is a summary of the problems that affected 
both settings and ultimately collapsed the rural and urban dichotomies. 
The government's preoccupation of the 1970s that the homelands should 
cater for the political aspirations of the Black majority led to its neglect of 
the Black Advisory Councils/4R which were statutory councils set up by 
the South African government in the hope of co-opting the black elite into 
the structures of black municipal administration. After 1971 the authority 
of urban Black municipalities was emasculated when their powers were 
transferred to the Bantu Affairs Administration Boards (BAABs), the aim 
of which was to apply the state guidelines regarding urban removals and 
urbanisation. The BAABs were later assisted in carrying out their mission 
as a result of the government's appointment of the Reikert Commission: 
the latter recommended special employment for permanent urbanised 
citizens, and the removal of the excess jobless blacks. The commission 
suggested that the government should provide for the resettlement of 
::'47 Two examples of interviews with Collins Chabane by the author (Polokwane, Limpopo Province, 3 
March 2003,) and Jerome Joseph Maake by the author (Polokwane, Limpopo Province, 4 November 
2003) serve to justify this point in the sense that, in the case of Maake, he was able to reside at Moutse 
for almost two years, carrying out MK activities undetected. He even adopted the local surname of 
Jiyane and only a small number of his units knew the truth about him. Chabane stayed at his home 
village in Gazankulu, carrying out MK activities until he was arrested after a betrayal. 












those workers not needed In the cities: by implication, In the rural 
areas. 249 
The altering political landscape after the 1976 student revolts that started 
in Soweto but later engulfed most of the country forced the government 
to pass the Community Council Act (1977), which ensured that urban 
African municipalities were established under the auspices of BAABs. A 
new breed of elected African municipal officials took the flak on behalf 
of the government. It was the government's intention that the pent-up 
rage of urbanised Africans should be confined to the first tier of the 
government - the municipalities. These consequently faced the wrath of 
the African majority, and the government's propaganda machinery later 
referred to this confrontation as "black-on-black violence".25o It was also 
hoped that the existence of the Community Councils would derail the 
liberation struggle since residents would be occupied with questions of 
participation in these municipal structures and with everyday concerns 
such as skyrocketing electricity bills and resulting cut-offs, or an 
unreliable electricity and water supply, rather than with the national 
question of economic and political emancipation from the national yoke 
of oppression. Political consciousness was, however, awakened, and 
awakened for good. 
One should note, therefore, that when political consciousness deepened 
the Community Councils collapsed. Their properties, such as community 
halls, municipal offices, schools, etc., became targets of political anger 
2-1') NUSAS, Exposing Total Strategy, University of Cape Town, SRC Press, February, 1980, p. 8. 
'';0 . 
- The term referred to black people who were fighting those who were also black and were seen to be 
supporting the government in its effort to retain the system of apartheid. The involvement of the so-












and frustration. Lack of funds also compounded the problems faced by 
the municipal officials in the implementation of their mandate. The 
violence gripping most urban areas as a result of the collapse of 
municipal infrastructures led to the migration of youths to the rural areas 
in search of a stable schooling environment. 251 These young people, in 
tandem with rurally-based student activists, revolutionised the rural 
schools that had enrolled them. Secondary schools such as Hwiti, Pax, 
Setotolwane, Marobathota and others in the rural far Northern Transvaal 
experienced unprecedented levels of enrolment, particularly in the 
1980s;252 and also high levels of student riots. As mentioned earlier, the 
high levels of political consciousness also resulted from the proximity of 
these schools to the University of the North. Tertiary students were able 
to politicise the neighbouring high schools in the area, especially those 
with boarding facilities. Local issues that bedevilled rural communities, 
such as the unsatisfactory community services delivered by chiefs and 
local authorities (in rural townships) were taken to new heights. This 
move blurred the alleged dichotomies that are often punted concerning 
the locality of the liberation struggle. These students later altered the 
political environment of the area in which the schools were based. A 
mistake often made, however, is to assume that these rural schools were 
stable and passive before the arrival of urban student activists. How does 
one explain the fact that the first president of CaSAS, Ephraim Mogale, 
appointed at the Wilgespruit conference in the late 1970s, stemmed from 
the rural areas of the rural far Northern Transvaal? 
Rural situations were not necessarily areas of political tranquillity and 
quiescence, although the urban areas were at the cutting edge of the 
c,l See Sello Mathabatha. 'Missionary Schools, Student Uprisings in Lebowa and the Sekhukhuneland 
Students' Revolts 1983 -1986', African Studies, 64, 2, December 2005. 











liberation struggle because of the predominance of the pertinent issues 
upon which the struggle was based?53 Difficulties with the modes of 
transport, the cost, supply of electricity, skyrocketing rents, housing, the 
permanent presence of the security forces that had occupied most of the 
townships after the breaking-out of violence since September 1984 in the 
Vaal Triangle, and a host of other issues affecting the urban African 
communities caused the struggle in these areas to be much more focused 
and sustainable. The availability, or lack, of amenities around which 
people's problems were based allowed the daily struggles against the 
government to be much more visible. This does not mean that the 
inhabitants of rural areas were quiescent. The exposure of political events 
taking place in rural areas took time as there were no news agencies to 
capture them as they were unfolding. The New Nation newspaper was to 
conclude later that" ... resistance in Sekhukhune and the rest of Lebowa 
(1986) has much in common with the style of anti apartheid organisations 
in the urban townships. ,,254 There was nothing new in this conclusion. In 
the 1950s and 60s most of the areas in the rural far Northern Transvaal 
were in fact resisting the government's betterment schemes, its culling of 
their livestock, forced removals disguised as resettlement under the 
settlement pattern systems and rulers who had been imposed, acquiring 
their new status after cooperating with the advocates of the Bantu 
Authorities. 255 These were issues of national importance but they affected 
particular groups of people living in rural settings. Urban communities 
were not necessarily affected by the introduction of Bantu Authorities 
C" Phala Mahwidi John. for example. was arrested in 1977 for MK-related activities in Soweto. He was 
involved in the rural struggles since the 1950s and linked up rural activists with urban ones until his 
arrest and subsequent imprisonment on Robben Island, for details see Rand Dailv Mail, 4 October 1977 
and 19 October 1977. 
"><;;.t • 
- New NatIOn, January 1 0 1986. 
c55 See Delius. P. A Lion amongst the Cattle: Reconstruction and Resistance in the Northem Transvaal, 











although by law they were supposed to be assigned an ethnic locality in 
the Bantustans. 
In the late 1970s and 1980s the political sands shifted and a new 
generation of rural political activists emerged, to wage the struggle 
differently. These activists could not wage the liberation struggle in the 
same way as their counterparts in urban areas, for a variety of reasons. In 
most cases, there was an interaction between the two geographical 
settings. Each and every political setup exhibited its own peculiarities and 
uniqueness. Rural political activists could not bum down schools, for 
example, because those schools belonged to their parents, as members of 
their respective communities. The homeland governments, in this case, 
those of Gazankulu, KaNgwane, KwaNdebele, Lebowa as well as the 
Republic of Venda, assisted rural communities in building schools on a 
rand-for-rand basis. In other words, if the cost of building a school was 
R 100000, for example, the community was supposed to raise its own half 
of the total amount and the government would contribute the remaining 
R50 000. To raze those schools that had been built by the parents' money 
would have alienated the older generation from the political activists who 
were mostly young, on the whole. This is not to deny that no schools 
were destroyed in these homelands but in the majority of cases the 
schools burned down were located in the semi-urban areas of these 
homelands, such as Lebowakgomo, KaNyamazane, K waMhlanga, 
Giyani, Seshego and Thohoyandou. Where schools were razed in rural 
areas, in the majority of cases they were technical schools and colleges 
erected by the government to provide certain skills needed in a particular 
homeland.256 
2>(' In 1986. for example, at Sekhukhune College of Education in the now defunct Lebowa homeland 











In the urban areas the situation was very different. Schools were 
constructed by Community Councils at the behest of the national 
government and there was no sense of ownership attached to the schools 
amongst the majority of people whom they were supposed to serve. The 
concentration of the majority of people in urban areas as a result of the 
scarcity of employment in the rural areas and of other social amenities 
also contributed to the imbalance of the liberation struggle in favour of 
the urban setting. Rural migration to the cities was bound to shift the 
balance in favour of the latter. The persecution of political activists in 
both rural and urban environments would not be tolerated forever by MK 
as it became increasingly easy to locate political activists from the urban 
areas to rural areas where they would normally hide from police 
harassment. The failure of some political activists to adapt to and be 
absorbed by rural communities led to the exploration of other avenues of 
escaping police brutality. An outlet into the relative serenity of exile was 
the most likely option: a temporary sojourn in preparation for infiltration 
back into South Africa to further the campaign of freedom. On the other 
hand there were those political activists who did not evade the long arm 
of the law and landed themselves long stays on Robben Island. But this 
was not necessarily the case. Certain political activists, strangely enough, 
managed to outwit the security forces and continued to wage the 
liberation struggle while on the most wanted lists. The subsequent 
discussion deals with those political activists who were not so fortunate 












State repression and MK 'slippery' routes 
As state repression upset the binary of urban and rural locale of the armed 
struggle, it is necessary to trace the mindset behind state repression by 
examining the government of the day. With P.W. Botha becoming Prime 
Minister in September 1978, concepts referred to in passing earlier, such 
as the 'Total Strategy' and the 'Destabilisation Policy', were taken to new 
heights. The Total Strategy was: 
[A] comprehensive plan to utilise all the means available to a state 
according to an integrated pattern in order to achieve the national aims 
within the framework of the specific policies. A national total strategy is, 
therefore, not confined to a particular sphere, but is applicable at all levels 
and to all functions of the state "structure". 257 
Botha inherited a state that was security-conscious. Prime Minister B. 1. 
Vorster was so obsessed with the country's security after the collapse of 
the Portuguese colonial empire that he began to expand the capacity of 
h '1' ')58 t e ml ltary.-
In October 1974 Vorster launched a policy of "detente" that was intended 
to draw the like-minded countries of southern Africa into a constellation 
of states united against communism. In this case the enemy was yet to be 
found. The South African invasion of Angola in 1975 and the brutal 
suppression of the Soweto uprisings in 1976 destroyed all chances of 
dialogue and any friendly relations between South Africa and her 
neighbours. 259 The hostility that then characterised the relationship 
between South Africa and the nearby states conversely assisted the ANC 
",7 Glen Moss, 'Total Strategy', Work in Progress, No. II, 1980.p.1. 
2,X Robert Davis and Dan O'Meara, 'Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African 
Regional Policy since 1978', Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. II, No.2, April 1985, p. 118. 











to establish bases in them. In tum these hostile neighbourly relations 
informed the 'Total Strategy' and the 'Destabilisation policy'260 which 
were not necessarily linked. The attempts by the South African 
government to coax her neighbours into non-aggression pacts should be 
analysed in this context.261 
The political emancipation of Angola and Mozambique triggered a sense 
of being besieged in the mind of the South African government. The fear 
of MK being hosted by some of these neighbouring countries 
underpinned all the non-aggression pacts and foreign policies that the 
South African government devised, but these actions were cases of 
closing the stable-door after the horses had bolted, in the sense that the 
seed of resentment against white domination had already been planted 
inside South Africa. In acknowledging the impact that the Southern 
African political changes wrought on South Africa Colin Legum states: 
South Africa is clearly not an "island" lodged in the Southern African 
region but an integral part of a political subsystem within which changes 
in one area impinge directly on all its other parts. Just as white-ruled 
Rhodesia could not insulate itself from the changes resulting from the 
ending of Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique and Angola, so, too, 
South Africa has seen the splintering of its hopes of being able to erect a 
kind of Berlin Wall along the Limpopo and Cunene Rivers. It is not just 
that isolated groups of armed guerrillas have been able to penetrate its 
defense line but, much more important, that there is no impermeable 
barrier to the spread of ideas and influence. 262 
2(,0 On the policy of Destabilisation see Gavin Cawthra, Brutal Force: the Apartheid War Machine, 
(London, International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, May 1986). 
261 The motives of Vorster's policy of detente have invariably been questioned but 'The Constellation 
of States: Peace in Pieces?', South African Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 7, 1981, p. 105 - 113 
expresses reservations quite glaringly. See also Brittain's Hidden Lives, Hidden Deaths: South Afi'ica 's 
Crippling ofa Continent, (London, Faber and Faber, 1988). 
262 Colin Legum, 'Southern Africa in South Africa: the Impact of Regional Events on Domestic 
Politics,' cited in SOllth Afi'ica ill Southern Afi'ica: The Intensi(ving Vortex of Violence by Thomas M. 











The South African government had hoped that its borders would not be 
porous and that its neighbours would not grant political asylum to South 
African political refugees, fearing that these countries would be used as 
springboards for guerrilla attacks. It had also hoped that political refugees 
who managed to establish contacts with exiled organisations such as the 
ANC would not be provided with facilities with which to train and plan 
acts of sabotage against it. 263 This proved to be a myth. Encouraged by 
the examples of successful guerrilla warfare in Angola, Mozambique and 
Zimbabwe, the majority of the South African political activists who were 
either persecuted by the security police or were politicised by 
underground members of the ANC in their communities in the rural far 
Northern Transvaal decided to cross the border and join the South 
African liberation movements. 264 The fear that gripped white farmers in 
the north of the country can be summed up by the behaviour of Willie 
Esterhuyse, a border farmer in the north, who led a 50-man commando. 
He carried a 9mm pistol at all times and taught his 8-year-old son how to 
use his semi-automatic weapon just in case they were attacked by MK.265 
It is demonstrated that while the South African government armed and 
transformed farmers in the border areas into commandos waiting for MK 
cadres, MK deployed its military and political cadres into the country by 
. I 266 unconventlOna means, 
Dispersed political activists in the far Northern Transvaal could not hold 
on to their rural or urban settings. State repression was very severe and 
263 Deon Geldenhuys, 'Some Strategic Implications of Regional Economic Relationships for the 
Republic of South Africa.' ISSUP Strategic Review, January 1981, p. 20. 
264 Viva FRELIMO rallies of the mid-1970s were generally signs of encouragement and support by 
students and members of communities that the liberation struggle in South Africa was also possible. 
said in text. 
26j 'Northern Transvaal Landmines', Sundav Star, 22 December 1985. 
261> This point is made clear in an intervie~ by Dick Ralushai, who had been based in the now defunct 
homeland of Venda (adjacent to Zimbabwe) since the late 1970s and received so many weapons, that 











caused enonnous hann to political activism. The subsequent discussion 
provides an account for that dispersion and political consciousness (and 
not necessarily the road to exile). Collins Chabane, Ngoako Ramatlhodi, 
Tlokwe Maserumule, Jerome Joseph Maake, Nwedamutswu "Mumsy" 
Mamabolo Phillip and others left the country either in the late 1970s or at 
the tum of the 1980s for exile. Thabo Makunyane, who at the time was 
imprisoned for distributing banned literature in Venda, had been born into 
an ANC family. His grandfather was a card-carrying member of the 
ANC. His mother's cousin, a Tolamo, died in exile and these 
circumstances came to influence him at a later stage of his political 
development. Thabo' s maternal uncle almost died during the 
Sebatakgomo Movement uprisings in Sekhukhune in the late 1950s.267 
(Makunyane was born in Sekhukhuneland.) This led to the Makunyane 
family relocating from the Sekhukhune area and later moving to 
Polokwane. His mother's constant references to and lionisation of people 
she knew in the ANC and who were in exile also contributed to Thabo's 
political awakening. 268 Thabo in tum influenced his own acquaintances 
and friends and the gospel of freedom was preached and spread in this 
fashion. In this context, he was later sentenced, together with Ephraim 
Mogale, to eight years on Robben Island in the late 1970s (later to be 
reduced to five). The futility of banning people and suppressing their 
ideas of freedom and destabilisation was patently clear because the die 
had already been cast. Exiled political activists were already undergoing 
military and political training, ready to be deployed inside the country, 
and they knew the routes back home. The following case vindicates this 
point. 
Ch, See Peter Delius. 'Sebatakgomo: Migrant organisation. the ANC and the Sekhukhuneland Revolt.' 
Journal o/A/i'ican Studies. Vol. IS. No.4. October 1989. 
2(,X Interview with Thabo Makunyane by Siphamandla Zondi. Polokwane. SADET Oral History 











Zimbabwe: The launching pad of the armed propaganda liberation 
struggle? 
Since Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe attained independence, the 
regional picture has undergone profound alteration. Countries that once had 
shared similar interests with South Africa are now controlled by regimes 
overtly hostile to Pretoria; thus the anti-apartheid fires that were already 
smouldering throughout the continent were fanned by the new policy-
makers. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was re-energised by 
these events, and its Liberation Committee was newly inspired. Not only 
could they now devote their undivided attention to South Africa and its so-
called 'colony' of Namibia, but they could utilise the neighbouring 
independent states as launching pads in the 'liberation' of the blacks in both 
territories. The exiled A.N.C. and the P.A.c. might still have to do the 
fighting, but they found themselves surrounded by friends who would assist 
them politically, diplomatically, infrastructurally, and militarily.269 
In particular, the liberation of Zimbabwe in 1980 signalled a range of 
possibilities for that of South Africa. The historical relations between the 
ANC and the Zimbabwean liberation forces, particularly the Zimbabwe 
African People's Union (ZAPU)'s Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary 
Army (ZIPRA) were not by any means to be terminated on the attainment 
of independence by Zimbabwe in 1980. The South African government 
was aware of these historical links and wanted to cut them before the 
ANC could take advantage of Zimbabwean independence from the 
clutches of Ian Smith's government. South Africa's economic domination 
of the southern African region was one way of throttling the Zimbabwean 
government into submission.270 At independence, Robert Mugabe of 
Zimbabwe discovered that the country was financially and politically 
indebted to South Africa as it had inherited the legacy of the Unilateral 
c('<) Chris Maritz, 'Pretoria's Reaction to the Role of Moscow and Peking in Southern Africa', The 
Journal of Modem African Studies, Vol. 25, No.2, (1987), p. 326. 
c
7
11 Leaders of the 'front line states' formed SADCC in 1980 to try to strengthen economic ties amongst 











Declaration of Independence (UDI) (Rhodesia, 1965).271 Owing to their 
cooperation with respect to trade and transport the two countries 
exchanged "trade consuls" and the security forces collaborated, "in theory 
to seek out criminals", but in practice the cooperation amounted to South 
African pressure on Zimbabwe to make life difficult for members of the 
ANC. 272 An outright rejection of the debts incurred by the colonial 
government in Zimbabwe was not an option since it could have strained 
the relationship of the two countries and jeopardised the liberation of 
South Africa's majority from the white minority. But in 1980 the South 
African government, notwithstanding its power in all spheres, seemed to 
be under siege as a result of these remarkable changes in the political 
fortunes of the Southern African region. 273 
President Mugabe of Zimbabwe knew that the South African government 
would exact a price for his support of the ANC. The formation of the 
Mozambique National Resistance Movement (MNR or RENAMO) at the 
instigation of the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation (CIa) and 
South African collusion with Rhodesia after Mozambican independence 
in 1975 returned to haunt the Mugabe government later in the 1980s. On 
Zimbabwean independence the RENAMO directorate was flown to South 
Africa's Phalaborwa military base in the far Northern Transvaa1.274 
RENAMO ensured, by sabotaging the Mozambican rail systems, that 
Zimbabwe was held economically hostage to South Africa. Its incessant 
bombing of the Beira railway, an oil pipeline to Zimbabwe in the north 
and the coast road from Maputo to Beira destroyed the Zimbabwean 
271 Guy Arnold, 'Zimbabwe: Escaping South Africa's Coils', Nell' Aji'ican Market, No. 245, February 
19R8, p. 35. 
272 Ihid. p. 35. 
273 Dennis Austin. 'South Africa 1984'. Chatham HOllse Papers. No. 26. The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs. p. 46. 











economy.275 Summing up Zimbabwean economIC situation, Barber 
concludes: 
As a land-locked country she (Zimbabwe) has to rely on her neighbours 
for access to the outside world, and South Africa's ports and transport 
system which have always been important became even more so in the 
1970s, when, for one reason or another, the Mozambique ports were not 
available. 276 
The Zimbabwean government persisted despite all these man-made 
obstacles, being forced by moral and historic obligations to assist in the 
liberation struggle of South Africa, as argued below. It was under these 
circumstances, therefore, that Zimbabwe hosted most of the political 
refugees who were either released from the country's jails or came to 
settle and carry out the ANC's underground liberation struggles. 277 The 
following historical case details some of the salient incidental benefits 
accruing to the ANC/MK as a result of the Zimbabwean government's 
political savvy and determination to see southern African free from 
colonial misgovernment. President Mugabe realised that inasmuch as the 
Mozambicans had hosted him and made major sacrifices he too was 
morally and politically obliged to assist the ANC in the fight against 
apartheid. He needed to do so in a manner that would be acceptable to 
critics and not bluntly demonstrate support arrogantly and openly for the 
ANC. Space was therefore created for MK operatives in Zimbabwe who 
remained there on sufferance mostly during the 1980s, carrying out MK 
missions into South Africa through its northern border. The intention is to 
bring to light the fact that it was not only the urban areas of South Africa 
27, Ihid, p. 20. 
27(, James Barber, 'Supping with the Devil- Zimbabwe-South African Relations', International Affairs 
Bul/etin, Vol. 6, No. I, 1982, pp. 4-5. 
277 Interview with William Motau by the author, IKIM Building, Nelspruit, Mpumalanga Province, 27 












that contributed to the liberation struggle waged by MK. The intricate 
nature of the liberation struggle couple with a range of sophisticated 
networks that straddled both the rural and urban settings, justify the 
inclusion of these case studies. 
Harare Motorway Express Bus Company and MK 
The arrival of Refiloe Mudimu in January 1977 in exile signalled an end 
to the relative complacency that the South African government had 
enjoyed in terms of the security of the rural far Northern Transvaal. 
Refiloe, a student leader during the Soweto 1976 student uprisings, left 
for exile in Mozambique and was appointed the deputy political 
commissar of his group on arrival there.278 Refiloe trained in East 
Germany during June 1977 and was appointed a commander under the 
stewardship of Duncan Nhlanhla Mahlangu on his return, after which he 
stayed in Quibaxe (Camp 13) in Angola. Here he was appointed one of 
the instructors in military combat work (MCW) as well as in military 
topography. He assisted in compiling the ANC military topography 
manuals. In 1978 he was summoned to Lusaka to take part in the ANC's 
envisaged movie, The Battle for South Africa. Duncan Nhlanhla 
Mahlangu was also summoned to Lusaka for the same mission because of 
his recent experience during his escape after the capture of Solomon 
Mahlangu in Johannesburg. 279 Refiloe was asked to give an account (in 
the movie) of what had led to the 1976 Soweto student uprisings. Duncan 
Mahlangu was presumably requested to relate the George Goch incident 
c7X Interview with Refiloe Mudimu by the author, South African Navy Headquarters, Pretoria, Gauteng 
Province, 18 January 2005. 











in which he had escaped, while Solomon Kalushi Mahlangu was later 
hanged.no 
In 1979 Joe Qqabi visited Camp 13 and he and Refiloe were able to 
discuss their interaction back in South Africa before both of them left the 
country. The current head of logistics in Angola passed away and as a 
replacement Joe Qhabi recommended to Mzwai Piliso (a special aide to 
the ANC's Acting President Oliver Tambo at the time) that Refiloe would 
be a suitable candidate.28I This marked the beginning of Refiloe's steady 
rise in the hierarchy of the ANC and MK. He subsequently left Quibaxe 
camp to Luanda in August 1979 to take over the position of the deputy 
chief of logistics in Angola. He was also included in the treasury 
committee and remained in those positions until 1981. Refiloe then 
proceeded to Lusaka, Zambia, to be married. While he was waiting for 
the formalities to be concluded he was appointed MK representative in 
the national youth preparatory committee, which later revived the ANC 
youth section. In this committee Refiloe's colleagues were Eddy Funde, 
Max Sisulu, Joyce Dipale and others. It organised the ANC youth 
conference that took place in Mazimbu, Tanzania during 1982. 
After this conference Welile Nhlapo was appointed the first chairperson 
of the ANC youth section in exile. Klaus Maphepha (Vusi Mavimbela) 
was a member of this section, Mongezi Stofile was in charge of publicity, 
while Joyce Dipale and Mpho Masetla were also included in the 
executive committee of the youth section of the ANC. Max Sisulu took 
responsibility for the internal reconstruction of the youth initiatives. 
eXO Ibid. 
eXI Joe Qhabi always insisted that recently recruited MK cadres should be given positions of 
responsibility so that they gave direction based on recently acquired information, rather than MK 












Refiloe worked under Stofile as the national coordinator of the youth and 
radio programmes of the ANC's Radio Freedom, broadcast from Lusaka. 
The ANC youth section presented a bulletin called Revenge and another 
youth bulletin was entitled Forward. Refiloe was a member of the 
Forward editorial board. Refiloe was later appointed the chairperson of 
the ANC youth section in Lusaka for three successive years, and in this 
position he was able to collaborate very closely with Thabo Mbeki and 
Welile Nhlapo. 
In the course of his duties Refiloe eventually met Cassius Maake and Paul 
Dikeledi and they discussed their main concern at the time: that the need 
existed for MK to deploy members in the front areas (Frontline States). 
The same discussion was later held with Chris Hani. Hani prevailed upon 
Refiloe to agree that there was a pressing need for him to pack and join 
the ranks of MK on a fulltime basis. Hani informed him that he should 
choose between being permanently stationed in Botswana or in 
Zimbabwe. Refiloe chose the latter because he had relatives there that 
could assist him in the execution of his political duties. After his South 
African passport was forged RefUoe was infiltrated into Zimbabwe using 
his South African names as reflected in these identification documents. 
Refiloe's surname of Mudimu should be written and pronounced 
"Modimo" to denote its South African Northern Sotho (Sepedi) origin. 
The Zimbabwean version of the same surname is Mudimu and on this 
basis he was able to masquerade as a Zimbabwean citizen.282 It was also 
on the basis of this surname that he was able to affiliate to the ZANU-PF 
and enjoy access to whatever he needed in Zimbabwe. Refiloe later 
proceeded from Zimbabwe to Zambia in order to report to his MK 











supenors on the progress he was making in his endeavours regarding 
infiltration into the northern part of South Africa. 
Refiloe mislaid his passport before he could return to Zimbabwe. A new 
passport was issued for him in Zambia, bearing a different name, but on 
the declaration form that was to be completed at the border post with 
Zimbabwe Refiloe mistakenly gave an address that eventually led to his 
arrest. When his period of stay in Zimbabwe lapsed the Zimbabwean 
Ministry of Home Affairs started looking for him. He was arrested for 
staying too long in the country. Initially the Zimbabwean authorities gave 
Refiloe the benefit of the doubt because he was claiming to be a 
Zimbabwean on the basis of the spelling of his surname - Mudimu. They 
requested him to fetch his "parents". He obliged. Only after he had 
brought his "parents" to the home affairs offices were he was asked the 
name of his "mother" - which he could not provide. Although Refiloe's 
deportation order to Zambia was then issued, Shadrack Khumalo (Africa, 
nom de guerre) was a member of the ANC security personnel in 
Zimbabwe who had connections with officials in the home affairs 
department. Khumalo and his contacts there "stole" Refiloe's file and as a 
result he was able to continue to stay in Zimbabwe illegally, coordinating 
MK activities, ordnance in particular. 
In this capacity Refiloe was responsible for the infiltration of weapons 
into South Africa using the rural far Northern Transvaal as an entry point. 
A tour bus company called Harare Motorway Express used to ferry 
numerous passengers into South Africa and back into Zimbabwe, mostly 
Zimbabweans but occasionally South Africans. Refiloe recruited some of 
the bus drivers and conductors of this firm into underground activities. It 











activities of their drivers and the MK connections. The Beit Bridge border 
post in the Musina (Messina, in the past) area was used as an entry point. 
The bus travelled from here to Johannesburg and it was able to offload its 
"gifts" (see below) at certain bus stops where internal MK contacts were 
waiting. Refiloe started by managing to "befriend" Dominic Katana who 
was employed by this company as a regular bus conductor.283 The 
Zimbabweans using these buses preferred, in the early 1980s, to change 
rands into Zimbabwean dollars and it was during one of these encounters 
that Refiloe and Dominic met. After exchanging pleasantries and 
befriending each other Refiloe recruited Dominic for the smuggling of 
arms. 
Dominic revealed to Refiloe the existence of secret compartments being 
used to smuggle liquor into Zimbabwe from South Africa, which were 
later used to transport arms and ammunition destined for the latter 
country, wrapped in such a way that they looked like real gifts from 
relatives or lovers. The employees of the Harare Motorway Express bus 
company, particularly the bus drivers, were paid for their courage in 
taking the risk of smuggling ordnance. The MK recruitment units were 
enlisted to recruit people who would receive these gifts inside the 
country. Once a person was recruited, using various mechanisms like 
identifying well-known political activists inside the country, he would 
then be summoned to Zimbabwe to be briefed concerning MeW. The 
classes in Zimbabwe included secret communications such as sign 
language, topography for the purposes of the location of DLBs, and a 
whole range of techniques that the underground world of MK' s liberation 
struggle encompassed. 
eX' Dominic Katana arrived at the ANC head office after the installation of the new government, asking 











In Johannesburg, Dan Montsitsi, one of the leaders of the Soweto student 
uprisings, usually received the "gifts" that were mostly wrapped as if they 
were Christmas gifts with red ribbons on top. It is essential to dwell on 
the "gifts" story in detail to prevent possible confusion and scepticism 
about the veracity of the story. These "gifts" were not addressed to any 
particular person and they were usually hidden from the passengers' view 
in the secret compartments mentioned earlier on. The bus drivers were 
told of the dropping-off places and the contacts that would receive the 
parcels. They were not supposed to meet these "contacts" inside the 
country.284 Timing, the mode of transport and the weight of the "gifts" 
comprised essential factors. But in urban areas few localities were 
available as dropping-off points. Personal gestures and distinguishable 
attire that were probably described (to the bus drivers) were made use of 
in such cases after "formal introductions" between the recipient and the 
bus driver. Secret briefing meetings, for example, were held in Zimbabwe 
between Refiloe and whichever bus driver was assigned to South Africa 
to meet MK contacts for this purpose. Drivers would be informed that 
when they arrived in Johannesburg they would, for instance, be 
approached by somebody wearing a black hat the brim of which would be 
turned backwards, for example. These disguises were meant for 
identification purposes and to test the loyalty of the bus drivers rather 
than to cause confusion. Any interaction was fraught with the possibility 
of arrest and needed maximum vigilance. 
In towns such as Makhado (Louis Trichardt) Dick Ralushai was the 
contact who received the "gifts" for the rural far Northern Transvaal 
eX4 "A Contact is a single individual performing one or other function for the movement. He does it 
consciously and is committed debasing all consequences," The Creation of the Underground Units, 
Umkhonto we Sizwe Papers, Jack Simons Collections, Manuscripts and Archives, University of Cape 











region of Venda and the surrounding villages. 2Rs The ANC Intelligence 
Unit deployed inside the country recruited Ralushai into these activities. 
The work of recruiting people for the infiltration of arms was not 
confined to the ANC intelligence unit only. Members such as Kenny 
Fihla, his sister Bessie and Dan Montsitsi as well as Rapu Molekane on 
the Witwatersrand also recruited others who were, in their judgment at 
least, trusted cadres of the ANC organisation or sympathetic to its 
policies. Ralushai, for instance, exhibited a history of BPC and SASO 
involvement where he had served as a branch secretary in Sibasa (Venda) 
under the auspices of Simon Tshenuwani Farisani in the 1970s. 
Ralushai's SASO activism resulted from his days at the University of 
Zululand, where he had studied law until he was unable to return to the 
university as a result of the solidarity that students there had pledged with 
the University of the North students when Abram Tiro was expelled in 
1972. 
Ralushai was arrested on the 19 October 1977 together with the rest of 
the leaders of the majority of black student and political organisations and 
detained at Modderbee prison in Benoni for almost a year. He shared a 
prison cell with his boss Percy Qhoboza, in the sense that Dick also acted 
as the rural far Northern Transvaal correspondent of the Weekend World, 
the newspaper Qhoboza edited.286 Modderbee prison represented a 
learning curve for Ralushai in the sense that he met many prisoners who 
were politically mature, such as Matthews Maphumolo who had already 
served ten years on Robben Island before he was released in the late 
1970s. Maphumolo joined the Modderbee group who had been detained 
there since 1977. Ralushai was released in 1978 and subsequently 












converted to ANC politics because of his exposure in prison to the ANC's 
cadres and politics. He brought this wealth of experience to the ANC and 
Refiloe's underground unit. 
Ralushai led a unit of about six people such as Elias Ramano, Calvin 
Mthiwane, Mashudu Mudau and others, which was not only responsible 
for the distribution of arms and ammunition and their storage in the rural 
far Northern Transvaal but also for a number of attacks in the Venda area 
during the 1980s. The headquarters of the former Venda homeland's 
armed forces and the fuel depot in Louis Trichardt included some of these 
targets.2~7 The unit also attacked the magistrate's office in Thohoyandou, 
the capital city of the Republic of Venda. Another attack in the Venda 
area was that on the police station in Sibasa during 1981. Bishop Peter 
Phaswane, Dean Tshenuwani Farisani, Reverend Mahampa and Ramano 
Shikororo were detained on allegations of complicity in these 
incidents.2~~ They were subsequently released in 1982 on the grounds of 
insufficient evidence to link them with the police station incident. 
A difficulty faced by homeland activists at the time stemmed from the 
fact that only a few people were interested in politics because of the 
repression meted out to political activists by the Venda security police. 
These police could easily clamp down on these activists as they were few 
in number and were well-known to the security forces of both South 
Africa and Venda. The same known political activists were arrested for 
every action taken against the government by its political opponents. 
Under these repressive conditions a deluge of "gifts" from Zimbabwe 
eX7 [hid. 











nevertheless continued to flood the rural far Northern Transvaal. In an 
interview with Ralushai the point was made clear: 
Interviewer: Do you think that you had a lot of "hardware"? 
Ralushai: Yes, you know .... there was a stage when these things were 
coming like we were going to have a war at one stage. You know, one 
would actually be going out almost every two nights, you know, or three 
nights ... I remember particularly towards the late 80s, we were actually 
receiving a lot of "hardware" from outside (Zimbabwe). We were ... at one 
stage not managing to have the proper dead letter boxes (OLBs) for those 
things but we had to work overnight to get the proper storage for them. 2R9 
Refiloe's mission was made possible by the people selected inside the 
country by the ANC Intelligence unit. Ralushai used his insurance 
company's car to transport the "hardware" to various storage facilities in 
the rural far Northern Transvaal. The map of the area where the 
"hardware" was to be dropped would be handed to Ralushai prior to its 
offloading by his contacts in exile as arranged by Refiloe and others. The 
time would also be communicated to him beforehand, as would the mode 
of transport involved. This entailed the colour of the vehicle, its number 
plates and the driver for that particular day. Most of these drivers were 
part of the mission and as a result they would know what to do. These 
deliveries were mostly undertaken at night and the weight of the "gift" 
suggested its contents. It was on the basis of his political history and his 
job with the insurance firm that Ralushai had been recruited. He was at 
the time based inside Venda in the Vivo area, which was the next port of 
call after Beit Bridge for the bus company and other transport truck 
compames. 
The receipt, storage and distribution of ordnance were not as 
straightforward as is suggested here. The ANC Intelligence Unit, for 











example, would recruit people with a pedigree of political activism and 
then hand them over to the RPMRC for a crash course in the reading of 
coded messages, weapons handling and storage, identification of dead 
letter boxes, sign communication techniques and a host of other related 
matters that needed to be circumspectly adhered to at all times. The 
reconnaissance unit, for example, would identify the potential targets. 
There were many ways of carrying out reconnaissance missions of these. 
One method was to organise picnics near the targets. It is common 
knowledge that revellers normally take photos and in the process of 
celebrating during a picnic photos of the target would be taken for further 
inspection by another unit such as the Special Operations Unit, which 
woule! carry out the mission on the said target. 
The Special Operations Unit (SOU), commonly called Special Ops, was 
intended to be a unit empowered to select highly symbolic targets and 
mount "spectacular armed propaganda attacks".290 Owing to such attacks 
MK came to be highly regarded. It was later remarked that the ANC 
waited for opportune moments to "fan the flames of unrest with guerrilla 
attacks, which increased from 40 in 1984 to 136 in 1985 and 228 in 
1986.,,291 The SOU operated outside the classical behaviour of military 
combat. In line with the theory of guerrilla warfare it avoided direct 
military confrontation with the SADF and other security enforcement 
agencies of the various homelands where it operated. Joe Slovo was 
responsible for it. 
The profiles of people recruited in these underground MK structures were 
supposed to be kept very low at all times so that police attention would 
~'!II Lu1i Callinicos. Oliver Tambo: Beyond the Engeli Mountains, Op. Cit., p. 530. . 
_'!I Anthony Marx. Lessons of Struggle: South Afi-ican Internal Oppositioll, 1960 - 1990, (Cape Town. 











not be drawn to them. When Refiloe was appointed the commander of the 
Nchabeleng Unit292 after 1986, under the auspices of the Service Unit 
(SU),293 Ralushai became one of the key players on such missions in the 
area. However, in Zimbabwe Refiloe was redeployed from the ordnance 
department after the death of Cassius Maake in Swaziland in 1986, 
paving the way for Rachid (Ishmael Abubaker)/94 who was introduced to 
Dominic Katane in order to continue the work that Mudimu was doing 
with MK. The Harare Motorway bus company continued to be used 
extensively for many years, escaping police detection. Cars owned by 
individuals and hired vehicles were also used for the same objectives; in 
most cases their drivers or owners would not know about the 
consignments they were transporting back to South Africa. The ANC 
officials in Zimbabwe would normally book visitors into hotels and then 
take care of their cars while visitors were attending to their assignments 
in Zimbabwe. Secret compartments would be constructed in these cars; 
contacts in South Africa would be informed about the compartments and 
the registration numbers of cars carrying the "gifts" into the country. The 
same feat was repeated in other neighbouring countries by different units 
of MK that were infiltrated into them.295 
Still other underground operatives of MK were assigned the tasks of 
ensuring that consignments of arms and ammunitions were safely stored 
when they had already been delivered inside the country, in places like 
292 Nchabeleng Unit was named after the United Democratic Front leader in the Northern Transvaal 
who was killed by the police in 1986. The unit operated in and around the Northern Transvaal 
immediately after Nchabeleng was beaten to death by the security police at Schoonoord police station. 
He was also a veteran of the ANc/MK who spent 8 years on Robben Island and was released in 1972. 
293 MK's Service Unit was led by Linda Mti in the 1980s. It was responsible for servicing all units that 
were operating inside the country. 
29-1 Cassius Maake (Job Tabane) was one of the leaders of MK, stationed in Swaziland at the time, 
before his assassination by Eugene de Kock's security police. 
2'15 See Gomolemo Mokae's 'Robert McBride - A Coloured Life', PhD Thesis. Vista University, 











KwaNdebele, Moutse and Phalaborwa. For example, Nick Matlhakoane 
was responsible for the receipt and distribution of arms and ammunition 
in and around Phalaborwa. 296 He was also tasked with the responsibility 
of monitoring Glory Sedibe (September). September defected from MK 
after being abducted from the ANC in Swaziland in the mid-1980s with 
the aid of the Swazi royal police and thereafter worked for the South 
African security police; according to MK his actions needed constant 
surveillance. He was the second-in-command of the political machinery 
in Swaziland, responsible for rural military and political missions in the 
far Northern Transvaal. His defection and vast knowledge of MK 
operations particularly in this region was considered dangerous by the 
ANC. It is assumed that the security forces regarded him as a major 
acquisition in their conflict with MK. September was arrested by the 
Swazi Royal Police in the Phungalegazi area (a royal residence) and 
handed over to the South African police who made him an offer he could 
not refuse - to be an askari. 297 September died of poisoning in the early 
1990s under mysterious circumstances after he had tried unsuccessfully 
to be reconciled with his former friends in the ANC. 
In Tzaneen Refiloe established contacts which ensured that the infiltrated 
arms and ammunition were safely transported to their destination. Most 
of these recruits would cross the Beit Bridge border post into Zimbabwe 
legally in order to hold briefings and debriefings with Refiloe's unit, 
returning into South Africa and continuing with their above-board duties. 
Cassell Mathale, the current provincial secretary of the ANC in Limpopo, 
was one such person. Trish Hanekom, Ryder (Paul) Moloto and Refiloe 
2% Interview with Refiloe Mudimu, by the author, South African Navy Headquarters, Pretoria. Gauteng 
Province. 21 January 2005. 
2,!7 An Askari is a former guerrilla 'turned' or recruited by the security forces. Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Afi-ica Report. Volume Seven. August 











met with Mathale from Tzaneen in the Beit Bridge area during the mid-
1980s; while they were holding this meeting the news of Ephraim 
Mogale's car accident in Botswana was reported to Refiloe. Mogale was 
being infiltrated back into the country after a visit to Zimbabwe for 
consultations on the underground activities of MK. At the time of the 
accident the South African Youth Congress (SA YCO) inside the country 
needed Mogale for their conference. Mogale was one of the veterans of 
MK who were tried and tested and could therefore easily move in and out 
of the country for briefing and debriefing purposes. 29R In Moutse, for 
example, Isaac (Sam) Ditshego was the main contact, assisted by 
Mahlangu Bax, Ephraim Mogale and others. Sam Nkosi together with 
Pharephare (Richard Mothobi) travelled into exile from Bushbuckridge 
before they were reinfiltrated into the country through Botswana to carry 
out the mandate of securing a safe place for arms and ammunitions. They 
too met with Refiloe for these purposes. 
The stockpiling of weapons admittedly had its own flaws. In theory, 
weapons were supposed to be stored in DLBs at all times unless they 
were going to be used in a mission. The dangers of DLBs are legendary, 
as a single example will demonstrate. The apprehending of Chief 
Mohlamonyane Piet Mathebe and his unit led the police to the arms cache 
in the Potgietersrust (PP Rust) area.299 Chief Mathebe and his section of 
the Nchabeleng unit were still discussing how to store these arms when 
the police burst in on them. The unit possessed a sketch and by means of 
it the police were able to trace other arms caches in the PP Rust area. The 
c9X Interview with Ephraim Mogale, by the author, Bronkhorspruit, Gauteng Province 26 & 27 April 
2003. 
c9<) Chief Mohlamonyane Piet Mathebe was recruited into the ANC/MK underground in the mid-1980s 
when his village of Moutse was involved in a protracted war with the KwaNdebele government that 
wanted to incorporate it. See Phatlane, S. N., 'The KwaNdebele Independence Issue: A Critical 
Appraisal of the Crises around Independence in KwaNdebele 1982 - 1989'. MA Thesis. University of 











arrest of one individual led to the taking into custody of the whole unit or 
units. This kind of situation also accounted for the arrests of MK cadres 
during Operation Vula in the late 1980s.300 
The apprehension of Chief Mathebe's section needs further elaboration 
because it exposed the weaknesses of the DLBs for the purposes of 
storage. Holes were dug and used as storage facilities. The idea was to 
avoid human-to-human contact as far as possible, for fear of the 
consequences arising from arrests and defections to the South African 
security police under extreme interrogation and torture. For the next 
person to find the DLBs, it was not necessary to have a map of the area 
where the DLBs were located. Visualisation of the area and the exact 
place when weapons were stored should have been sufficient. The MK 
training in topography and map interpretation was meant to address some 
of these concerns. The arrest of MK cadres with maps on their persons 
would obviously lead the police to the DLBs, as Chief Mathebe's case 
had demonstrated, and the consequences were dire. As a result DLBs 
would be known only by a very few MK underground cadres on a need-
to-know basis. It was therefore possible that an area could be saturated by 
DLBs. Dick considers that in his area of Venda he ran out of suitable 
locations, particularly towards the late 1980s, as large consignments of 
"gifts" had been received by his unit from Refiloe in Zimbabwe. 30l There 
were always dangers of DLBs being excavated, either by people who 
might have seen MK cadres bury weapons or by workers carrying out 
their daily work. In urban areas, household yards and to a limited extent 
open playing fields were used in most cases because there was not 
31111 Interview with Refiloe Mudimu, by the author, South African Air Force Headquarters, Pretoria, 
Gauteng Province, 21 January 2005. 











enough open space for DLBs.302 Rather than depending on the 
cooperation of the owners of the yards, in most cases they were not 
informed about their yards acting as storage facilities because in such 
situations honesty was not always an option. Underground military and 
political matters require maximum caution. 
Refiloe's key vantage point in Zimbabwe helped MK to infiltrate arms 
into the north of the country despite the fact that the area was teeming 
with security forces. The South African security police expected that they 
would be able to apprehend MK cadres, since the area was once 
described as not being far from "the fangs of the terrorists. ,,303 Most of 
these "terrorists" used either the Botswana or Swaziland "pipelines,,304 to 
enter the country and link up with their "gifts" from the heavily guarded 
Zimbabwean route. Some of these "terrorists" made use of the same route 
from Zimbabwe into Beit Bridge border post, unarmed since their "gifts" 
had preceded them. 
The porous nature of the two country's routes can be captured by a 
narration of the role played by Sam Ditshego in the 1980s. Ditshego was 
recruited inside the country for MK operations. He married his wife in an 
area that straddles the two countries of South Africa and Botswana, called 
Pitsane-Molopo. Pitsane-Molopo used to be a geographic unity but the 
course of history disrupted that unity and created two villages that are 
separated by a fence between the two countries. The inhabitants of the 
village share everything, including social events such as burials and 
10e Interview with Madela George (Mdu) Mokoena, by the author, South African Police Services 
(SAPS) Regional Headquarters, Middleburg, Mpumalanga Province, 15 October 2002. In this 
interview this point emerged clearly because Mdu believes that his unit's DLB is still situated in his 
father's yard in Mhluzi, Middleburg Township. 
10.1 Lebowa, 'Homeland Leaders Reject Independence', 13 December 1974, p. 29. 
104 "Pipelines" were secret routes of infiltration into South Africa and exit into exile used mostly at 











weddings, as well as other cultural engagements. As a son-in-law of the 
village Ditshego would receive invitations to attend some of these social 
gatherings. He and his MK contacts in Moutse would make use of such 
occasions to infiltrate people into the country from Botswana and spirit 
those who had been recruited out of the country.305 All that was needed 
for people to be able to travel to Pitsane-Molopo was an official letter 
from Ditshego's chieftaincy in the Moutse area near Groblersdal. The 
chieftainess was an MK sympathiser and a son of hers, who was heir to 
the throne of the Bantoane community, was a member of the underground 
MK unit: Chief Mohlamonyane Mathebe. The Chief later left the country 
for formal military and political training with ANC/MK. 
The recruitment of people inside the country for MK was multi-pronged. 
Contrary to popular arguments such as those advanced by Howard 
Barrell/06 the role of some comrades in South Africa was to find MK 
sympathisers who would accommodate MK cadres on missions inside the 
country. But matters did not always tum out as planned and aberrations 
should not be understood as norms. The case of Maserumule Tlokwe will 
make the point clear. Tlokwe left the country for Mozambique in 1979 
after constant police harassment. He handed himself over to the 
FRELIMO forces and was eventually united with the ANC. Years later 
(in about 1983-4) Siphiwe Nyanda, an MK leader responsible for the 
rural Northern Transvaal MK machinery, deployed him into the far rural 
Northern Transvaal together with Tito Manthata on a recruitment drive.307 
311' Interview with RefiIoe Mudimu, by the author Navy Headquarters, Pretoria, Gauteng Province, 21 
January 2005. 
306 Barrell argues, amongst other accusations, that MK ran no reception committees for deployed cadres 
on various missions inside the country and that this hampered their progress in the execution of those 
mISSIOns. 











The two MK cadres were not travelling together but were intending to 
meet at some point inside the country to consolidate their missions. 
Tlokwe entered the country through "pipelines" into the KaNgwane area 
(Eastern Transvaal at the time). He was instructed to stay for a week at 
GaMampuru in the Steelpoort area and wait for the next instruction from 
his superiors in MK in exile. Everything initially proceeded as arranged. 
His next task was to move to the Motetema Township outside 
Groblersdal after accomplishing his first mission and wait for the 
following instruction. When Tlokwe was taken to Motetema to join the 
Maepa family (his host while en route to the next destination) he found 
that the family had relocated to Dennilton. The driver who transported 
him to the Maepa family just dropped him at a particular spot; Tlokwe 
was then supposed to locate the Maepa household in Motetema. Tlokwe 
eventually managed to trace the Maepa family in Dennilton, some thirty 
kilometers away from Motetema location. Unfortunately Isaac "Ike" 
Maepa, the owner of the homestead, was not staying there with his family 
at the time. He was somewhere on the Reef carrying out ANC 
missions. 30R Tlokwe spent time with the family waiting for the instruction 
regarding his next step. The instruction never arrived as arranged but he 
waited lest his superiors lose his track. Possibly, when Tlokwe was 
dropped at Motetema and told to wait for the "next instruction", those 
who were supposed to convey these instructions lost trace of him when he 
could not find the Maepa family. The fact that Tlokwe did not receive the 
"next instruction" and was arrested could be attributed to this disruption 
in the line of communication.309 The fact that he eventually found the 
30X Isaac Maepa was an underground MK operative with a legal travel document (a passport) which he 
used to travel legally between South African and Swaziland on behalf of the ANC. 
309 The point with these "next instructions" was that neither the carrier of the "instructions" nor the 











Maepa family in the Dennilton area, did not form part of the plans of his 
MK handlers in exile; hence the delay and the dislocation of the entire 
mISSIOn. 
Tlokwe was already well-armed and was mostly in hiding, only going out 
to meet certain people for particular missions but when his main 
instruction was not forthcoming he grew tired of hiding during the day 
and started visiting the shops nearby. On the other hand, Maepa's 
children and their friends were acquainted with him and noticed the large 
amount of money that was in his possession. Little did they know that 
these R50 notes were mostly fake, intended to flood the South African 
economy so as to facilitate its collapse. One of the friends of Maepa's 
children stole some of the notes. He was severely assaulted by the 
Maepas' children who later related the episode to Tlokwe. Tlokwe 
admonished the children for having assaulted the "culprit" as this act was 
unlawful. The children later decided to go and finish "this thief' off in the 
fear that he would lay a charge of assault against them. They also knew 
that he would mention Tlokwe as the owner of the money that he (the 
thief) had stolen and were concerned because they were aware that 
Tlokwe was a member ofMK and that he was well-armed. 
Tlokwe was no longer able to hide his weapons as he was supposed to 
have left for his next destination before people's suspicions were aroused. 
The problem of a lack of communication disrupted all these plans, as did 
the facts that the Maepas had relocated to Dennilton and that Maepa 
senior (Isaac Maepa) was not there.3lo The "thief' was located at the 
hospital from which he absconded to the nearest police station where he 
cadres deployed in the fields of operations. Military and political "instructions" are normally 
sacrosanct: although they allow room for individual ingenuity they should not lose its gist. 











reported the whole story. Tlokwe was arrested after contingents of 
backup security police were summoned to Dennilton from the 
Middleburg and surrounding areas. 311 Tlokwe was eventually sentenced 
in 1984 to a lengthy prison sentence on Robben Island after legal 
representations by Matthews Phosa and Dikgang Moseneke. The point of 
this episode is that in guerrilla warfare exactitude is essential but is not 
always adhered to. In Tlokwe's case it was not true that: 
Once the ANC has dispatched guerrillas from their home bases it is unlikely 
that it is so able to exercise control over its personnel that it will avoid acts 
of terror. Far removed from military command the isolated guerrilla is a 
relatively free agent, selecting his targets, and proceeding towards them. 
There is always the temptation to replace military targets with softer civilian 
targets, either because there is less chance of detection, or because they 
satisfy one of the above-mentioned psychological needs. 312 
The ANC in exile was also watching political developments inside the 
country with interest, which was not only focused on the government's 
policies and how it was reacting to the ANC's attempts to unseat it; the 
ANC was also concerned about the behaviour of its cadres deployed 
inside the country. In his response to Oliver Tambo's concern about what 
was happening here where MK cadres were "seemingly" not adhering to 
military and political instructions, Chris Hani assured Tambo that was not 
the case. Hani alluded to the fact that the MK command structure was not 
always present on the ground and that it was sometimes impossible to 
supervise activities, given the distance from Lusaka to Johannesburg or 
.111 Tlokwe told the TRC Amnesty Committee about his missions inside the country when he was 
deployed by MK but never, like many of the MK cadres, revealed what he did exactly inside the 
country. At some point of his presentation he mentioned that, '" cannot be precise" when asked by the 
TRC commissioner. See Tlokwe Frans Maserumule, TRC Amnesty Application Submission 
Application N umber AM 6217/97. 
3ic Andrew Prior, 'Political Culture and Violence: A Case Study of the African National Congress of 











Durban. Lines of communication were long - it was a feat of no mean 
magnitude to get MK cadres to reach their destination. 3J3 
The above example demonstrates that there were indeed reception 
committees that received MK cadres from exile, as Tlokwe's example has 
shown, and also indicates that problems were associated with the 
execution of MK missions inside the country. The sympathisers of MK 
were prepared to take risks that involved life and limb. It is however, 
important to note that most of these sympathisers were not informed of 
the impending missions in which they were going to assist. For instance, 
Dorcas Mokoena served as a link for infiltrated MK cadres in the eastern 
Transvaal township of KaNyamazane and also assisted in supplying those 
cadres that needed food and accommodation in the area, as early as the 
1970s.3 J4 No prior arrangements were made with her. She would be 
informed on the spot about what to do. When Dorcas eventually visited 
Zambia in 1986 as part of the Inyandza National Movement of the 
KaNgwane administration that was visiting the ANC in Lusaka for talks, 
she read in one of the ANC records about people who were cooperating 
with the organisation and discovered that her name was also recorded. 
However, she had never divulged her name to any MK cadres that visited 
her house nor did she ask them for their names. She was never officially 
requested by MK to assist in any way but individual MK members who 
were infiltrated knew that she was ready to assist in whatever way she 
was asked to. In a way she formed part of the internal structures that were 
needed to provide assistance to infiltrated MK cadres who were in transit 
to other areas in the inner part of the country on various missions. Dorcas 
undertook several trips to Swaziland on ANC missions to meet with Chris 
~1'Luli Callinicos, Oliver rambo: Beyond the Engeli MOllntains, Op. Cit .. p. 522 . 
. ,14 Interview with Nomsa Dorcas Mokoena, by the author, 6 November 2004, KaNyamazane, 











Hani, amongst other contacts in that country, but she never gained a sense 
of the magnitude of her own contribution to the liberation struggle that 
MK was waging. 315 Hani never requested her to assist deployed MK 
cadres in the homeland of KaNgwane where she was an educator. 
Conclusion 
The often-talked-about question concerning whether the real locality of 
the struggle was urban or rural is a non-issue, since the struggle for 
liberation was a national one waged by the ANC amongst other liberation 
organisations, which gradually permeated and eventually engulfed all 
parts of this country. The rural areas of the far Northern Transvaal were 
made use of in the same way as the urban areas in the prosecution of the 
liberation struggle in South Africa. The struggle, as the ANC came to 
realise after the 1978 Vietnam visit, was not supposed to be planned and 
introduced from the outside.316 Several trials of MK cadres arrested by 
the security police demonstrated the intricate nature of the liberation 
struggle and that it is a myth that the struggle for liberation in South 
Africa was simply urban-based and simple. After all it was the ANC that 
had argued from the onset that "the plan was to continue to infiltrate MK 
cadres into the most receptive rural areas (Pondoland and Sekhukhune 
amongst those receptive areas) adjacent to the borders of South 
Africa. ,,317 Callinicos argues that the rural resistance to the 1951 Bantu 
Authorities Act had placed the armed struggle on the national agenda.318 
The inclusion of rurally-based political activists from the far Northern 
Transvaal, such as Nelson Diale, Peter Nchabeleng and his son Elleck, 
11> Ihid, 6 November 2004. 
11<, Thomas G. Karis and Gail M. Gerhart, From Protest to Challenge: Op. Cit, pp. 720 - 734. 
; J7 Luli Callinicos, Oliver Tambo: Beyond the Engeli Mountains. Op. Cit, p. 364. 











vindicated the argument that the struggle was not as urban as is 
mistakenly thought. The disruptions of schooling in urban areas resulted 
in the migration of students to rural boarding schools but when the latter 
experienced educational disruptions, the authorities (such as the Lebowa 
government) altered the admission policies and only admitted day 
students. 319 This did not curb political unrest. 
In South Africa political activists who were engaged in underground 
guerrilla struggles escaped from urban settings and vice versa when the 
security police were looking for them. When they arrived in a particular 
locality they did not hide indefinitely but made contact with the local 
underground MK structures that were determined to destroy the apartheid 
system. When they could no longer function effectively in the far 
Northern Transvaal MK cadres such as Mathabatha, Mogale and others 
used to hide on the Reef where they linked up with the urban-based MK 
cadres.32o Mathabatha was able to carry out the instructions of MK 
undetected from as early as the early 1970s when he left the country 
during school vacations for Swaziland where he received training in 
underground political and military combat work (MCW).321 
It became essential to involve ANC cadres in community problems 
everywhere these existed so that the organisation could champion the 
rights of every sector of the South African society. A non-partisan 
approach was needed to draw nearer to community-related problems in 
both the rural and the urban settings. It was in this context, therefore, that 
the ANC encouraged the formation of the "broadest possible national 
1i'! Financial Mail, 21 March 1986. 












front for liberation; the reinforcement of the underground by drawing in 
activists thrown up by the mass struggles; the proliferation of political 
operations; and the establishment of a central coordinating body inside 
the country".322 This "body" will be dealt with later. 
The Harare Motorway Express Bus Company provided a valuable service 
to MK, undetected until the unbanning of the liberation organisations in 
1990. The above example was used to signifY the importance of the rural 
link, particularly the far Northern Transvaal area adjacent to the border 
with Zimbabwe. Had it not been the underground work and commitment 
of the rural based underground MK activists such as Ralushai and others 
in the Nchabeleng Unit, the Zimbabwean based MK operatives would not 
have been able to link with the colleagues in the urban areas of South 
Africa. The 1985 ANC Consultative Conference in Zambia later officially 
encouraged the transportation of "gifts" to South Africa. Howard Barrell 
reported that: "The ANC is a large organisation with representatives and 
cadres in some 40 countries. Particularly since 1976, the ANC has been 
redirecting more and more of its external mission's resources back into 
the country". 323 These "resources" needed recipient inside the country 
who were linked with MK cadres in way or another. The overriding aim 
was preparation for a protracted people's war inside the country. The 
favourable conditions of relative ungovernability here, particularly in the 
mid-1980s, played into the hands of those advocating the people's war. 
The Zimbabwean route that assisted in the infiltration of arms and 
ammunitions into the country was one route amongst many others. It was 
not sanctioned at an official level by the Mugabe regime, but it would be 
122 Luli Callinicos, Oliver Tamho: Beyond the Engeli Mountains, Op. Cit., p. 526. 












inaccurate to state that the Zimbabwean government was not aware of the 
ANC activities. 
The role of the 'frontline states' in the South African liberation struggle 
differed from one country to another. Swaziland's role altered somewhat 
after the death of King Sobhuza and the signing of the secret non-
aggression pact with South Africa in 1982. The pact did not hinder the 
ANC from carrying out its obligations to the oppressed South African 
people. The 1984 Nkomati Accord between Mozambique and South 
Africa hampered ANC operations effectively. The Accord represented the 
culmination of the South African government's lifelong wish to drive the 
ANC bases, facilities and passage routes out of Mozambique. 324 The 
Accord, however, permitted the ANC a diplomatic presence in 
Mozambique. The affirmation of support for the ANC after the Nkomati 
Accord was confirmed by the Front Line States' Summit Meeting held in 
Arusha, Tanzania on 29 April 1984 in which the developments in 
southern Africa were considered. The Summit's communique read that 
"Mozambique's commitment to continued moral, political, and 
diplomatic support for the ANC in the struggle against apartheid and the 
majority rule in South Africa" was appreciated.325 Some of the setbacks 
that were experienced in this respect are scattered throughout subsequent 
chapters. 
3cc\ Spicer Michael, Nkomati And Beyond, 'Peace In Our Time' - Will It Be Myth Or Reality?, Finance 
Week, Vol. 20, No. 11, March 22-28,1984, p. 569. 
3c' 'Peace is Incompatible with Racism and Colonialism: Final Communique of the Front Line States 












MK and the Internally Based Organisations 
Introduction 
The countrywide tyranny against the adversaries of the apartheid system 
of the late 1970s resulted in a mass exodus of political activists into exile. 
Their persecution and banning, the incarceration of ANC advocates and 
the disappearance and killings of MK cadres could not be unchallenged 
forever. There was a need to reconsider the strategies and tactics dealing 
with the brutalities of the government. The lessons of the 1960s in which 
the ANC and MK were suppressed, resulting in the majority of people 
escaping into exile for years, could not be repeated. As Mzala proclaims, 
"students of strategy know that although no revolutionary struggle 
exactly repeats the experience of previous revolutions, we can 
nevertheless learn a lot from the experience of others,,326. Similarly, the 
political activists of the 1980s avoided the mistakes of previous 
revolutionary generations. 
Their overriding aim was to campaign and organise a strategy unheard of 
in the past, encompassing every sector of the South African community. 
The interactions between those activists inside the country and those who 
were in exile assisted in developing this approach, in particular, at the end 
of the 1970s. Oliver Tambo admitted in his summary of the deliberations 
of the 1979 Politico-Military Strategy Commission that: 
)ch Mzala. 'Umkhonto we Sizwe: Building People's Forces for Combat, War & Insurrection, Part 2'. 











We've been forced by events into a false, bad strategic situation in which 
[the] arn1ed struggle is and remains the basis of political struggle - an 
impossible equation. [It is] necessary to correct this distortion ... [It is also] 
necessary to recognise that our approach is an external approach: we see the 
struggle as being built up from outside, introduced from outside by people 
who are outside ... This approach wholly excludes the people, the masses, as 
the decisive factor not only for victory, but [ also] for any progress at all in 
our struggle ... [We] see a serious strategic problem to solve before we can 
make advances. Hence the view that we slow down on [military] operations 
and work for a change in order of priority as between political work and 
'1' . 1'7 ml Itary operatlon.-~ 
Manifestly, the Vietnam lesson inculcated in the leadership of the ANC 
formed the strategy that mass political support must eventually involve all 
sectors of the society. Furthermore, it also taught the ANC leadership that 
an armed propaganda liberation struggle must be guided and determined 
by the need to generate political mobilisation, organisation and a 
prolonged resistance. A strategy was required to sustain resistance while 
replacing political activists who were exiled, jailed or killed. Still, there 
was a pressing need for trained MK cadres to be redeployed into the 
country to fan the flames of liberation. All these noble objectives were to 
remain pie in the sky if the ANC did not either establish a sustainable 
internal existence or infiltrate existing political and trade union 
organisations that were holding out against the government's draconian 
measures, within the country. 
The efforts taken by the exiled mission of the ANC and MK to achieve 
liberation in South Africa needed to dovetail with the actions taken by the 
internally-based organisations with similar aspirations. To that end, this 
chapter examines the efficacy of these interactions and how the level of 
political conSCIOusness within the country impacted on the 











implementation of the MK operations inside the country. Additionally, 
the chapter traces the resurrection course of "'Charterism", the philosophy 
of a comprehensive patriotism and non-racialism attributable to the 
Freedom Charter and the ANC.328 It also examines the 1980s persecution 
of individuals serving in the UDF with specific reference to the UDF's 
actions in the rural Northern Transvaal. The intention is to verify whether 
the ANC/MK managed to establish contacts with internal organisations 
that were either ANC proxies or worked with the ANC because they 
shared common political aspirations. Consequently, the role played by the 
trade unions in entrenching the ANC/MK as forces to be reckoned with in 
the South African liberation struggle is briefly examined since it has 
already been thoroughly dealt with. This chapter advances the hypothesis 
that the UDF was formed after the ANC's call for the establishment of a 
central coordinating body inside South Africa.329 Hence, postulations that 
the UDF was a substitute for the ANC within the country may have some 
elements of truth, thus it is argued that the dovetailing activities of the 
two organisations on their home turf, confirm this assertion. 
The decline of the BCM-inclined organisations that dominated the South 
African extra-parliamentary politics throughout the first half of the 1970s 
was largely attributable to their disregard for broad organisational-
building and collective actions.33o The BCM orientated organisations and 
individuals also, were not dogmatically wedded to their ideologies. It was 
only a matter of time before some of them would alter their ideologies 
along with the changing political landscape. The 1981 congress of 
AZASO, for example, resolved to drop the Black Consciousness cause 
,2X Jeremy Seekings. The UDF. A History o(the United Democratic Front ill Sowh Africa /983 - /99/. 
(Cape Town. David Phillip. 2000). p. 29. 
12') The assertion that there was a link between the ANC and the UDF was made by the South African 
government; see the Beeld newspaper, 2 August 1984. 











and to view Black students as part of an oppressed community firstly, and 
secondly, as students. This was an attempt by enlightened student 
members of the BCM to rid students of their elitist tendencies that had 
developed during the SASO days. In practice, this meant that students 
had to playa supportive role towards community struggles and political 
campaigns initiated at a community level. Students were recruited to: 
visit and assist communities facing removals, distribute leaflets about 
political campaigns, help organise rent boycotts and create support 
committees for striking workers. Matters of immediate concern to 
students were addressed, only if they were able to make a substantial 
contribution to these student organisations committed to the struggle of 
the people.331 
The tendency to increase one's commitment and contribution to the 
liberation struggle, a lesson from the struggle against state repression, 
was a relatively new phenomenon during the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
The exclusion of the non-student population in opposition politics led to 
the formation of the BPC of South Africa with the express hope of taking 
care of the generic Black populace's political aspirations. The decline of 
the BCM organisations left a legacy to organisations that took root after 
this nosedive.332 The political floor-crossing that ensued was not largely 
ideological and it is in this context that it was relatively easy to move to 
the ANC-oriented formations when they came to the fore in the late 
1970s. After years of lacklustre existence it remains a logical conclusion 
how the ANC-inclined organisations came to dominate the 1980s and 
331 Maticias, 'Ten Years of the Black Tertiary Student Movement', Scchaha, November 1989, p. 10. 
33c For a different contestation of the ascendancy or decline of the BCM organisations see Lawrence 
Schlemmer, 'The Stirring Giant: Observations on the Inkatha and other Black Political Movements in 
South Africa' in The Apartheid Regime, Political Power and Racial Domination by R.M. Price and 












eventually the new South Africa. A synopsis will be provided: In its 
calculated attempts to stifle any form of unity within the ANC and to 
completely annihilate this enemy, the government instituted the infamous 
19 October 1977 clampdown on political organisations, certain religious 
institutions (such as the Christian Institute) and the liberal press, all of 
whom opposed its racist policies. The government also expressed its 
frustrated ire in the banning of individuals, for example, the 23 October 
1977 five year banning order served on Beyers Naude. The potency of 
the collective action by mass organisations signalled the need for a united 
front against apartheid. It was only in late 1979, with the formation of the 
CaSAS, that the gradual gravitation towards the ANC related 
organisations appeared. 
Other events in the far Northern Transvaal also resuscitated the ailing 
image of the ANC/MK. The 1979 arrest of MK members: Ncimbithi 
Lubisi (O'Lubisi Vladimir Raul Ulvanov), Petrus Mashego, Naphtali 
Manana, Ikanyeng Moses Molebatsi, Hlolile Benjamin Tau, Phumlani 
Grant Shezi, Jeremia Radebe, Boyce Johannes Bogale and Thomas 
Mngadi, further contributed to the reawakening of political interest in the 
ANC. The crackdown of the free flow of information did not prevent the 
news of the arrest of these MK cadres from spreading. The charges of 
attempted murder against Mankutu Mashapa and Thomi Mothibi by 
Lubisi, Mashego and Manana when the latter attacked the Soekmekaar 
police station on 4 January 1980, not only indicated the emerging 
widespread nature of the liberation struggle, but also highlighted its 
changing texture.333 The Soekmekaar police station was attacked during 
the same period that the neighbouring Batlokwa community put up 
13' South African Institute of Race Relations' A Survey of Race Relations in South Ati-ica, African 











massive resistance against forced removals. 334 It can be concluded that 
the MK attack was calculated to inform the community of Botlokwa that 
it could look to MK for support against forced resettlement policies of the 
apartheid state.335 The Lubisi MK unit established bases in Tzaneen from 
which it was able to launch attacks on the Soekmekaar police station. 
These forced removals were motivated by the South African 
government's security misconceptions that there was a need for the 
creation of a corridor to the north of the country that should not be 
obstructed by a cluster of villages and thus, the white farmers in the 
border areas were armed to the teeth and organised into commandos. 
The political events towards the end of the 1970s gave renewed hope that 
black resistance politics that was dominated by the BCM related 
organisations' rhetoric was coming to an end. The government draconian 
reactions to growing political disturbances inadvertently assisted in the 
demise of the BCM influence. The dawn of the 1980 decade signalled 
the new mood of optimism generated by MK related activities such as the 
arrests of the CaSAS leadership and the new vociferous trade union 
movement. Similarly, a new sense on strategies and tactics gripped the 
ANC in exile that brought to the fore the fact that mechanisms needed to 
be hatched that would bring synergies between the exiled organisation's 
operations and the new political cadreship that was evolving inside the 
country. The overriding question was how to integrate political agitations 
unfolding inside the country with actions that were taken by the ANC to 
infiltrate new ideas and actions into the country. That is the preserve of 
the following discussion. 
1'4 'Guerrilla Attack'. Sechaba, London, April 1980, p. 17. 












New strategies and tactics at the crossroad. 
An experienced generation of the ANC from the pnsons, particularly 
Robben Island, together with a hardened generation of youth, who were 
prepared to be mowed down by apartheid bullets, required a new 
approach to the theory of freedom. These lessons from both the younger 
and older generations of different freedom fighters had some tangible and 
implementable outcomes at the tum of the 1970 decade. The creation of 
political machineries to train the political cadres who infiltrated the 
country and replicated themselves through political education of the 
people in the struggle, and elevating the combat spirit, were some of the 
strategies and tactics vigorously adopted in the 1980s.336 These efforts 
found expression in various SA community-based organisations that were 
later affiliated to the UDF. Whether the UDF was an envisaged "central 
coordinating body inside the country,,337 that was to be established as part 
of the mandate of the terms of reference of the Politico-Military Strategy 
Commission is secondary to this study, but, of profound importance is 
that this "central coordinating body inside the country", had individuals 
who would fulfil the missions of the ANC and MK. Their contributions 
under the banner of MK are scrutinised throughout this study. 
It is against this background that the 1980s decade dawned throughout the 
country, in particular, in the rural far Northern Transvaal. The 
governments of countries of southern Africa was generally in the hands 
of the ANC sympathisers and therefore the "rear bases" phenomenon was 
tangible. The "rear" bases" phenomenon refers to the countries that 
shared borders with South Africa and likely to be used by MK as entry 
336 Mzala, 'Umkhonto we Sizwe: Building People's Forces for Combat, War & Insurrection', Part 2, 
Sechaha. January 1987, p. 24. 











points. The ANC was also relatively well-prepared to make inroads into 
South Africa from these frontline states where it existed in these 
neighbouring countries under sufferance without free reign to conduct its 
own affairs. From all comers of the country the borders appeared to be 
porous. The internal political activists were able to communicate and 
direct political proceeding with the exiled leadership. In March 1979 for 
example, the Botswana police arrested four South Africans armed with 
explosives, automatic weapons and a large quantity of ammunitions after 
raiding houses in Gaborone. Shorty Tlhomedi, James Rantau, John Maruo 
and Zacharia Tolo were imprisoned for the possession of weapons of war. 
However, "Botswana's strategic location and political obligation to the 
liberation cause inevitably defines that country as a country of transit. 
The government had consistently refused to allow guerrillas to operate 
from or through its territory.,,338 The truth is that the Botswana 
government tum a blind eye on ANC activities and it was only when 
those activities became glaring that she intervened. The ANC was waiting 
in the wings of these countries where there had been occasional arrests. 
However, the arrest of MK cadres caught with weapons of war was 
expected but not acceptable in the sense that there were criticisms when 
host countries took action against ANC members caught with weapons. 
Addressing a meeting in London, in March 1979, to launch a campaign 
against military and nuclear links with South Africa, an ANC official, 
Seretse Choabi accused African governments of denying ANC members 
access to their countries.339 Some years later, in the neighbouring 
countries, such as Mozambique (after the 1984 Nkomati Accord), and 
Swaziland (in the transition years in the wake of the death of King 
11K Roger Southall. 'Botswana as a Host Country for Refugees', Journal of COllllIJonwealth and 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 22, No.2, July 1984, p. 159. 
m South African Institute of Race Relations, 'A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa 1979, 











Sobhuza II in 1982), the ANC found itself constantly harassed by these 
countries at the insistence of the South African government. In sharp 
contrast to this view, Matthews Phosa surmises that only a small minority 
in the neighbouring countries supported the South African government's 
pressure to extradite the ANC. 340 The neighbouring countries found 
themselves in this quandary throughout the history of the struggle III 
South Africa, while, generally, individuals took it upon themselves to 
assist in the struggle championed by the ANC. 
The purpose of the foregoing account is to depict, albeit perfunctorily, the 
atmosphere under which the ANC was operating in the Frontline States. 
The Southern African situation was daunting. The ANC was aware that 
the problems posed by these states were insurmountable. How the ANC 
was to link the emerging organisations in South Africa with these rear 
bases was of profound importance. A general realisation in the ANC 
existed that engaging the masses on its side and preparing for the armed 
warfare were two sides of the same coin.341 Even though the reference is 
to an earlier date, 1961, its implication is that communication within the 
organisation was interlinked over a series of decades for an ongoing 
fossilised common liberation vision. Therefore, it should have come as no 
surprise that the ANC had infiltrated most of the organisations that had 
emerged from within the country, and then spearheaded their campaigns. 
This approach was not new to the world of liberation politics. As Amilcar 
Cabral observes, a people's struggle becomes theirs if it is based on their 
aspirations, dreams and desire for justice and progress and not on those of 
,~II Interview with Matthews Phosa by the author, Nelspruit, Mpumalanga Province, 30 January 2004. 
,-II Vladimir Shubin, A Vicw From Moscow, (Bellville, Mayibuye Books, University of the Western 











the minority or the opposition. 342 Armed with all these aspirations, the 
ANC embarked on a journey to the home front which characterised the 
1980s which was an indirect response to Oliver Tambo's message of 8 
January 1979, in which he called on all opponents of racial conceit, 
dominance and white supremacy, to let loose a resolute battering on the 
false political, economic and racist obstructions under the axiom, 
apartheid or separate advancement.343 The new strategies and tactics that 
were fashioned out by the ANC's years of underground operations 
needed to be complimented inside the country. Military and political 
policies, strategies and tactics couldn't be applied in a vacuum. There was 
a need that the MK should establish links with organisations that were 
operating inside the country under extreme conditions of repression. 
Deployed MK cadres on recruitment drives inside the country were 
mandated to strengthen the internally based organisations that shared 
political vision with the ANC. The following section expatiates on it. 
The rebirth of internally based organisations and MK units: The 
1980s 
The major problem that frustrated the renewed determination to 
resuscitate dormant internal political structures of the ANC was that these 
structures were "weak and vulnerable".344 The armed propaganda warfare 
was one of the strategies adopted by the ANC "to stimulate the process of 
regeneration" of these internal structures within the country.345 The 
process of the rejuvenation by deployed political cadres of the ANC was 
,.)e Amilcar Cabral, Unity and Struggle - Speeches and Writings, New York, Monthly Review Press, 
1979, p. 75. 
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long and very arduous. This was not out-of-the-ordinary. The blase 
visibility of the ANC in the 1976 student uprisings was one of the many 
reasons that contributed towards the rarity of effective and tangible 
internal structures of the ANC. This changed with time. The arrest of 
Lubisi's unit as well as other landmark armed propaganda attacks, such as 
the 1980 bombing of SASOL, popularised the ANC nationally. The 
military top brass of the SADF admitted, in the 1980s, that the "problem" 
with the ANC was that it was everywhere. 346 How did this "problem" of 
the prevalence of the ANC come about? Is it true that "the insurgent 
campaign", as Tom Lodge declares, "re-established the ANC as the 
predominant force in black South African politics even [when] its support 
[was] still mainly in the form of ideological inclination and emotional 
sentiment rather than organised membership. ,,347 Of course, Lodge 
missed the point that the ANC was organised and underground. How was 
it possible for the ANC to achieve its objectives of sustaining and 
maintaining the cooperation of the underground networks if it was not 
organised? What mechanism was adopted to reconnect the underground-
based MK activists with the organisations that held the same view? 
"Ideological passion,,348, described by Jack Spence as a concept "that 
offers an explanation of the past, announces present discontents and 
projects a vision of the future", also assisted the ANC in its effort to win 
the hearts and minds of the people. The ANC's Department of Internal 
Reconstruction and Development (DIRD) was entrusted with the 
promotion of that "ideological passion" through its proxies inside the 
country. The Strategy and Tactics Document of the ANC declared the 
3-1(, 'Response to Comrade Mzala by Nyawusa', Sechaha, April 1985, p. 18. 
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same notion as propounded by Spence, highlighting the depravity of 
wealth on the grounds of skin pigmentation, the suppression of skills, and 
increasing poverty and starvation. The ANC maintained that its policies 
carried the aspirations of those deprived of these essentials and wished to 
have an over-arching umbrella organisation that could accommodate the 
objectives of the local community-based organisations into a national 
body, an ideal organisation that the ANC's DIRD wished to have dealings 
with. Established in 1977, this department was aware of the complicated 
terrain of its field of operation in the country. The UDF became a 
recipient of this "ideological passion" but the confluence was afflicted 
with life threatening obstacles. 
The DIRD's problem was also related to the fact that the Frontline States 
were not prepared to risk the wrath of the South African government by 
allowing the ANC free reign to use their territories as launching pads. 
These Frontline States were, however, prepared to accommodate the 
ANC politically, diplomatically, infrastructurally, and militarily as they 
surrounded South Africa. 349 Since the success of any revolutionary 
armed-force hinges on the presence of a dependable rear base close to the 
country under attack, these states were strategically positioned for the 
ANC.350 South Africa's military and economic superiority made these 
Frontline States lethargic in their assistance to the ANC. Zimbabwean 
President Robert Mugabe made the point patently clear in June 1981, that 
under the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) they were morally 
obliged to assist the liberation movements in South Africa and Namibia. 
However, "We have said we will not create conditions in this country 
,-I') Chris Maritz, 'Pretoria's Reaction to the Role of Moscow and Peking in Southern Africa', JOllrnal 
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which can be used by any organisation for carrying out military attacks 
against our neighbours, including South Africa.,,35I Mugabe knew as 
much as anyone interested in the politics of the region that such 
statements were intended for cordial neighbourly relations with South 
Africa. Cross-border raids into neighbouring states, including Zimbabwe, 
were carried out by the South African government on supportive 
allegations that most of the ANC host countries ascribed to the liberation 
movement. After the Zimbabwean independence in 1980, for example, 13 
ANC guerrillas imprisoned by the Ian Smith government were released 
and the ANC was later allowed to open offices in Salisbury (now 
Harare).352 These MK veterans were permitted to stay in Zimbabwe and 
assist in interacting with underground MK cadres inside the country 
through DIRD.353 
The arrival and subsequent appointment of Mac Maharaj as the DIRD's 
secretary general in the late 1970s in exile assisted in fulfilling the 
mandate of the department. He was relatively new in exile and had inside 
knowledge of the underground connections within South Africa, 
particularly with Pravin Gordhan. Joe Nzingo Gqabi also made a major 
contribution through his internal connections in Botswana while in exile 
in June 1978 after his terrorism acquittal as part of the "Pretoria 12" 
earlier in the year. The notorious "Pretoria Twelve" trial at the Pretoria 
Old Synagogue Court included Mosima "Tokyo" Sexwale, Naledi Tsiki, 
Martin Ramokgadi, Seathlolo Jacob, Lele Motaung, Simon Samuel 
Mohlanyaneng, Elias Masinga, Michael Ngobeni and Pauline Mohale. 
They were arrested for alleged conspiratorial activities to topple the 
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South African government.354 Their arrest demonstrated tentative steps 
that the exiled section of MK was trying to establish with their 
counterpart inside the country throughout the country. The trial exposed a 
network of rurally- and urban-based underground MK activists. 
Influential MK leaders such as Diale, Nchabeleng and Ramokgadi were 
eventually acquitted, which in tum assisted in the resurgence of the 
underground struggles that had nearly been nipped in the bud in the rural 
areas of the far Northern Transvaal. Diale and Nchabeleng later became 
active underground ANC/MK members in the Northern Transvaal. They 
became, particularly Nchabeleng (who became the UDF leader of the 
Northern Transvaal) leading faces of the UDF in the Northern Province. 
Back to Gqabi' s arrival and updated internal knowledge in exile. Gqabi 
was a veteran of the MK, having joined the outfit in 1961 and 
subsequently gaining military training abroad. He was apprehended upon 
his return and sentenced to two years' imprisonment for leaving the 
country illegally. At the end of his two-year jail term, Gqabi was 
rearrested at the Fort, charged under the Sabotage Act, and sentenced to 
10 years on Robben Island.355 His mysterious assassination in Harare, 
Zimbabwe, on 31 May 1981, where he was an ANC Chief Representative 
after independence, was a major blow to the internal/external axis of the 
ANC/MK.356 It was on the basis of these nascent political connections 
between the ANC, the disjointed internal organisations, and individuals 
inside the country that the ANC urged internally based people, In an 
interview with New African, March 1980: 
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The African National Congress is continuously encouraging our people to 
organise themselves into all manner of formations to continue the struggle 
and to raise the level of confrontation. We, therefore, welcome the 
emergence of all organisations that seek to unite our people in the struggle 
against the fascist dictatorship. Our principal objective then becomes that 
of ensuring that such organisations are activised into struggle. 357 
The ANC's message was later to be taken to its fruition when the 
political playing field reached maturity. The political playing field was 
ready to be "activised into struggle" in the sense that trade unions were 
'allowed' to operate in factories after the recommendations of the 1979 
Wiehahn Commission. The worker's right to go on strike was taken away 
in the sense that if there was such a need, an application had to be sent to 
the government's Department of Manpower and Utilisation (DMU) for 
approval. The migrant workers, who formed sixty percent of the South 
African workforce, were excluded from trade unionism35R because they 
were regarded as "migrant" workers. In keeping with the policies of 
separate development, they did not have the permanent rights to reside in 
the "white" areas of South Africa.359 This a blow to the migrant workers 
of factory floor but they were always able to articulate their political 
frustrations at hostels were they were residing. In the case of the far 
Northern Transvaal the Northern Transvaal People's Congress 
(NOTPECO) was later able to provide link between these migrant 
workers and their political aspirations that were deeply ensconced in the 
UDF. NOTPECO offered a vital link between the workers' organisations 
based in the urban areas and the Northern Transvaal Youth Congress 
1'7 Sheridan Johns and R. Hunt Davis, Jr, Mandela Tambo and the A/h'can National Congress. The 
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(NOTYCO).360 NOTPECO was formed in August 1986 by a combination 
of migrant workers and the regional organisers of the UDF in the rural far 
Northern Transvaa1. 361 NOTPECO brought with it years of experience in 
the struggle for liberation in South Africa because most of its members 
such as Wilfred Monama and Jepson Nkadimeng were tried and tested 
members of trade unions and Sebatakgomo movement in the 1950-60s.362 
When the far Northern Transvaal was gripped with political violence 
members of NOTPECO were able to assist in providing a sense of 
direction and leadership. The usurpation of political control and power by 
the youths particularly in the late 1980s account for the demise of 
NOTPECO in the politics of the region. 
The system of apartheid that the ANC was fighting against ensured that 
there were no legal loopholes that could be explored by the migrant 
workers towards their attainment of their membership of the trade unions. 
Some workers who fell outside the migrancy category did not find it easy 
though in their trade unions. The Labour Relations Amendment Act 
(LRAA) making it compulsory for the unions to register with the 
Industrial Councils (ICs) remained a problem. The LRAA replaced the 
Industrial Conciliation Act (lCA). It also replaced the Black Labour 
Relations Act (BLRA) of 1953 and the Settlement of Disputes Act 
(SDC). The status of the workers was not altered by the Act, as they 
continued to be regarded as "labour units" in that they were allowed to 
participate in a statutory bargaining system that did not afford them 
genuine trade union rights as workers. 363 The situation was further 
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complicated by the fact that most of the trade unions refused to register 
with the ICs which, in tum, refused to negotiate with trade unions that 
were not registered with them. Of critical importance was the fact that the 
unions were not permitted to participate in politics. 364 The acceptance of 
the recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission by the government 
allowed black workers to unionise under strictly controlled conditions 
and thus indirectly creating another fertile ground for political 
mobilisation. 365 The need for ideological flexibility became evident to the 
ANC in its drive to enlist the support of a broad spectrum of South 
African political persuasions. 
In the rural areas of the far Northern Transvaal, this limited freedom of 
trade unionism had no immediate considerable spin-offs for the ANC 
because the area was largely dependent on subsistence-farming, which 
does not suggest that there were no trade unions operating in this region. 
Things changed over time. For instance, the significant role played by the 
Metal and Allied Workers Union (MA WU) in the mid-eighties in the 
Steelpoort area cannot be overlooked.366 This organisation not only 
concentrated on shop floor problems but also took the responsibility to 
establish community-based political organisations, such as the Steelpoort 
Youth Congress (Steyco), which later became an affiliate of the UDF. 
The fact that MA WU had an office in the village of GaMampuru, not in 
the town of Steelpoort or in one of the factories where its membership 
was based, is a clear indication of the synergy and cooperation that 
existed between the factory workers and community activists. Generally, 
trade union activism made inroads into politics, a scenario that proves 
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that the two were inextricably intertwined. Eventually, 10han Wessels of 
the Steelpoort Farmer's Action Committee asked their Member of 
Parliament who happened to be a Minister of Manpower as well, Pietie 
du Plessis, to erect a fence that would separate Steelpoort from its 
neighbouring villages of Sekhukhuneland because of the villages' 
politicisation.367 This was a clear reflection of the extent to which politics 
had encroached on everyday life in rural communities of the far Eastern 
and Northern Transvaal. The locality of the MA WU office also had to do 
with the fact that Chief Mampuru of GaMampuru community had 
political sympathies for the trade union movement. He was a member of 
Sebatakgomo and Khuduthamaga (sic) in the 1950s.368 This migrant rural 
organisation was suppressed throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The 
example of the connection and membership of Sebatakgomo movement 
of the 1960s by Chief Mampuru illustrates the futility of the 
government's attempts at suppressing political aspirations. The historical 
role that was played by the trade unions in the 1960s in assisting people 
to join MK justifies that assumption that MA WU (and by extension, 
Chief Mampuru) had sympathies for the ANC in the GaMampuru area of 
the north-eastern Transvaal. The fact that Chief Mampuru hosted Tlokwe 
Maserumule (an MK deployed cadre in 1984) confirms the assumption 
that there were sympatheties.369 Tlokwe was deployed in the area for 
politicisation and recruitment purposes. The ANC had a sophisticated and 
thorough process of verifying credentials of hosts before the deployment 
of MK cadres. The host's political background, current political 
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affiliations and sympathies as well as the possibility of accomplishing a 
mission while hosted were some of the considerations before a host can 
be selected. These considerations were not communicated to MK 
deployees for fear of compromising the mission in case of military and 
political miscarriages. Miscarriages of military and political missions that 
ended up in political trials indirectly assisted in informing people inside 
the country that MK was alive and active. These political trials also 
exposed the connections between trade unions on the side and the 
political ferments which were gripping the country in the 1980s. 
Early in the 1980's, political trials that involved trade unionists were 
already underway. In the trial of Barbara Hogan, for example, the 
government wanted to prove that there was a connection between the 
emergence of trade unionism in South Africa and the underground 
operations of the MK. In this trial, Hogan admitted to being an ANC 
member and to assisting in organising two consumer boycotts at the 
behest of striking unions and further helping in the formation of a union 
that catered for unemployed black people. 370 Trade union movement was 
not confined to a particular locality and what Hogan was accused of did 
not exclude the unemployed people of the far Northern Transvaal. One of 
the famous cases of "death in detention" at the hands of the security 
police was that of the secretary of the Food and Canning Workers Union, 
Dr. Neil Aggett, in the early 1980s.371 In the eyes of the security police, 
the line, if at all existent, between trade unionism and overt political 
actions, was blurred which was also the attitude of the ANC, as many 
examples confirmed. The formation of a trade union that catered for 
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unemployed black people spelt danger in the eyes of the government 
because the majority of rural people and were unemployed. The 
connection between the envisaged union by Hogan and her membership 
of the ANC was not a prospect that the government that was hell-bent on 
destroying the ANC would allow. Issues of immediate appeal to the 
unemployed were plenty. Most of the causes of friction in the rural areas 
of the far Northern Transvaal that brought people together centred on the 
shortage of land, racism masquerading as separate development, 
tribalism, and in some cases, successions related to chieftainships. It was 
these problems that the ANC encouraged organisations inside the country 
to grapple with " .. .in factories, on the farms, in the Bantustans, at 
universities and on the battlefield. ,,372 
Old members of the ANC in the region who were lying low such as 
Diale, Nchabeleng and Ntsoane became sources of information on ANC 
related matters. There were not novices in the ANC, MK, underground 
operations and trade unionism. Nchabeleng spent eight years on Robben 
Island and when released in 1972, was banished to his home village of 
Apel in Sekhukhuneland. The South African government purposely 
disregarded the fact that Nchabeleng had lived in Pretoria before his 
imprisonment on Robben Island and that he had left Apel village 25 years 
prior to his arrest. Nchabeleng had been quite active in the Office 
Workers Union, SACTU, the ANC and Sebatakgomo before his arrest. 
Diale had the same membership of organisations as Nchabeleng and was 
also released at about the same time. Diale was banished to GaMasemola 
village and Ntsoane was sent to GaMphahlele where he stayed with his 
sister, an anomaly in the course of events of African family life 











patterns.373 It becomes necessary to point out that such a disruption of life 
of the victims of apartheid was the least of the government's concerns. 
Diale later established an Advice Centre at Jane Furse in Sekhukhuneland 
where he 'advised' the youth on how to skip the country to go and join 
MK in exile.374 Diale and Nchabeleng continued to influence youth 
organisations in the area throughout the 1980s. Their efforts bore fruit in 
the mid-1980s, particularly in the former Lebowa Bantustan. The 1986 
killing of Nchabeleng on grounds of instigating violence in the region 
was a clear indication of the impact of his involvement in the liberation 
struggle in the rural areas of the far Northern Transvaal. Some of the 
youth from the area joined the ranks of MK as a result of repression and 
these old MK cadres' influence. The majority of the youth joined youth 
congresses that were affiliated to the UDF which Nchabeleng led. 
The political unrests that engulfed rural Northern Transvaal, such as 
those in 1986 at Apel in Sekhukhuneland (organised by the 
Sekhukhuneland Youth Congress), were widely reported.375 This is the 
area where Nchabeleng was banished to. In the mid-1980s throughout the 
region youth congresses would use victims of unrest's funeral to plan 
ahead. In Motetema Township outside Groblersdal, the Lebowa police 
killed seven youths in March 1986 when the youths were stopped at a 
police road block, designed to hinder mourners from attending a political 
funeral in the township.376 These political funerals were used as political 
rallies at which future action-plans were formulated. Night vigils were 
mostly used by leaders of the youth congresses to meet and chart the 
wayfoward with political leaders who were regarded as having links with 
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MK either in exile or underground. The police tried to intervene to curb 
the number of people that were supposed to attend these funerals but they 
seldom succeeded. 
In the final analysis, it has been demonstrated, and it will be 
demonstrated again that the establishment of underground connections 
between the seasoned leaders of MK and trade union movement as 
represented by Diale and Nchabeleng and their urban based colleagues 
such as Ramokgadi, Nkadimeng and Gqabi (particularly after September 
1976) proved to be useful. The flame of liberation engulfed most of the 
Northern Transvaal when more and more people were recruited into the 
ranks of the UDF and underground structures of the ANC and MK. Diale 
and Nchabeleng established clandestine contacts with other political 
activists who remained inside the country, maintaining a low profile in 
the suppressive atmosphere of the 1970s.377 In the confusion of the 1976 
uprisings, their political profile improved somewhat as they became the 
source of information on how to leave the country and join the ANC and 
MK.378 Gqabi, Nkadimeng and Ramokgadi made contact with long-
standing former members of Sebatakgomo and the ANC in the rural far 
Northern Transvaal. It was easy to trace them, as both Nkadimeng and 
Ramokgadi were members of the Sebatakgomo movement. After 
September 1976 Ramokgadi made several trips to Sekhukhuneland where 
he contacted Diale and Nchabeleng. 379 Sexwale's unit established two 
more units of MK at Apel and GaMasemola under Diale and Nchabeleng. 
The idea was to provide internal political and military training as well as 
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sending selected individuals out of the country for intensive training. 3Ro 
Sexwale's unit was not only assigned to Sekhukhuneland; it had similar 
assignments elsewhere in the country as well, including the explosion on 
the Pretoria-Pietersburg railway line at Dikgale on 26 October 1976.3R1 
The encounter and narrow escape of Sexwale and his group at the border 
between South Africa and Swaziland, led the security police to several 
clues that eventually closed down the entire far Northern Transvaal 
network of the MK. A total of 163 individuals including Diale, 
Nchabeleng, Ramokgadi, Gqabi and Nchabeleng's son, Elleck, were all 
arrested. Diale, Nchabeleng and Gqabi were eventually acquitted in what 
was known as "the Pretoria 12" trial. Diale and Nchabeleng, as 
subsequent discussions will show, would play leading roles in the 1980s 
in the underground operations of the ANC and MK and the UDF. Gqabi 
went into exile in 1978. 
The Home front - What Next? 
In her chapter aptly titled The Search for the Road Ahead, Luli Callinicos 
captures the overriding aims of the ANC's desire to come home and fight 
the liberation struggle. This was a search for the road, fraught with 
thoms, bullets and betrayals, which in itself was not important, but rather, 
the destination that lay beyond it. More important was that which led one 
into exile in the first place. Callinicos states, "Their fervent aim had been 
to acquire the expertise to mobilise more effectively, to continue the 
struggle inside the country, to rebuild the underground and set in motion 
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guerrilla warfare against the apartheid regime.,,382 Not all people involved 
in the struggle would engage in combat warfare, but many were prepared 
just in case it reared its head. Mzala explicates: 
... without anns in hand, ... these gallant comrades, in many unrecorded 
cases, planned and executed their missions and built a foundation on which 
our people's anny was built; they too, like the military combatants, are the 
heroes of our revolution, their names will last forever, and one day all our 
people will know of them and will need them for their courage. 383 
The point is that there were thousands of people who were involved in 
the liberation struggle without formal membership of either the ANC or 
MK. This had been the case all along in the ANC and the 1985 Kabwe 
Consultative Conference of the ANC's decision that all members of the 
movement had to undergo military training, and should not be 
miscalculated as casus belli in a military sense, but should be interpreted 
as a tactic in anticipation of a need for battle readiness. This was not a 
new clarion call. Early in the 1970s, Joe Matthews made this point quite 
clear that an ideal MK cadre should be an all-rounder. He states: 
We must arm the people not only with modern weapons but [also] with 
revolutionary skill and ideas. Above all South African revolutionaries must 
master the problems posed by the South African revolution. The tendency to 
draw relevantly and irrelevantly from other struggles by analogy should not 
be encouraged. True, we must be ready to learn the revolutionary experience 
all over the world. But in the end the creative thinking of our own 
revolutionaries is required to be applied to the South African revolution. 384 
The revolutionary international expenence as advocated by Matthews 
influenced the ANC that it was not necessary to overcome South Africa 
militarily "but to create an intolerable situation for the occupying power 
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,x.' Mzala, 'Umkhonto we Sizwe. Building People's Forces for Combat', War 7 Insurrection, Sechaba, 
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or its puppet regime.,,385 Although Seegers was referring to the 
revolutionary tactics adopted by FRELIMO m its fight with the 
Portuguese colonial government in Mozambique, similarly, the ANC 
learnt that the lessons of guerrilla warfare that sustained an ungovernable 
political situation and not the "political threat per se", would lead to 
governmental capitulation. But who were these South African 
revolutionaries that Matthews was referring to? How were they supposed 
to carry out their mandate while trying to avoid the mistakes that led to 
the arrests of others before them? 
MK cadres who were send home on various missions were exposed to 
many challenges, opportunities and obstacles. There was a need to strike 
a balance in pursuance of the liberation. A new and committed MK cadre 
deployed inside the country was needed. The atmosphere of near 
ungovernability prevailing inside the country as of the early 1980s 
dictated that there should be a rethink on deployed cadres of the 
movement. Tambo decided that there should never be any mission inside 
the country that would be based on maps nor an "on-the-spot" study of 
areas.386 He did not imply that MK cadres were no longer going to be 
sent into unknown territories nor that people were no longer going to be 
arrested with incriminating evidence on their persons. Tambo meant that 
reconnaissance missions, the identification of local comrades and the 
familiarity with the topography were going to be emphasised before the 
commencement of any expedition. These would involve intensive 
research about local politics, operational area, language and the political 
history or sympathies of the contact persons. Tambo learnt a valuable 
1." A. Seegers, 'Strategy in National Revolutions: Some Aspects of FRELlMO's Revolutionary 
Strategy', Polifikol1, Vol. 4, No. I, June 1977, p. 66. 











lesson from the MK's daring Operation J. 3R7 His prudence limited frontal 
confrontation between MK cadres and the South African security forces 
within the country. Three salient feat of military and political gallantry 
echoed Tambo's injunction. 
One such interesting incident (the incident that fits perfectly into 
Tambo's vision of an MK cadre) comes from an MK cadre, Patrick 
Thibedi, who was at Secunda when the SASOL oil plant refinery was 
bombed in June 1980. Thibedi was a driver in a construction company 
that had been contracted to deliver the sand used in the completion of the 
SASOL II and III factories. The night SASOL was attacked by MK 
cadres, Thibedi decided to work overtime, making several deliveries of 
sand to the factory. The police investigations led them to suspect that 
Thibedi's overtime work must have been a ploy to assist those cadres 
who eventually shelled the factory. He was hunted down and arrested by 
the police and shot at, sustaining a broken leg, after attempting to escape 
from a moving police van near Evander. He was eventually absolved of 
any complicity in the attack. Heartbroken and angry while in detention, 
Thibedi had discussions with an arrested MK cadre, Moss Molefe, at 
Randfontein police station on how to join MK. After his acquittal 
towards the end of 1980, Thibedi consulted with foreign mine workers 
from both Swaziland and Mozambique on how to enter their countries. 
He immediately left the country through Komatipoort to join the ANC 
and attended a one-month crash course at Funda Camp in Angola where 
he learned military engineering specialising in explosives and target 
shooting. He returned to attack the SASOL oil plant refinery on 21 
October 1981 after being personally briefed by the head of the Special 
W Operation J was a codename for an MK operation that was envisaged to be carried out by highly 












Operations Unit, Joe Slovo.388 Thibedi insisted that his was supposed to 
be a one man mission and Slovo granted him his wish. Thibedi, having 
accomplished his mission, decided to use the remaining arsenals of 
weapons in Witbank before he headed back to report in exile. 
Unbeknown to Thibedi, the South African security forces were out in full 
force looking for him when he decided to visit his children and mother-
in-law at Marapong in the Dennilton area of, today, Mpumalanga 
province. A massive roadblock by all shades of security forces in the 
country, set up at Verena near Witbank, prevented Thibedi from realising 
his dream of paying his children a fleeting visit en route to exile. 
Realising that he risked long-term imprisonment he decided to tum back 
from that roadblock but the security forces fired at his car. He survived, 
and disappeared until he was arrested near the Swaziland border on 27 
October 1981. Thibedi was later sentenced to 24 years imprisonment on 
Robben Island. 
The point about Thibedi's experience is that it fits perfectly into Tambo's 
vision of an ideal MK cadre who was supposed to be infiltrated into the 
country, and the information and knowledge that he was supposed to 
possess. Thibedi knew the target (SASOL oil plant refinery) quite well, 
the area (just in case there was a need for an immediate escape) and the 
language in case he needed to get information in line with his mission. 
Thibedi refused to be accompanied by other MK cadres because of his 
suspicions of possible betrayal and mistrust amongst members of the 
same unit and also because of his confidence that his mission needed him 
and him alone - this was an act of bravery. It is true that Slovo warned 
him against visiting his wife or children in Dennilton yet, in spite of this, 
'XX Interview with Patrick Thibedi, by the author, ANC Provincial Head Office, Nelspruit. Mpumalanga 











the mission was accomplished.389 A lesson was learned by Thibedi in MK 
cadre's previous missions into the country that resulted in massive arrests 
of the entire underground network of operatives. The Sexwale-Tsiki units 
and their internally based contacts, discussed earlier, provide a relevant 
example. These units allegedly "travelled persistently - conducting a 
blizzard of meetings" and, eventually being nailed down by the security 
police on December 30 1976, brought about the destruction of the entire 
machinery. It is documented that Ramokgadi and Gqabi wrote about the 
experiences recommending that, "without a well-developed underground 
and organised domestic political base, armed activity should not be 
commenced.,,390 Slovo concurred with this view cautioning that, 
"creating a core of trained professional armed cadres, putting them into 
the field with adequate logistical support and with adequate contact to 
carry them through the initial period, requires long-term planning.,,391 It 
was against this background, among other factors, that Thibedi insisted 
on a one-man mission, and the ANC obliged. 
The general directive given to MK cadres brought into the country from 
exile was to establish an MK presence inside the country by politically 
educating and recruiting people into the underground structures once they 
were formed. 392 This was one way in which MK thought it could "[sink] 
its roots deep amongst the masses of our people whose combat 
formations it is leading to confront the military machine of the apartheid 
regime.,,393 It was impossible to recruit people who had no known 
sympathy to the liberation cause. This explains why community leaders, 
WJ Ihid. 
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student and trade umon activists were mostly targeted and eventually 
recruited into the underground structures of the movement. Cadres of 
MK such as Cassius Motsoaledi, Casper Musekwa and Robert Mokoena 
were dispatched to the Bushbuckridge area of the now-defunct Bantustan 
of Lebowa (from exile) for reconnaissance and recruitment purposes in 
the early 1980s. Motsoaledi and Mokoena were from prominent political 
families in Soweto and Musekwa knew the area of Venda quite well even 
though his parents had gone into exile in Swaziland some years prior to 
the independence of the Bantustan. Motsoaledi's father, Elias, was 
languishing in jail on Robben Island as part of the first MK command 
imprisoned after the Rivonia treason trial. Mokoena was related to Paul 
Dikeledi (Peter Sello Motau) who was later to be shot dead on July 9 
1987 by the occupants of a BMW sedan bearing South African number 
plates when the taxi in which he was travelling was stopped in 
Swaziland.394 Dikeledi was killed together with a member of the ANC 
National Executive Committee (NEC) Cassius Maake (Job Shimankane 
Tabane) while Augusta Tsinini of Mozambique escaped in that 
butchery.395 They, amongst other MK cadres deployed in the region, were 
all part of the Northern Transvaal rural machinery of MK responsible for 
the recruitment and reconnaissance of potential targets in the rural far 
Northern Transvaal in the 1980s. Mokoena knew the area of 
Bushbuckridge as he had relatives there who were eventually roped into 
the underground operations of MK. These relatives and political friends 
served as hosts (reception committees) and facilitated some of the 
missions assigned by the MK leadership to those that were deployed in 
the country, such as Mokoena, Motsoaledi and Musekwa. 
m 'Obituary: Cassius Make and Paul Dikeledi', Sechaha, September 19R7, p. 29. 











In one of their forays into the area of Bushbuckridge Motsoaledi was 
arrested with other members of the village in the early 1980s after an 
incident that was sparked off by lightening that had struck a household. 
Consequently, accusations of witchcraft were bandied about and an 
alleged perpetrator's house was gutted by a fire caused by angry 
members of the village. In that melee, Motsoaledi, who was on a mission 
in the area with Robert Mokoena, was told to hide in the bush until the 
situation subsided, but, when he later went to his host, George Mokoena 
(Robert's nephew), the police arrested him. 396 Motsoaledi was not 
apprehended for his MK activities at the time but as part of the village 
swoop that was taking place in the area after the lightening episode. 
Chief Chiloane made a representation to the local magistrate that the 
majority of those who had been arrested for the lightning incident were 
students who were supposed to write examinations. They were all 
released on the strength that they were fingerprinted and could be traced 
to their parents when needed by the police. 
Motsoaledi's case showed inconsistencies because he had a different 
accent from the rest of Chief Chiloane' subjects. It never occurred to the 
police that he was a member of MK having infiltrated the region from 
neighbouring Swaziland. Motsoaledi claimed that he was a relative of 
George Mokoena from Thembisa (an area likely 0 accommodate his 
accent) and it was on that understanding that he was released pending the 
outcome of the fingerprints. When his fingerprints were eventually 
confirmed by the police headquarters in Pretoria that he was, in fact, 
highly sought after and that he should be detained on the spot, 
.1% Interview with Frank Thabane, by the author, Acornhoek Police Station. Bushbuckridge. Limpopo 











Motsoaledi was already out of the country, having fled to Swaziland.397 
Before he left the country in 1976, after the Soweto student uprisings, 
Motsoaledi had failed to report to a Soweto police station daily as had 
been required by the police; therefore a warrant for his arrest existed. The 
security police later persecuted George Mokoena for hosting Cassius 
Motsoaledi when they later discovered who he was (from the 
fingerprint's report) but they were not sure that George Mokoena was 
really George. This was the name that they had first heard from Cassius 
when they had apprehended him for the first time in that great swoop. 
Cassius did not know that George's name was not common knowledge in 
the area. He was called "Best" Mokoena. Cassius Motsoaledi told the 
police that he was visiting his relative George Mokoena who was 
studying in Bushbuckridge in his effort to explain why he was there 
instead of Thembisa from where he claimed he had come. He told the 
police that he was Phineas Mokoena to convince them that he was indeed 
George's cousin. In September 1981 George resolved to leave the 
country to go into exile; not the first time. He and his friends Frank 
Thabane and Michael Malope had been in exile for MCW in June 1980 
during school vacations. 398 They served as an underground linkage in the 
area until their arrest in the mid-1980s.399 These underground MK 
operatives were active members of school student movements in the 
Bushbuckridge area of the north-eastern Transvaal. 
There are two points that need to be emphasised about the entire 
encounter of the MK deployed in the Bushbuckridge area of Lebowa: 
3')7 Interview with Cassius Motsoaledi, by the author, Erasmuskioot: Pretoria, Gauteng Province, 16 
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MK cadres such as Cassius Motsoaledi and Robert Mokoena were on 
recruitment and reconnaissance mission inside the country.400 Firstly, 
they visited their relatives and somehow involved them in the 
underground liberation struggle which had more to do with security 
consciousness. Secondly, the nature ofMK underground operations at the 
time made it impossible for a full disclosure of anything, otherwise 
Motsoaledi and Robert Mokoena could have been told that Thabane, 
Malope and George Mokoena (the nephew of Robert Mokoena) were 
already members of MK, who had joined in June 1980. In an interview 
with Cassius Motsoaledi, it emerged that when he visited Bushbuckridge 
he seemed to bel ieve that these three MK cadres were not members but 
local sympathisers of the ANC.40' He did not know that they had already 
gone through the crash course in MCW as far back as 1980. An MK 
cadre called a Nzimbi was the one who took them (Thabane, Malope and 
George Mokoena) across the border to Swaziland, and eventually to 
M b· 40' ozam lque. -
The nature of the underground liberation struggle at the time dictated that 
the three underground MK cadres mentioned above maintain a low 
profile politically in order to avoid the attention of the security police. 
There was always a need for them to be fully trained and it was always 
possible for trainees to disappear for some time, particularly after the 
completion of high school or during school vacations. Most of those who 
skipped the country for military and political training from the rural areas 
of the far Northern Transvaal claimed, when they resurfaced, that they 
400 Interview with Cassuis Motsoaledi, by the author. Erasmuskloof. Pretoria. Gauteng Province, 16 
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had been working in urban areas and unable to come home due to work 
related reasons.403 After undergoing an intensive military training that 
took them to the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the early 1980s 
Malope, Mokoena and Thabane were sent back to the Bushbuckridge 
area to cany out the underground liberation work for MK around about 
June 1984.404 The changing political climate in the country initially 
favoured them in that the country was caught up in a nationwide 
unprecedented level of political upheavals with the youth in the forefront. 
This was the mid-1980s. The youth comprised a revolutionary contingent 
that was "highly politically conscious, experienced in struggle over a 
period of more than half a century, who stood ready in their tens of 
thousands to be recruited and organised into contingents of political and 
armed fighters. ,,405 
Matthews Phosa was at the time an attorney In Nelspruit working 
clandestinely for the ANC and servICIng this MK unit In 
Bushbuckridge.406 This connection explains why Phosa was exposed and 
forced to go into exile in Swaziland when the police eventually caught up 
with the unit,407 which was organising and spearheading youth revolts in 
the Bushbuckridge area, by organising the youth into youth political 
formations and political education based on the ANC objectives and 
principles.408 The Thabane unit did not cany out these clandestine 
~I" M igrantcy was always used for all sorts of excuses including missions of going into exile for short 
consultations and training undetected. 
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objectives on its own but had surrogates in the youth congresses that they 
infiltrated. 
The exposure came because of an arrest accompanied by gunfire 
exchanges when this MK unit was moving house for security reasons. 
On one particular day in 1984, Thabane was relocated from the house in 
which he was secretly staying, to another in the neighbourhood. 
Unbeknown to those who were organising these safe houses, the owner 
of the new house into which Thabane was moved, was a policeman in 
Witbank whose son lived there and informed the local police about 
Thabane's presence in the house. In the gun battle that ensued, Thabane 
was injured in the leg but, nevertheless, managed to escape. He then 
moved to another house in the neighbourhood. However, he was bleeding 
so profusely that he had to seek medical assistance from someone. 
Feigning compassion, a certain man offered to seek help on Thabane's 
behalf. He left Thabane alone under the pretext of wanting to summon 
Thabane's uncle who was also part of the underground MK liberation 
struggle. The man came back with the police among whom was Siphithi 
Malaza, a double agent for both the security police and the ANC in 
exile.409 Thabane was then arrested. Thabane was sentenced to fifteen and 
half years on Robben Island for his MK activities. 
In the same exposure and confrontation with the police, Michael Malope 
was killed when he was found in Patrick Mogale's room. 4lO Mogale, a 
school principal of Bheki Zwayo Secondary School in the area at the 
time, used to lend these three cadres his car to carry out their political 
~II') Ihid, 1 R January 2005. 












mISSIOns, which led to his imprisonment later on Robben Island.411 
Mogale, who was present in the room when the gun battle ensued, was 
also an ANC sympathiser who had taught some of these cadres of MK. 
Of pivotal importance is that the message the MK wanted to convey was 
now taking shape in the rural areas of the far Northern Transvaal - the 
politicisation and involvement of the masses. 
Notwithstanding Tambo's vision of an ideal deployed MK cadre there 
were other political developments that were taking place in the rest of 
southern Africa. These developments impacted on the interaction of MK 
and those organisations that were internally based. They also affected 
plans that were hatched in exile with regard to MK deployees. It IS 
against this background that the following conditions are outlined. It 
should therefore be understood that the Nkomati Accord signed by the 
South African government with Mozambique in 1984, disorganised the 
ANC and MK plans. Thabane alluded to this when he pointed out that the 
ANC was forced by the implications of the Accord to despatch them to 
South Africa without thorough preparation.412 That is why, according to 
Thabane, MK cadres were instructed to concentrate on political 
mobilisation and to cut down on military actions as the host countries in 
exile were beginning to be hostile towards them. It was around that time 
(after the signing of the Accord in 1984) that the ANC relocated some of 
the MK cadres to Ethiopia and Uganda. Thabane's sentiment seems to be 
borne out by a number of facts. Jorge Robelo, a member of the Political 
Bureau and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the FRELIMO 
party in Mozambique maintains that their position was to give the ANC 
political and diplomatic support and not to contribute to its military 
.111 Ihid . 
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efforts.413 This state of affairs culminated in confusion around the same 
time that Thabane refers to: the military coup in Lesotho affected the 
ANC; and in Swaziland and Botswana "" .ANC and MK structures and 
operational capacity in Swaziland and Botswana were also undermined 
and destroyed, with cadres again hastily infiltrated into South Africa, 
causing increased casualties.,,414 The Nkomati Accord in particular, 
unexpectedly compelled MK to realign its long-term military policy of 
"hacking its way home" prematurely. After the Nkomati Accord: 
The ANC was forced to re-think its strategy in 1984 when the 
Mozambican government, which had been a traditional host and ally of the 
ANC, was forced to sign an agreement with the South African 
government. This effectively closed off Mozambique to the ANC and the 
ANC military was forced to withdraw to Angola and Tanzania. At the 
same time, other of South Africa's neighbours indicated that they too were 
unable to provide sanctuary for the ANC. 415 
The psychological impact of the MK operations was immeasurable on the 
psyche of the majority of the people whose aspirations the ANC had in 
one basket. Alfred Nzo vividly captured this impact that instilled self-
confidence and transformed the dormant resentment towards the 
government into a spirit of an open mass confrontation.416 Even military 
and political sceptics, such as Dale McKinley, alluded to the oppressed 
black people's expectations of MK armed campaign.417 The interaction 
between the deployed MK cadres and the youth congresses proved useful 
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in the sphere of MK operations. The youth constituted the majority of 
ANC aligned organisations inside the country and they were able to 
identify targets, provide safe houses for MK cadres and organise secret 
underground meetings in which revolutionary skills were imparted to 
selected few and trusted cadres of the movement. The bulk of the 
membership of umbrella organisations like the UDF was not directly 
involved in the planning and execution of ordinary military and political 
missions of the liberation struggle. The dangers of doing something 
contrary were daunting. The focus on the youth was not mistaken 
because every revolution has the intention of capturing the minds of the 
youth as its primary objective.418 The formation of youth congresses took 
up the cudgels in all spheres of life and in the process managed to 
challenge the causes of their marginalisation from community levels to 
the economy of the country. These young people who were in the 
forefront of receiving and protecting MK cadres infiltrated the country 
through 'routes' that were not as conventional as the observers of history 
would like to believe. 
One daring mISSIOn of MK cadres into the cauldron of violence in 
KwaNdebele will confirm the above. The arrival of Maake and his MK 
unit in the mid-eighties in KwaNdebele under the guidance of Chris 
Hani, who was in exile, could not have been possible if the youth of 
Moutse, in particular, were not prepared to provide them with safe houses 
and other equipment.419 Maake's unit (comprising Mike Sindane, Johnny 
Nhlanhla, and later joined by Chief Piet Mohlamonyane Mathebe, 
Charkie Edison Mathebe and Charles Doctor Mathebe) was hosted, 
undetected, in Moutse for almost two years when the community was 
~I' Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954 ~ 1962, (London, MacMillan, 1987), p. 403. 
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faced with a two-pronged intractable problem.420 There was a looming 
incorporation of the area into KwaNdebele and the homeland was about 
to opt for independence.42I The fierce battle that the community was 
wagmg against the vigilantes of Imbokotho needed a military 
intervention that could tilt the scale of the war in favour of the Moutse 
community. The unit fought fierce battles in tandem with the masses of 
Moutse in the KwaNdebele area. 
This MK unit led by Maake carried out many operations such as the 
attack on Elias Musi (otherwise known as Elvis Mishi) for suspecting 
that he had been assisting the police in their war against the opposition of 
the Moutse residents against the incorporation into the Bantustan of 
KwaNdebele. The MK unit went to Musi's place at Saniesloot where he 
was seen standing outside his house. They fired several shots at him 
before he fell to the ground. It later emerged that he had been injured in 
the leg in that attack.422 The same MK unit attacked a police station in the 
area in the early hours of the morning to minimise any possibility of 
injuring any civilians. The objective had always been to avoid the use of 
random violence and injury of guiltless civilians.423 The police returned 
fire but the unit managed to flee in a get away car that was parked a few 
metres from the police station where, in another attack, two policemen, 
Freddy Sepogwane and Jerry Motluong were injured.424 Maake 
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masterminded the attack on the magistrate's court at Sempupuru in 1987 
after making a home made bomb that caused a neighbouring squatter 
camp around the Kwaggafontein police station, to relocate for fear of 
being caught in the crossfire.425 The unit also killed Lieutenant Petrus 
Fourie and his son Sergeant Mark Fourie on the 11 September 1987, in 
an ambush at Dennilton/Marble Hall/Moteti T-Junction.426 Lt. Fourie was 
a member of the KwaNdebele police and a commanding officer of the 
Watch Unit in Dennilton which was responsible for most of the 
brutalities visited upon the people who opposed their incorporation into 
KwaNdebele homeland. Sgt. Fourie was a member of the SAP based at 
the police college in Pretoria. At the time of the ambush he was just 
accompanying the father to the area. The MK unit got the information 
through contacts in the police force that Fourie senior and Warrant 
Officer Kekana were going to meet on that day to discuss the 
investigation they were carrying out at the time. These were not the only 
fruitful mission that they carried out in the area. There were other cases 
of bravery by the Maake unit in Moutse in 1987-88. The unit managed 
the Area Military Committee (AMC) that was responsible for all 
direction and operations of MK in the area, keeping track of what was 
taking place and liaising with their overall commander, Chris Hani, in 
exile. People who knew about the committee were able to report their 
cases there, for example, a member of the incorporation opposition had 
been kidnapped by the agents of the Imbokotho vigilante outfit and 
hidden at the Immerpan area. The Imbokotho vigilante brigade was the 
KwaNdebele Bantustan based outfit used by the homeland's political 
leadership to entrench themselves amidst community opposition to the 
homeland's political development. The AMC sent, upon investigations, 
42' Interview with Bax Mahlangu, by the author, Bronkhorspruit. Gauteng Province. 28 April 2003. 











the Maake unit to rescue the kidnapped MK functionary in 1987. These 
acts of the MK unit were made possible with the help of the involvement 
of several units of MK some of which were responsible for the 
distribution of arms and ammunition in the area. A military training camp 
was also established in the area in 1986 in a cave called Mmaleonya near 
the royal family of the Bantoane community.427 
There was also a need for MK to establish a constant supply of trained 
cadres to ward off and sustain the resistance campaign against the two 
military states - the South African government, and the KwaNdebele 
Bantustan and its Imbokotho task force. These operations could not have 
been possible without the support of the local people in their 
organisation, Moutse Youth Congress, an affiliate of UDF. These 
underground cadres were mostly youths such as Bax Mahlangu, Themba 
Mahlangu, and families such as the Maepa in Dennilton who assisted 
Tlokwe when he was deployed to the area in 1984 and many others who 
laid the groundwork for MK to establish itself on home soil. MK cadres 
based inside the country such as Stanley Mathabatha, played a sterling 
role in informing deployed cadres from exile about the state of affairs. 428 
In the end, the Moutse community was left out of the independence sham 
that was envisaged. The Maake unit was enlisted into other national 
campaigns such as Operation Vula and when the network was uncovered 
almost all the membership of the Operation were arrested. Jerome 
Maake faced the bleak future of another imprisonment on Robben Island 
427 Interview with Stanly Mathabatha, by the author, Provincial Department of Finance, Polokwane, 












and only a dint of luck in the form of the unbanning of political 
organisations in 1990 saved him from another term on the island.429 
Conclusion 
The reappearance of the ANC stalwarts on the South African political 
stage and their interaction with the youth, the tentative movements of the 
ANC underground and MK tremendously counteracted the refined 
arguments advocated by the BCM related organisations of the 1970s.43o 
The decline of the BCM related organisations and their subsequent rise 
by the Charterists gave the ANC a confidence to declare the 1980s a 
"decade of freedom. ,,431 The BCM organisations also lost their "prestige" 
because the ANC cadres who were following the instructions of the ANC 
in exile had infiltrated them.432 This was a well orchestrated plan by the 
ANC carried into the country by deployed MK cadres on recruitment 
missions. The emergence of CaSAS and the subsequent mushrooming of 
civic associations and youth congresses in the early 1980s ensured that 
the fortunes of the ANC and MK were catapulted onto the national stage. 
The creation of the UDF reinforced the local struggles that were waged 
because the UDF had the capability to provide a national political and 
ideological axis for forces opposed to the government's racial policies.433 
Contrary to Tambo's persistent refutations that the UDF was not an ANC 
front, the symbiotic relationship between the two tells a different story. 
The South African government had the impression and perception of the 
429 Interview with Jerome Joseph Maake, by the author, Polokwane, Limpopo Province. 4 November 
2003. 
4311 Sello Moeti. 'Ten Years of So we to Uprising', Sechaba, June 1986, pp. 4-5. 
431 Thando Zuma, 'The Surest Way to People's Power. A Response to Brenda Stalker', Sechaba, 
February 1988, p. 9. 
432. 'ANC calls for Unity', Sechaba London, October 1979, p. 18. 
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"UDF as a stalking horse for the exiled ANC."434 The perception spelt 
danger for the UDF and explains its persecution by the government 
towards the end of the 1980s decade. It is argued that the "central 
coordinating body inside the country" that was envisaged as part of the 
mandate of the terms of reference of the PMSC was actually indirectly 
answered with the formation of the UDF. Tom Lodge's analysis of the 
UDF obliquely confirms this assertion that for an organisation that had 
fifteen members who belonged to the ANC (before it was banned) of 
whom five were members of MK (in some cases the same people) and 
seven were members of SACTU,435 what else is needed to prove that this 
was an ANC broad based church? The intermingling between the ANC 
and UDF obliquely brought to the fore the assumption that the UDF was 
the "- overt, internal face of the ANC. ,,436 The UDF united more than 
400 community based organisations that comprised all South Africa's 
racial composition.437 It may not have been the central coordinating 
committee as envisaged by the ANC in exile. How else were the many 
encomIUms for the UDF, from the ANC in exile, supposed to be 
interpreted? It is in this spirit that Oliver Tambo urged: 
... That outstanding product of the creative initiative of the masses of our 
struggling people, the United Democratic Front, has borne the brunt of the 
futile terrorist onslaught of the Botha-Malan-Coetzee regime to defeat our 
mass offensive and to suppress our democratic organisations. To this day, 
the threat of prohibition hangs over the UDF. Yet we are convinced that, 
having more than survived the assassination and imprisonment of its leaders, 
the cold-blooded murder of its leaders, the bannings of its meetings and so 
on, the UDF will overcome all attempts by the enemy to wipe it out of 
existence. Practice has more than amply demonstrated that the struggling 
m 'South Africa: The UDF', Afi'ica Confidential, Vol. 28, No.2, 21 January 1987, p. 4. 
41< Tom Lodge, 'The United Democratic Front: Leadership and Ideology', A/i'iciln Studies Institute, 
University of the Witwatersrand, 1987, p. 2. 
43<, Gomolemo Mokae, 'Robert McBride - A Coloured Life', PhD Thesis. Department of English. Vista 
University, Pretoria, 14 June 1993, p. 37. 












masses of our country need the UDF as an instrument to maintain, advance 
d d . d . 438 an eepen our umte actIon. 
The UDF remained at the apex of internal opposition politics in South 
Africa after its launch on the 20 August 1983 at the Rocklands Civic 
Centre, Mitchell's Plain. Although it was conceived as a rallying point 
against the South African government's constitutional reforms, the UDF 
eventually coordinated struggles against apartheid.439 The youth 
congresses that were established throughout the 1980s were almost UDF 
affiliates. The link between the exiled MK and the internally based 
organisations was working perfectly well as of the late 1980s despite 
repressive measures taken by the government against them. 
The UDF continued to serve as a reservoir for the MK's clandestine 
operations which did not go unnoticed in security police circles. Station 
Commander Johannes Jacobus Kloppers of the Dennilton and Siyabuswa 
police stations acknowledged the presence of the MK In the 
KwaNdebele-Moutse debacle. 440 Presenting evidence before the Parson 
Commission of Inquiry, Commander Kloppers blamed Imbokotho 
vigilantes as well as the ANC and UDF for violence in the area. 441 The 
UDF's role and its ability to outclass the government's repression can be 
summed up in the words of The Star newspaper that, 'The UDF has 
become the hydra of SA politics ... the many-headed snake whose 
opponents are bent on decapitating it but are faced with its ability to 
m OR Tambo, 'Attack! Advance! Give the Enemy no Quarter!' (January 8'h Message of the National 
Executive Committee of the African National Congress); Sechaha, March 1986, p. 5. See also Steven 
Mufson's Interview with Thabo Mbeki in Fighting Years Black Resistance and the Struggle/or a New 
South Af;·ica. (Boston, Beacon Press, 1990), p. 206. 
4YJ Jean de la Harpe and Andrew Manson, The UDF and the DCI'elopment of Resistance ill South 
Afi-ic{{, Africa Perspective, No. 23, 1983, p. 66. 
440 Jerome Joseph Maake, TRC Amnesty Application No. AM 7756/97. 











regenerate heads to replace those lost. ,,442 This was a feat of 
unprecedented magnitude that was not there in the ANC before. The 
ability to replenish detained or killed cadres of the movement and be able 
to send recruited youth into exile as well as to integrate those that were 
trained in exile back into the country was a accomplishment that was 
relatively new in the 1980s. For those are looking for military 
achievements it is important to note that the ANC has always argued that 
the liberation struggle was more political than military. The military and 
political campaigns that popularised MK and indirectly mobilised the 
masses for the ANC were not as massive as they later became in the mid-
1980s. The MK armed propaganda operations were also not without 
detractors, a criticism that was not new. Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi for 
example, criticised the ANC at a meeting in K waMashu on June 8 1980 
after the Sasolburg and Secunda MK attack. His view was that he "would 
not stand by and watch the ANC committing political suicide by 
attempting to establish itself on the lunatic fringe of the society".443 
The legalisation of the trade umon movement and the need for an 
umbrella organisation of trade unions also assisted in sustaining the 
people's expectations about the ANC, particularly after the formation of 
COSATU in 1985. Individual members who were active in the trade 
union movement were able to carry out the campaigns that were 
engineered by MK such as the recruitment drives for people to join the 
underground structures. The DIRD eventually managed to accomplish its 
mission to establish contacts with the internal organisations that took up 
the cudgels against the government's celebrations of Republic Day, the 
skyrocketing rents, the imposition of tribalism masqueraded as separate 
442 'The UDF & Regime's Strategy of Control', The Star, 30 April 1985. 











development, and a host of other social ills that affected the black 
majority. The role that the trade unions were playing on factory floors 
was actually not new in the ANC's war against the South African 
government. The SACTU played the same role as that of a conveyor belt 
to the ANC/MK struggles of the 1960s.444 It was just that new strategies 
and tactics used in the past were grinded and perfected with time by 
COSA TU. When COSA TU and the UDF were truncated by the 
emergency regulations in the mid-1980s, they were able to mutate into 
something as nebulous as the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM). The 
goals were still the same - to outwit the government of the day in 
strategies and tactics of arrests, proscription and killings. MDM was 
described at some point as, 
... the movement's hydra-headed character that finally defeated the 
Nationalist government and its security apparatus - it could not be 
disabled by simple decapitation, like the ANC and the South African 
Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) 20 years earlier. The COSA TU 
unions, too, had developed their own bottom-up traditions, with strong 
factory organisation and an independent, worker centred political line. 
SACTU, by contrast, was little more than the ANC's labour auxiliary.445 
In the final analysis, the interchange between the ANC/MK and the 
myriad of internally based organisations that were housed under the UDF 
became visible and beneficial to the re-emergence of MK in the rural far 
Northern Transvaal. It should be reemphasised however, that the 
underground nature of MK operations dictated that the deployment of the 
MK cadres in a particular locality be kept to a bare minimum. Their role 
was to control and give military and political guidance whenever 
necessary. The deployed MK cadres' brief was not to fight with the 
444 See Edward Feit, Workers Ivithollt Weapons, The South Afi-ican Congress of Trade Unions and the 
Organisation of the Afi'ican WorkersL Op. Cit., pp. 162-3. See also Stephen M. Davis, Apartheid's 
Rehels Inside South A/i'ica 's Hidden War, Op. Cit., pp. 15-16. 











SADF soldiers in a conventional warfare but rather, to conduct guerrilla 
warfare tactics whenever and wherever necessary for armed propaganda 
warfare purposes.446 It is in this context that the interplay between the 
exiled government and internally based opponents should be analysed 
and finally understood. Regional events that were unfolding in the 1980s, 
such as secret pacts, had a detrimental effect on the MK operations in the 
rural far Northern Transvaal. The effect was felt in the execution of the 
MK underground activities which needed " ... safe rear bases in order to 
organise logistic support, training and refuge for guerrillas in-between 
attacks.,,447 The Nkomati Accord in particular was singled out by the 
ANC as a 'surrender' and since its signing, the allegation went, the rest 
of southern African states were under pressure from South Africa to 
follow suit. The unintended results of the secret pacts were that the ANC 
encouraged its cadres to stay inside the country and resist the 
government's clampdown rather than to leave the country for exile. This 
is not to deny that recruits were admitted to the MK training camps 
outside South Africa. The numbers dwindled after the Nkomati Accord 
and new camps were opened in places like Ethiopia and this proved to be 
costly and counterproductive. Rear bases became more attractive than 
faraway camps. 
44(, In the case of attacks in Moutse the idea was to reinvigorate the opponents of incorporation into the 
Bantustan of K waNdebele by pointing out to them that there was a hand of a guerrilla outfit that was 
behind them. 
447 An Appraisal of Armed Struggle in South Africa. SAHA, AL 2457 H5. 17 MK. Historical Papers 












MK and the South African Government's Response 
Introduction 
This chapter sets out to interrogate the South African government's 
response to the growing political consciousness and ungovernability of 
the whole of the rural far Northern Transvaal during the 1980s. Different 
methods of placating the politically agitated black majority, such as the 
1983 political reforms (tricameral parliamentary systems) and the 
government's strategy of shifting its political responsibility to the 
homelands are the axis of argument in this chapter. The key argument 
here is the postulation that the constitutional reforms the government 
initiated were subterfuges whose desperate aims were conspicuous to any 
naked political eye.44R In the light of the realisation that the majority of 
the population was not to be fooled by political gimmicks sugar-coated as 
political changes, the South African government instigated a severe 
internal and external repression against its opponents. The aim was to 
entrench its power but the writing was also on the wall for the 
government which was aware that force in itself could not rule the 
majority. This chapter discusses the government's stratagems to entrench 
itself amid growing resentment of its policies, investigates the 
government's attempts to contain the growing political umbrage of the 
1980s, and shows how the victims of state aggression fared in the 
environment of state security. 
44, George Sizos made the same reference to Botha's reforms policies in a seminar as "cosmetic" and 
deceptive. See George Bizos, 'Frontline States. How to Counter South Africa's Destabilisation', 











Constitutional reform and legislated despotism 
The South African government's unbending detennination to pursue the 
politics of national security was underpinned by the idea that the 
successful promotion and sustenance of white political and economic 
supremacy depended on maintaining national security, and state 
repression became a fulcrum of state security throughout the decades of 
rule by the National Party government. The state did not abandon other 
means to keep itself firmly in the seat of power, however. Severe 
authoritarianism and superficial legalism, the enactment and execution of 
laws that exculpated the government's abuse of its power legitimately all 
became distinguishable marks of the South African government rule. The 
adoption of torture as a political tool to extract information or compl iance 
in indefinite detention became the second hallmark of the apartheid 
government. Torture was common, regular and condoned by the South 
African government. 
Torture went hand in hand with the official denial of atrocious acts 
carried out in the name of the government. The security police force was 
elevated above the law itself and the police were assisted by the pliant 
judiciary, which was always ready to be at the government's beck and 
call. This became evident in the arrest of Tlokwe Maserumule when a 
magistrate was woken up after hours to come and charge him (Tlokwe) 
when he was apprehended in Dennilton in 1984.449 Inadvertently 
confinuing this forgoing assertion, Jack Cronje, one of the notorious 
security branch members boldly told the TRC Amnesty Application 
Committee that, "People hurt during interrogation by the security police 
had to be killed because detaining them under security legislation would 











allow them to report their injuries to a magistrate. ,,450 This was not an 
aberration but a policy of government that was allegedly based on 
Christian principles. The dangers and occurrences of a magistrate taking 
action against the security police for inflicting harm on political suspects 
are minuscule. Magistrates and judges as well as the police were 
employed to perpetuate the system of government that was declared by 
the United Nations (UN) as a crime against humanity.451 The extent to 
which these supposed custodians of democracy and freedom were 
misused by the South African government forms a part of this chapter. 
The ultimate aim is to determine the power of the state in its quest to 
suppress the will of the majority of its citizens. 
Was this state repression a new phenomenon in the government's security 
arsenals? Joe Slovo acknowledges that in the 1960s there was still a 
semblance of the rule of law regarding the abuse of power by the police 
in relation to perceived political activists that were in the hands of the 
state.452 The biggest challenge to the status quo came in 1976 when 
apartheid was challenged to its core. After June 1976, it became virtually 
impossible for the South African government to pretend that there was 
nothing wrong with its racial policies. The youth generation of the 1970s 
was prepared to confront the bullets with bare chests and hands. The 
government, on the other hand, was unrepentant in its pursuit of total 
control of politically related disturbances. The heavy-handedness of the 
government m suppressmg the countrywide political agitations 
besmirched its already sullied image in the minds of the victims. 
4,0 October 30 1996 - South A/i-ican Press Association (SAP A) press release or visit 
~V\,w.doi.!!m.La. frc. media. 199flN6W, s9{11 030h.hrm. 
4, I Cases of a magistrate assaulting political detainees are legendry. Both Maserumule Tlokwe and JJ 
Maake interviews make this point quite clear that the magistrate assaulted them after becoming enraged 
during interrogation. 











The government instituted its own constitutional changes in view of the 
political upsurge that had gripped the country since the late 1970s. The 
intention was to create divisions amongst different racial groups by 
applying disparate preferential treatment policies. A Cabinet Committee 
established in 1976, chaired by P. W. Botha, then the Minister of 
Defence, suggested bringing the Coloured and Indian communities into 
central government, but as subservient partners in a political system that 
catered for the aspirations of the whites. Only the National Party, from 
whom Botha came, supported the recommendations. Other government-
created institutions like the South African Indian Council (SAIC) and the 
Coloured Representative Council (CRC) rejected the recommendations 
on the grounds that they excluded the African majority. However, these 
structures lacked legitimacy because they too were structured along 
racially exclusive lines and they were rejected by the majority of people 
belonging to these groups, while they set precedents for subsequent 
political developments. Botha was so infuriated by the reaction of these 
two institutions that he threatened the Coloured Labour Party that he 
would find himself other Coloureds who would cooperate with him if this 
party was not prepared to. Botha's threat was to become a reality later 
when conditions were optimal for the implementation of such a threat. 
The government dismissed the SAIC and CRC's rejection of the 
recommendations of the Botha Commission. 
In 1979 the Schlebusch Commission was set up to look into constitutional 
reforms that were geared towards assuaging the international opprobrium 
that South Africa was faced with as a result of its internal racist policies 
against the African people. The Schlebusch Commission, under the 











reported on its recommendations In 1980.453 This Commission 
recommended the formation of the President's Council, which, when 
eventually set up, comprised sixty members who were drawn from the 
ranks of the White, Coloured, Indian and Chinese communities, and 
replaced the Senate that stopped its operation as of the 1 January 1981. 
One of the criticisms levelled against the President's Council was that its 
members were experts rather than representatives of the above ethnic 
enclaves. This body was also sanctioned to explore the possibility of 
constitutional developments along racial lines. The Schlebusch 
Commission also recommended the appointment of twelve additional 
members of parliament (MP) who were to be appointed by parliament. 
One of the beneficiaries of this recommendation was Magnus Malan who 
became the Minister of Defence in 1980.454 Both the Coloured Labour 
Party and the Indian Reform Party refused to have anything to do with the 
President's Council and Botha, then Prime Minister of the Republic of 
South Africa. True to his earlier threat, Botha found fourteen people from 
the Coloured; Indian and Chinese communities who were prepared to 
serve on the President's Council. As always, the exclusion of the African 
majority was based on the pretext that their future was in the 
homelands.455 For its obduracy in defying Botha's instructions the CRC 
was replaced with the Coloured Persons Council (CPC) but the CPC did 
not function effectively since Botha was not enthusiastic about it. The 
SAIC was put under pressure and eventually collapsed because the people 
it was supposed to serve interpreted it as a political mannequin 
m See de Klerk. F. W. The Last Trek a New Beginning. An Autohiography. (London. Macmillan. 
c 1998). pp. 93-94. 
N Richard Leonard. South Africa at War. White Power and the Crisis in Southern Afi·ica. 
(Connecticut. Westport. 1983). p. 198. . 











functioning at the behest of the South African government.456 
The banned ANC congratulated the Coloured and Indian communities for 
their rejection of the two structures propounded by Botha. Oliver Tambo 
even went further to call for the destruction of the Bantustan system and 
the Bantu Councils.457 The government's constitutional internal reforms 
did not achieve the intended results; at least, not in the long run, nor in 
the past. The concerted ruse to lure the Coloured and the Indian 
community to White racist politics was not new; a history of the SAIC 
would confirm this tenacity on the part of the South African government 
to initiate constitutional reforms based on racial lines. Prime Minister 
Hendrik Verwoerd's government which had created the Department of 
Indian Affairs in 1961 indirectly spawned the SAIC. The Minister 
responsible was authorised to appoint a "National Indian Council" to 
advise him on Indian matters that were selected by him. The 1963 
"conference" attended by 100 Indians and held clandestinely in Pretoria 
by the government's selected delegates, appointed 21 men to constitute 
the National Indian Council (NIC). The secretary of the Indian Affairs 
Department chaired the Pretoria secret meeting. The opposition to their 
activities paralysed the NIC. The South African government remained 
steadfast in its racial constitutional track. In 1972, the government 
thought that increasing the number of members from 21 to 30 would 
make the body acceptable and accountable. Twenty-five members of the 
Council were appointed and five elected. In 1973, the government 
changed its own electoral rules and declared that 15 members of the 
Council were to be appointed and a further 15 elected through "electoral 
colleges" comprising members of the Indian local authorities, Local 
N OR Tambo. 'Extend and Defend Our Revolutionary Gains'. Sechaha. President OR Tambo's 
January 8 1981 Statement, March 1981, p. 5. 











Affairs Management and Consultative Committees.458 As in the past, a 
boycott of that charade was called thus there was no electoral roll. The 
South African government's recalcitrance to defeat the opposition 
manifested in March 1980 when 40 members of the SAlC were to be 
elected in terms of the common voters roll and five nominated. As 
previously, opposition to these racial reforms was mounted and the 
government's plans were frustrated but, nevertheless, continued to 
resurface in mutated forms throughout the years. 
The most important question that needed to be posed in view of these 
aborted constitutional changes was why the insistence on constitutional 
reforms that excluded the African indigenous majority existed. The 
changing southern African political landscape and the perception that the 
seizure of power through military and political means was possible 
because of victories in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe and a myriad 
of internal problems in South Africa are amongst the causes that impelled 
South Africa toward constitutional self-introspection. The government's 
determination to continue with constitutional changes along the racial 
lines was bound to meet with growing anger and frustration. The New 
Nation newspaper concluded that there were, "... new contradictions, 
which opened up new fronts of conflict. Then followed popular 
grassroots resistance, which in tum gave rise to brutal repression.,,459 
The 1980s witnessed an unprecedented upsurge in internal and external 
opposition to the government's policies throughout the entire country, 
driven by the African majority. It was clear that the government was not 
prepared to entertain an all-inclusive approach to its political future. It 
N 'Boycott the SAle'. Sechaha, August 1980, p. 27. 











was also evident that the government was rating its own security above 
the freedom of the African people. This was confirmed by the 
appointment of the Rabie Commission. The government felt besieged 
towards the tum of the 1970s and in that state of paranoia, appointed the 
Rabie Commission to investigate all security matters. The Commission 
reported its recommendations in February 1982 and they were codified 
into the July 1982 Internal Security Act. 
A brief history of security legislation patently brings to light the 
cumulative nature of state repression in South Africa. The Suppression of 
Communism Act of 1950 came into power two years after the National 
Party's victory. The Act was formally called Act No. 44 of 1950, which 
banned everything communistic including people merely regarded by the 
state as communists. The government's definition of communism was 
vague and nebulous causing untold victimisation of thousands of people 
throughout its years of application. The Suppression of Communism Act 
was repealed in 1976 and its provisions incorporated into the Internal 
Security Amendment Act. The 1981 Internal Security Act repealed all 
security legislation applicable in the past and extended the powers of the 
security forces. It circumscribed anything aimed at bringing about 
political, industrial, social or economic change by means of (allegedly) 
promoting disturbance, disorder or unlawful actions by encouraging 
hostile feelings between Blacks and Whites.46o As if the Act was not 
enough to subjugate any protruding opposition against the obnoxious 
policies of the government, the Intimidation Act, aimed at trade unions 
and school boycotts, was passed. The Demonstration In or Near Court 
Buildings Prohibition Act was aimed at preventing demonstrations in 
~(,() Albertyn C. 'A Critical Analysis of Political Trials in South Africa, 1948 to 1988', PhD Thesis, 











support of political trialists. 461 
It was virtually impossible for extra parliamentary organisations to voice 
their grievances against the government policies without tlouting any of 
the security laws that were in place. The government continued to hold its 
'maxim' that, "The only way to render the enemy powerless is to nip 
revolution in the bud, by ensuring that there is no fertile soil in which the 
seeds of revolution can germinate.,,462 In the government's view the 
causes of the fertile soil for insurrection was not political exclusion but 
the reluctance to obey the laws of the country. There was a misconception 
that the introduction of security laws would eventually cow the majority 
into submission. The tlipside of these security laws was that they assisted 
in bringing together the government's very opponents and creating fertile 
grounds for popular political uprising. Victims of legislative arrogance 
came together into political organisations that had quasi freedom. It was 
also realised that there was a need for the amalgamation of all forces 
opposed to the government. The government's enforced reign and the 
implementation of constitutional and legislated repression were shaken 
when the government was directly challenged by the formation of the 
UDF in 1983. 
This challenge was not new but it was an organised act which was 
mounted and sustained until the demise of legislated apartheid in 1994. 
The international community that abhorred apartheid also assisted in the 
exposure of the horrors of " ... an uncommonly repugnant system.,,463 
Before completing to cite her husband Sven Olof Joachim Palme's 
4hl 'Pretoria's Commissions of Enquiry', Sechaha, July 1983, p. 26. 
462 Maj. Gen. A J. Wandrag, SOE Deputy Commissioner, SA Police (Riot Control), Political Unrest: A 
Police View, ISSUP Strategic Review, October 1985, p. 15. 












work 464, Lisbet went on to urge: " ... and so by declaring our support for 
the black struggle, and helping to isolate the apartheid regime, we must 
live up to our responsibility for bringing this repulsive system to an 
end. ,,465 A barrage of criticisms continued unabated. Describing the 1983 
constitutional reforms, Alfred Moleah points out that these were " ... 
nothing more than pragmatic adjustments to secure white supremacy. 
Through clever manoeuvres and sleight of hand [Botha] is trying to let 
Afrikaners, and whites in general, have their cake and eat it.,,466 The state 
continued to capture the remaining semblance of governance through the 
legislative barrel of the constitution. On the other hand, measures to 
subvert new and whetted security laws were sharpened and perfected as 
soon as they were announced. Internal opponents of the apartheid system 
found a solution that was long overdue: the replacement of those that the 
government thought were instigators with new ones until victory was 
achieved. The legislative despotism that South Africa wanted to model 
itself into was not challenged on home soil but it was challenged from all 
comers of the globe by various means. 
Intimidation versus internal response 
The government's internal constitutional changes were calculated "to 
increase its own legitimacy" amongst South Africans whom the 
government thought were still politically undecided.467 The formation of 
~6~ Sven Olof Joachim Palme was a Swedish Prime Minister who was assassinated on February 28, 
1986 by a gunman in central Stockholm street Sveavagen. He supported amongst other political 
formations, the ANC and economic sanctions against the South African government visit 
iJ.r.tQ: 'lvj" \, .I:?ll v"ilipedi.l.or!!. wii..L Glut' PaJme for details. 
465 Ihid, p. 25. 
~6(, Moleah, T. Alfred, 'The Apartheid Fraud: The So-Called New Constitutional Dispensation, The 
International Organisation for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (EAFORD)" 
(London SEC Ithaca Press, February 1984), p. 10. 
467 Chris Maritz, 'Pretoria's Reaction to the Role of Moscow and Peking in Southern Africa', The 










the UDF was a direct and immediate response to attempts to exclude the 
African majority from the political landscape by means of the so-called 
Koornhof Bills. The Koornhof Bills were a cluster of laws such as 
Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill, the Black Local 
Authorities Act and the Black Community Development Bill that were 
supported by Koornhof as Minister in the Botha government in the early 
1980s. The idea with the Bills was to perpetuate racial discrimination 
while giving black people hope that the political arena was 
constitutionally changing. The ANC was frequently making calls that 
discriminatory laws should be disobeyed and the launch of the UDF was 
calculated to coordinate and organise resistance against such laws.468 The 
ANC called on its followers to "Let MK actions, ANC underground 
activity and mass actions form one mighty tide of revolt.,,469 The 
disobedience was a sequel to Oliver Tambo's appeal a year before when 
he was addressing the Second Italian National Conference of solidarity 
with the Peoples of Southern Africa that took place in Rome (26-28 
February 1982). Tambo said: 
The independence of Zimbabwe gave a powerful impetus to the 
revolutionary process which is rocking the foundations of apartheid 
colonial domination in Namibia and South Africa. If the light at the 
end of the tunnel is not visible to all, the problem is one of political 
shortsightedness [sic]. 
Allan Boesak, the then President of the World Alliance of Reformed 
Churches, summed up the prevailing responsive mood of the time in the 
exhortation: 
4hX Visit the section, "The ANC and the Internal Revolt", submission of the African National Congress 
Statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, August 1996 on 
http: w\,vw.am:.on!Ja. ancJ()CSIlTILSC, trca1l.html. 
4h~ MK 21, Umkhonto we Sizwe, a pamphlet on the 21 anniversary of MK ( 16 December 1982), 











There is ... no reason why the churches, CIVIC assocIatIons, trade 
unions, student organisations and sports bodies should not unite on this 
issue; pool our resources, inform people of the fraud that is about to be 
perpetuated in their name and, on the day of the election, expose their 
plans for what they are. 470 
Civic and Church leaders summoned international intervention in the 
South African political dispensation. Some of these civic and church 
leaders made these calls for disinvestments, economic boycotts of South 
African products and economic sanctions. Bishop Tutu and Alan Boesak 
became the leading voices outside the mainstream of opposition 
organisations. Towards the mid-1980s the international and domestic 
uproar seemed to have taken their toll on the government's obduracy to 
cling to its racial policies. The campaign to isolate the government 
internationally, disinvestments and the general internal insurrection took 
their toll in the 1980s. Internally, the incidents on 3 September 1984 in 
Sebokeng, the Vaal Triangle at the time, considered "as a temporary 
outburst" in the eyes of the government, transmogrified into a profound 
challenge for apartheid after 1985.471 In March 1986, the government 
lifted the three year old State of Emergency in the hope that it would 
obviate the impact of the impeding sanctions from the Commonwealth 
nations. 472 The pass laws were also abolished in the same April as a result 
of, amongst other reasons, a threat by COSA TU that it would call on its 
members to bum their passes if the government allowed the union's 
deadline of pass abolition to go by. The boycott tool at the hands of the 
oppressed majority was also becoming very useful as evidenced by the 
470 Murray Martin, South Africa: Time of Agony, Time of Destiny: The Upsurge of Popular Protest, 
(London, Verso, 1987), p. 38. 
471 Pauline H. Baker, 'Facing Up To Apartheid', Foreign Policy, 1986, Unpublished Paper Presented at 
the South African Institute of International Affairs/World Peace Foundation Conference, (Natal, 
Hilton, 1984), p. 50. For a blow by blow account of the Sebokeng uprising and the Vaal Triangle in 
general see Patrick Noonan's They're Burning the Churches. The Final Dramatic El'ents that Scuttled 
Apartheid. (Bellevue. Jacana), 2003. 












national stay away on the 1 May, 1986 as the recognition of worker's 
day.473 Campaigns of boycotts and sit-ins in identified buildings and 
other places also remained some of the tools in the hands of the 
government's opponents. The stage seemed set for a polarised and 
protracted racial conflict with the whites who were clinging tenaciously 
to apartheid on the one hand and the black majority whose freedom was 
tantalizingly on the horizon. 
The countrywide school boycotts were threatening to return SInce 
education was generally severely affected by the countrywide political 
upheavals. The government's neighbours could not assist in the situation 
either in view of the belligerent policies against them, evidenced by the 
attack on alleged ANC bases in May 1986.474 The nationwide declaration 
of the state of emergency on June 12 was calculated to browbeat political 
activists into submission. That did not work. The ANC commented: 
As we all know, the enemy is simultaneously engaged in a gigantic and 
fraudulent cosmetic exercise to improve the image of apartheid. 
Essentially this fraudulent exercise aims to give the impression that the 
racist regime is both capable of, and has started, to reform the apartheid 
system gradually and peacefully out of existence. The truth however is that 
all that our oppressors are doing is to create new conditions for the 
perpetuation and further entrenchment of their tyrannical rule. 475 
It was against this backdrop that the recalcitrance of the government 
became more and more desensitised. The government's siege mentality 
held sway throughout the 1980s as epitomised by the "Total Strategy" 
phenomenon. This phenomenon was described as an "all encompassing 
phenomenon wherein the state's policies and programmes are 
m fhid. p. 259. 
474 For details on the South African government's belligerent behavoiur see South Ali-ican Barometer, 
Vol.l,No.4,24ApriI1987,pp.51-2. 











constituted. ,,476 Its core functions, " ... involved direct military action, 
economic and military sabotage, support for dissidents, assassination and 
propaganda.,,477 The Total Strategy's years of incubation included the late 
1970s when the National Security Management System (NSMS) was 
established in 1979.478 NSMS was an attempt by the government to 
coordinate all covert and overt illegal practices to be in line with the Total 
Strategy campaign. NSMS mutated into the State Security Council in the 
1980s as the country degenerated into a totalitarian state.479 These 
desperate measures were undertaken by the government in its attempt to 
respond to widespread political insurrection against its racial policies. On 
the other hand, the government's relationship with her neighbours was 
also characterised by the same attitude displayed throughout the country. 
Pretoria used its immensely greater military and economic strength to 
uphold its position in Southern Africa and tried to discourage the 
neighbouring countries from harbouring the ANC or using their territories 
as springboards to attack the country.480 Unfortunately for the ANC, in 
the 1980s the SADF aggressively attempted to undermine the so-called 
frontline states to the point where many traded their support for the ANC 
for promises of an end to the South African subterfuge.48I Consequently, 
military incursions into the neighbouring countries became fiercer and 
more callous. 
A case in point was the attack on 9 December, 1982 on Lesotho by 
.j7(, Glen Moss, "Total Strategy', Work in Progress, No. I, 1980, p. L 
477 Tatiana Sillem, 'South African Destabilization of the Frontline State: The Case of Zimbabwe', M A 
Thesis, Trinity Hall, Cambridge, August 1988, p. II. 
m Kempton, Daniel Robert, 'Soviet Strategy Toward African National Liberation Movements', PhD 
Thesis, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1988, p. 239. 
m For detailed structure of the National Security Management System (NSMS) see the adaptation of it 
in the appendices by Robert D'A Henderson, South Afhcan Intelligel1ce ul1der De K/erk, 
(Pietermaritzburg, Shutter & Shooter, 1987), p. 140. 
~S(J Howard Barrell, 'Bash Your Neighbour Strategy', New Aji-ican, July 1986, p. 12. 
~XI Kempton, Daniel Robert, 'Soviet Strategy Toward African Liberation Movements', PhD Thesis. 











members of the SADF about which The Citizen newspaper bluntly 
commented that the civilian casualties were unavoidable.482 Forty two 
people were killed in this raid and most of them were Lesotho citizens. 
The same SADF raid was repeated in 1985 in which Leabua Jonathan, the 
premier of Lesotho was toppled. Still on the government's raids on 
neighbouring countries The Rand Daily Mail also commented, "No 
efficient army can be blamed for acting to paralyse that kind of plan.,,483 
When MK carried out military propaganda stunts in which civilians were 
hurt, security police would pontificate and criticise their actions. The 
media would also join the denouncement of the actions. Some years later 
General H.D. Stadler told the TRC that unlike the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (PIRA) that pre-warned the British police the ANC 
never issued a single warning where it knew that civilians were likely to 
be hurt.484 
The search for the ANC bases and the brutality that went with it, knew no 
boundaries. In the Matola attack in Mozambique, on January 30 1981, 
twelve refugees were murdered and Selby Mavuso, David Thobela and 
Thibe Ntsekang, were abducted by the SADF485 . Some of the victims' 
ears were cut off by the South African commandos.486 The secret pacts 
that were signed in the early 1980s between South Africa and some of the 
Southern African states did not dissuade them from issuing a statement in 
which they reaffirm their support for the ANC members as political 
4X2 The Citi=en, 10 December 1982. 
4X3 See 'Racist South Africa Invades Lesotho', Sechaba, January 1983. 
4X4 Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission by The Foundation for Equality before the 
Law. June 1996, Compiled by Maj. Gen. H. D. Stadler and other retired officers of the S.A. Police, Q I 
AL 3097. 
4Xj South African Government Information, Address by the Deputy President of the Republic of South 
Africa, HE Jacob Zuma, at the 23 rd anniversary of the Matola Raid. Maputo. Mozambique, 14 February 
2004, http: \\>\>\ow.int(H':ov sp~ech~:;,:::004 04()21()~)i.)+fJl()13.htlTl. 
4X(, Thomas G. Karis. Revolution in the Making: Black Politics in South Afi·ica. (Pretoria. UNISA: 











refugees.4R7 These were some of the steps taken by the South African 
government in its quest to pursue the ANC cadres and to discourage 
neighbouring countries from providing sanctuaries for them. In response, 
the ANC stepped up its operations inside the country particularly in the 
rural areas of the Eastern Transvaal. On 6 April 1981 a bomb went off 
after a goods train had passed over a section of a railway line in the 
North-Eastern Transvaal. The explosive charge was positioned on the line 
in a remote and mountainous area near Cottondale on the rail link 
between the mining towns of Kaapmuiden and Phalaborwa. The 
government sought to apprehend those who carried out these attacks 
throughout Southern Africa without much success. As G.G. Maasdorp 
observed, internal dissention remained because the government relied on 
the imposition of its political decisions rather than consultation.4RR 
The responses to government's tactics of intimidation were not always 
frontal. Sometimes the best way of responding was to run away from the 
tactics of intimidation. About the time when the SADF attacked Matola in 
Mozambique, the would-be MK cadre; Tlokwe Maserumule arrived in 
the country to join the ANC having fled his home village of GaMatlala in 
the far Northern Transvaal after the police had left a note with his mother 
that they were not going to give up their search for him.489 After the 
liberation struggle Tlokwe told the TRC Amnesty Committee that he had 
taken part in the attack on a temporary SADF unit that was based in the 
Hectorspruit area around 1982.490 The attack was meant to remove the 
temporary military camp of the SADF from the Komatipoort area, 
4XO Carol Cooper et a/, A Survey of Race Relations in South Afi'ica 1983, South African Institute of 
Race Relations, Johannesburg, 1984, p.44. 
4XX G.G. Maasdorp, Nkomati and All That. Can New Economic Battles be Found for the New Marula 
Liqueur?, (Pietermaritzburg, University of Natal Press, 1984), p. 9. 
4Wi Interview with Tlokwe Maserumule by the author, GaMatlala, Limpopo Province II July 2002. 











because the area was used as an entry point for infiltrating MK cadres or 
as an escape route into exile after carrying out military and political 
missions. Pressed for a detailed prescription of the Hectorspruit operation 
by the TRC Amnesty Committee, Tlokwe responded, "I cannot be 
. ,,491 
precIse. 
The use of military aircrafts to monitor entry routes around the borders of 
South Africa started long before the ANC managed to entrench itself 
amongst the masses. The major reasons for the establishment of air bases 
were initially motivated by fears of communism rather than the ANC. But 
why the obsession with military air bases against military weak states that 
surrounded South Africa. A bit of history is essential to put the South 
African's obsession with its own security into its proper perspective. 
Among the first steps taken to expand its air forces, the South African 
government constructed three military bases for the South African Air 
Force (SAAF) in the northern and northeastern Transvaal in 1966.492 
Another base was established in the Pietersburg district, not very far from 
the border with Zimbabwe, and was equipped with a squadron of Sabre 
jets and three S247 super-sensitive surveillance radar systems supplied by 
the British company, Marconi Avionics LTD, a subsidiary of GEC.493 As 
if this was insufficient, the government went on to establish one more 
military base at Nelspruit for use by the border ground and air patrols, 
and another one at Dunnottar as the headquarters of the 40th Air Squadron 
4')1 Ibid. 
49~ These military bases and others were used externally and predominantly against neighbouring 
countries and the liberation movements such as FNLA, MPLA, SWAPO and UNITA (converted after 
the Angolan independence on the 11th November 1975 into an ally of the South African government in 
the "Border War".). 
493 Map No.2 provides clear geographical details of where these military bases were located in the far 
Eastern and far Northern Transvaal. The idea is to show that there was always a fear from the South 
African government that MK cadres were going to come from the north of the country and these bases 











and major training centre for the Harvard planes.494 In 1977, the South 
African regime began to construct another military base, this time at 
Hoedspruit in the Eastern Transvaal, under the pretext of the need to 
deploy reconnaissance and interceptor planes to "defend South African 
air space.,,495 However, it later turned out that the first air unit to be 
permanently stationed there was in fact the No. 1 Squadron, which was 
later joined by the No.2 Squadron, both of which were ground attack 
squadrons equipped with Mirage F -1 supersonic fighter planes. The air 
base that was located within 15 metres of the Mozambican border and lay 
within 15 minutes' flying time from Maputo became fully operational in 
1981. According to the commanding officer of the No. 1 Squadron, the 
Hoedspriut air force base would enable the SAAF "to cover all borders 
from Northern Natal up to the Zimbabwean border", and would provide 
the government with strategic depth. In 1981, the regime opened another 
military base at Phalaborwa in the Northeastern Transvaal, to serve as a 
training centre for the i h Infantry Battalion. Speaking at its opening, 
Magnus Malan issued one of his many threats against the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the Front Line States, declaring that, "every country 
that harbours terrorists must know it stands to lose in this struggle," and 
that South Africa was "determined to wipe out terrorists even if' it had 
"to cross borders to do it.,,496 These threats became daily occurrences. 
The genie was out of the bottle with Malan's statement. 
At the beginning of 1982, the South African Minister of Manpower 
Utilisation announced that plans were afoot to construct a new military 
airbase in the area. He referred to this as a "tactical air force base", 
m Jeffrey Khensani Mathebula, 'Apartheid South Africa Destabilise Zimbabwe', Scchaha. 1982. p.14 
490 Ibid, p.14. 











further adding that when complete and opened, this new base would serve 
as the focal point for the entire northern border system, and it would be 
bigger than the one located 100 kilometres away in Pietersburg. To drive 
the point home about the aggressive intentions of the regime towards 
Zimbabwe and the rest of the Front Line States, P. W. Botha declared 
later, in September 1982 that, "South Africa's sphere of influence extends 
to all its neighbours.,,497 The ramifications of the build-up of these 
military airbases in the border-areas were far reaching, with many people 
continuing to suffer both directly and indirectly. 
The irony was that while the security police and soldiers were manning 
road blocks and arming farmers along the northern borders of the country 
as well as constructing air bases, MK managed to send 'gifts' using 
various modes of transport, mostly during the 1980s.498 These military 
airbases were not going to detect weapons secretly stuffed in 
compartments of buses and cars traveling from Zimbabwe into South 
Africa using Beit Bridge as an entry point. The role of the MK cadres 
based in Zimbabwe such as Refiloe Mudimu and his contacts in the rural 
far Northern Transvaal and the eastern Transvaal is a case in point.499 
Their role proved that it was futile for the South African security forces to 
contrive security strategies such as the' area defence', the Reconnaissance 
Commandos (Recces) and the Ethnic Battalions that were stationed near 
the borders of neighbouring states, ready for raids into these territories. It 
was also equally futile of the government to support puppet groups and 
-I'J7 [hid, p. 15. 
-I9S Interview with Refiloe Mudimu by the author, South African Navy Headquarters, Pretoria, Gauteng 
Province, 21 January 2005. 












organisations masquerading as indigenous resistance movements. soo 
These military outfits were under the auspices of the government's 
Directorate of Special Tasks based in Phalaborwa and had links with 
rebels like the MNR of Mozambique. They were aided and abetted by the 
Reconnaissance Regiment also based in Phalaborwa and responsible for 
MNR operations like "operation Punda milia" during the 1978-1988 
. d 501 peno . 
Individual experiences at the mercy of the Government 
The South African government's 'hold' on power became so desperate 
that the ANC's members who were arrested on missions inside the 
country relinquished any hope of dying decently. Back home in South 
Africa the situation looked very bleak for those who thought that they 
could forever evade arrests, detention and even death, since the security 
police were relentlessly searching for and apprehending political 
activists. These actions were neither novel nor were they newly 
reactivated only after the Soweto riots of 16 June 1976. They had 
haunted South African blacks long before these political revolts. The 
psychotic state of the South African government was evident. It 
distrusted everyone who was not part of its circle. Its state of paranoia 
worsened when P.W. Botha took over the reigns of government, as he 
was convinced that he was inheriting a government under siege. s02 
~IIO Rob Davies et ai, The Struggle for South Af;'ica. A Reference Guide to Movements. Organisations 
und Institutions, New Edition, Volume One, Centre of African Studies, Eduardo Mondlane University, 
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Botha's paranoid view accounts for the depth of the mess that he plunged 
the country into during his tenure in government. It also accounts for the 
brutality that was unleashed on the opponents of apartheid from the late 
1970s. No wonder that Dumisa Ntsebeza, one of the commissioners of 
the TRC, describes Botha's era as having "laid the formal groundwork 
for the bloodiest decade of recent South African history.,,503 
As briefly mentioned in earlier chapters, the salient roles that were played 
by the MK cadres who were sent into the country on various missions, 
but ended up in the hands of the security police, provide some insight of 
the unimaginable brutality of the South African security police. The 
distinction between the MK suspects and the trained ones became blurred 
in the government's quest to stem the tide of revolution for freedom. The 
line between children, women and the real sympathisers of MK became 
very blurry and prompted Oliver Tambo to question the wisdom of the 
killing of children in violence related uprisings. 504 Tambo's question was 
posed against the unbridled rage that the government manifested in the 
face of mounting popular uprisings that resulted in the death of children 
at the hands of the security police and the soldiers in the mid-1980s. On 
the other hand, there was a contention that the ANC had decided to 
collapse the distinction between "hard" and "soft" targets since its 
National Conference at Kabwe, Zambia in 1985.505 The impression 
created was that if the ANC could take a decision to abandon 
differentiating between whom to attack then the SADF was justified to 
respond accordingly. The problem with this fallacy was that the 
:;(I~ Dumisa Ntsebeza, Unfinished Business South Afi'ica Apartheid & Truth, (Muizenburg, RedWorks, 
2001), pp. 181-182. 
'04 Cit\' Press, 30 June 1985. 
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government's brutality did not start after the ANC 1985 conference but 
many years ago. 
The government's reliance on the brute force of the security police to 
suppress the growing political consciousness among the marginalised 
communities knew no boundaries. Terence Beard writes that In South 
Africa during the height of apartheid it was hard to find a single 
individual whose skin was not white, who did not regard the police with 
"fear or dislike, if not hatred".506 He further asserts that the use of police 
and soldiers to subdue insurrections and civil instability had been 
notoriously counter-productive.507 Reporting on the role of the SAP in the 
liberation struggle in South Africa, the TRC Report concludes: 
The development of intelligence-gathering units with an offensive capacity 
proved effective in the Rhodesian situation and was subsequently adapted 
to the South African context by both the police and military. The 
devolution of decision-making powers resulted in police units such as 
Vlakplaas and the Namibian-based hunter-killer Koevoet operating with 
virtual impunity, making it extremely difficult to establish lines of 
d d b 'l' 508 cornman an accounta I Ity. 
The description of Koevoet by the TRC as a "Namibian-based hunter-
killer" is no exaggeration. The following edition of the TRC aptly 
describes and brings blood chilling and nightmarish experiences of those 
that suffered at the hands of Koevoet and the Koevoet administered 
helicopter torture - a method of torture in which the victim was cuffed by 
the ankles and wrists and suspended upside down for days from a pole 
511(, Terence Beard. 'The Police and the Public' - Part I, Reality. Journal of Liberal and Radical 
Opinion, Vol. 13, No.5, September 1981, p.4. 
5117 [hid, p. 5. 
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between two tables. In Sekhukhuneland in the rural far Northern 
Transvaal the same torture took place at the Veeplaas Agricultural Project 
on the banks of the Limpopo River in 1986. With Koevoet, any 
confession was not sufficient for exculpation. 509 Koevoet members' 
inability to speak a single South African language was the only mark of 
identification that was used to separate them from the rest of the security 
forces. 510 The description states that: 
Koevoet was formed as a police counter-insurgency unit set up in South 
West Africa in 1979 by members of the SAP Security Branch. It 
comprised recruits mostly from the local population (of South West 
Africa) who were trained as a mobile unit to gather intelligence, track 
guerrillas and kill them. Koevoet (Afrikaans for 'crowbar') soon gained a 
reputation for brutality, largely because of its methods of interrogating and 
torturing local people and for its heavy-handed presence in the operational 
areas. In the early to mid-1980s, at the height of its war with SW APO, 
Koevoet claimed a kill rate of around 300 to 500 people a year, for which 
. b 'd b 511 Its mem ers were pal a ounty per corpse. 
Individuals who had paid the price for their liberation in the eyes of the 
majority of the dispossessed, like the ANC/MK stalwart Peter 
Nchabeleng, were not spared harassment by the security police. 512 In a 
civilised country that prides itself on democratic and humane laws, 
Nchabeleng could have been accorded the status of a political dissident 
that he rightly deserved. Nchabeleng's wife, Gertrude, was told, when her 
husband was kidnapped from his home in 1986, that he would never 
come back alive, and indeed, Nchabe1eng died at the hands of the police 
50'> Interview with one of the victims of the 'helicopter torture' Molatudi Maletjing "Hunter" Phillip by 
the author, GaSeroka, Sekhukhuneland, Limpopo Province, 21 April 2002. 
,10 In some cases it became extremely difficult to make a confession to Koevoet members because of 
the language barrier and as a result unreasonable torture continued unabated. Visit 
http: <:nv,ikip~Ji;.LOf'L \o~ikL KoevoetJ1:Histo,\,v. 
5 II Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Volume 7, Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, p. 926. 
512 The author was amongst those that Peter Nchabeleng found at Schoonoord police station in 1986 











at Schoonoord police station m Sekhukhuneland, Lebowa on II April 
1986. Words cannot describe the ordeal that the author and others 
endured the night Nchabeleng died of a "heart attack" at Schoonoord 
police station.Sl3 In African mythopoeia, the belief exists that a leader 
cannot die alone. His pages have to go with him as well. It was in this 
context that those of us who were rounded up in Sekhukhuneland, and 
locked at the Schoonoord police station, were supposed to die together 
with Nchabeleng. Hell broke loose and to our delight, we survived to tell 
the story. The security police knew that the courts would argue, as they 
argued in Nchabeleng's case that, "A policeman may beat a person to 
death if he resists - but not intentionally."sI4 this suggests that the 
police's 'unintentional' misconduct was normal and apparently 
unstoppable. At the end of the late 1980s, the rural far Northern Transvaal 
was teeming with soldiers on horseback, in "hippos" and helicopters 
looking for insurgents.SIS That became a permanent feature until the 
police were satisfied that violence had died down. 
The harrowing expenence of Patrick Thibedi, one of the apolitical 
citizens, turned a prominent MK operative at the hands of the police 
force, serves as an example. Arrested for the MK attack on the SASOL II 
oil refinery plant at Secunda on 1 June, 1980, that caused the state 
damages, officially estimated at R66 million but originally announced at 
R6.5 million,sl6 Thibedi went through a torturous ordeal until he was 
finally acquitted by a court of law in the early 1980s. The security police 
tried recruit him as their contact man in the underground operations of 
>1< Ineke van Kessel, "Beyond Our Wildest Dreams" The United Democratic Front and the 
Transformation oj'Sollth Afi'ica, Op. Cit., p. 128. 
>1.1 The Star, 25 June 1987. 
<1< SASPU National, April/May 1980. 












MK assuming that he was indeed a contact for the MK operations. The 
'offer' was turned down on grounds that Thibedi had no contact with the 
ANC or MK.517 His side of the story was unbelievable to the police and 
they thought that he was uncooperative and therefore had to pay the price. 
The torture that he went through remained indelibly hurtful until he went 
into exile to join the MK. Anger drove him to the ANC rather than the 
patriotism that normally does. 
Thibedi single-handedly came back to attack the same SASOL oil plant 
he was accused of attacking in 1980 under the guidance of Joe Slovo, 
after he had left the country for short training in military combat and 
explosives in 1981. His bravery in executing the mission assigned to him 
by Slovo left such an indelible mark on Slovo that he recommended a 
movie be made of Thibedi's historical episode.518 The security police's 
brutality after arresting Thibedi near the Swaziland border, two weeks 
after his narrow escape at a roadblock in Verena near Witbank, new no 
bounds of human morality and sympathy. He was buried alive in a hole 
that was infested with human eating worms in the Loskop Dam area for 
several hours.519 The scars left on Thibedi's body, coupled with the 
gunshot wounds sustained when he had tried to escape from the police 
van in 1980 at Evander would make anyone vengeful. 520 
Thibedi had an opportunity of carrying out his vengeance after the 
unbanning of the ANC and the arrival of the new political dispensation in 
'17 Interview with Patrick Thibedi by the author, ANC Provincial Head Office. Nelspruit. Mpumalanga 
Province. 29 August 2002. 
m 'Slovo's Movie wish comes true', Sundav Times, June 192005. 
"9 Interview with Patrick Thibedi by the a~thor, ANC Provincial Head Office, Nelspruit. Mpumalanga 
Province, 29 August 2002. 











1994 on Captain Visser who had asked Thibedi for assistance between 
Middleburg and Witbank after Thibedi's release from Robben Island in 
the early 1990s. Visser had had a punctured tyre in the Middleburg area 
(Mpumalanga Province) when he happened to stop Thibedi for assistance 
since he did not have a spare tyre for his vehicle. Visser went to 
Middleburg with Thibedi in his car where they bought the tyre and 
returned to replace it. After Visser had invited him to his home as a 
gesture of thankfulness, Thibedi told him who he was. Visser 
immediately recognised that indeed Thibedi was the MK guerrilla whom 
he had fed to the worms at Loskop Dam. When Thibedi went back before 
the actual day of the arranged visit he found that Visser had relocated.52 \ 
The point is that the security police's brutality against perceived MK 
cadres was so vicious that it caused people like Visser to think that the 
punishment they meted out to capture MK cadres would not be forgotten 
in their victims' lifetimes. Visser declined to be interviewed and is still in 
the police service in Witbank. 
Frank Thabane and his underground MK unit in the Bushbuckridge area 
of the then Lebowa Bantustan would also not forget their encounter with 
the South African security forces that resulted in the death of an MK 
cadre, Michael Malope, and the long imprisonment of Thabane and 
school principal Mogale Patrick on Robben Island. 522 Recruited into the 
underground operations of MK by Cassius Motsoaledi523 and Peter 
,21 Interview with Patrick Thibedi, by the author, ANC Provincial Head Office, Nelspruit. Mpumalanga 
Province. 29 August 2002. 
,22 Interview with Mogale Patrick by the author, Acornhoek, Bushbuckridge. Limpopo Province, 23 
October 2002. 
,23 Cassius's father, Elias Motsoaledi, was imprisoned on Robben Island during the Rivonia Treason 











Ngwenya524 in the early 1980s as part of the Northern Transvaal Rural 
Machinery of MK Thabane's unit, was uncovered by the security police 
in the mid-l 980s. 525 Paul Dikeledi and Cassius Maake (Job Shimankane 
Tabane) were killed by the security police in 1987.526 They were both 
members of the NEC of the ANC. The security police denied 
involvement in their killing.527 Thabane's unit was responsible for 
recruiting potential MK cadres and reconnoitering targets for military 
propaganda operations in the area. It was trained initially for MCW and 
other related underground activities such as recruitment and identification 
of possible targets for propaganda military operations that they would 
recommend to members of the SOU. In an area where the unit was 
operating, particularly in the 1980s, there were teething problems that 
brought people together. Bushbuckridge was geographically closer to the 
Eastern Transvaal homeland of KaNgwane but administratively under the 
Lebowa Bantustan.528 The Eastern Transvaal, as the area was called at the 
time, was mostly beset with land disputes between the South African 
government and the KaNgwane Bantustan administration that also 
involved Swaziland on the one hand and the Bantustan of KwaZulu on 
the other.529 In May 1982, the South African government announced its 
intention to cede the entire KaNgwane administration and the area of 
Ingwavuma to Swaziland.530 No official reasons were given for the 
government's intention. The decision sparked mass protests in these 
)2-1 Peter was related to Paul Dikeledi (nom de guerre) (real name Peter Sella Matau). a prominent ANC 
member who was based in Swaziland in the 1980s. 
52) Interview with Cassius Motsoaledi by the author. Erasmusklaof. Pretoria. Gauteng Province. 16 
May 2005. 
521> See Glen Moss, 'MK and the Armed Struggle '; Work in Progress. No. 46-63. 1987-1987. p. 5. 
527 Glen Moss, 'Politics with a Price on Its Head: Apartheid Death Squads'. Work in Progress, No. 53. 
4 May 1988. p. 25. 
52X For MK activities in the KaNgwane Administration see the author's 'KaNgwane - Pretoria's Fiend 
or Friend', Unpublished Paper. 
5~<J David Robbins. 'The South African Land Deal', A/i'iea Report, November-December 1982, p. 18. 
5,11 For a brief discussion on the subject see 'Swaziland: New Directions'?' A{i'ica Confidential, Vol. 21, 











affected areas and thereby provided MK units with fertile ground for 
mobilisation and recruitment. 531 The security police on the other hand 
were well aware of the upsurge of political activism in the area. The death 
in detention of an underground MK operative and employee of the 
KaNgwane administration, Timothy Thembuyise Mudau, is an instance 
of the plethora of police brutality in the now defunct Eastern Transvaal. 
Mudau was strategically placed In the KaNgwane homeland 
administration to recruit and work for MK in the area. 532 He had contacts 
with Matthews Phosa who was also responsible for servicing the MK unit 
in Bushbuckridge area under Thabane. 
In the execution of their tasks Thabane's unit came into contact with 
other underground MK operatives such as Phosa who was based in 
Nelspruit as a lawyer in the 1980s. Phosa had provided this unit with the 
requirements and when it was eventually discovered, he left the country 
for exile after a tip-off of an imminent arrest by the security branch of the 
South African police, which, incidentally, came from a member of the 
police unit that had arrested Malaza Siphithi Vincent from Thabane's unit 
in Bushbuckridge.533 The story of Thabane's MK unit revealed the brute 
force that the security police used arbitrarily and with no moral 
compunction. After killing Michael Malope in a cottage used by the 
school principal, Mogale Patrick, the police ordered everyone inside the 
cottage to get out. The unit allowed only Mogale's son who was inside 
the cottage, to move out and in the ensuing gun battle Malope was killed. 
Mogale and George Mokoena were arrested. Thabane was injured in that 
encounter with the police but managed to escape. He was later arrested 
'1[ Interview with Matsane Lord by the author, ANC Provincial Offices. Nelspruit, Mpumalanga 
Province 3 April 2004. 
;,c Ihid. 3 April 2004. 











when the man who had promised to go and summon medical assistance 
for the wounds that Thabane had sustained in the gun battle with the 
security police, betrayed him. 534 
Malaza was a member of the security police division that was established 
to counter the activities of the liberation movements; particularly those of 
the ANC. 535 He worked in the SAP as a field worker. Malaza's job 
entailed the identification of cadres of the liberation movements in the 
SAP Terrorist Photo Album,536 the time they left the country, and when 
they returned. He continuously monitored and researched their families 
and updated the information in the SAP 5 Investigation Diaty. This was a 
file that was used as a registry for all political activities in a particular 
political locality. Chiefs and iNdunas enlisted to assist in the gathering of 
information in their respective farms or villages were usually rewarded 
with cigarettes, liquor, old clothes, or anything that a SAP field worker 
may have recommended to his superiors as a token of gratitude for their 
cooperation.537 Malaza's role also included tarnishing the image of the 
liberation movements with the assistance of these chiefs and iNdunas. He 
did, however, also work for the ANC in the South African security police. 
Malaza was recruited into the underground structures of the ANC after he 
had followed the information that he had gathered in the line of duty in 
the SAP. 53R Malaza's double role in the security police as an agent for the 
ANC provides interesting reading. He providcd the correct information to 
"4 Interview with Frank Thabane by the author, Acornhoek Police Station. Bushbuckridge. Limpopo 
Province. 23 October 2002. 
<.1' Interview with Malaza Vincent Siphithi, by the author, Sunnyside, Pretoria. Gauteng Province. 18 
January 2005. 
<.11> The SAP Terrorist Photo Album was a photo album in which alleged members of MK's photos 
were kept by the security police for identification purposes (Interview with Malaza Siphithi. by the 
author. Sunnyside. Pretoria. Gauteng Province, 18 January 2005). 













both the ANC and the security police and even went to the extent of 
recruiting his colleagues in the security police such as Matshwenyego 
Daniel Mokgabudi and Tshifhango Cetrick Rapudi. Mokgabudi and 
Rapudi were later arrested and charged with ten charges of terrorism 
when they appeared before Mr. W. J. van den Bergh in the Pretoria 
Regional Court on 7 November 1986. The state alleged that they had 
been recruited by the ANC or "a Malaza" to join the organisation.539 
Malaza reported to the ANC through Peter Boroko and Willie Williams 
based in Mozambique during the 1980s. He also reported the contacts that 
the SAP had with British Mampane and Sam Nkuna (ANC members), 
agents of the security police based in the ANC camps in Tanzania. 
Mampane and Nkuna and were eventually brought into the SAP fold 
when the security police in South Africa suspected that the ANC was 
about to detect them as spies. 
Back home in his hometown of KaNyamazane near Nelspruit Malaza was 
viewed with trepidation for his ferocity against suspected members of the 
ANC. Dorcas Mokoena was one of those activists persecuted by Malaza 
and does not believe that Malaza had any contacts within the ANC at 
al1. 540 The community of KaNyamazane wanted to kill Malaza at some 
point so he reported this to the ANC in Swaziland. Malaza was advised to 
consult with those that he suspected might understand his plight and tell 
them to come to Swaziland for consultation with the ANC regional 
structure. He was unable to secure such a hearing with his underground 
<1'1 Monk Nkomo, 'Accused of Spying on Cops for ANC: SB's in COUl1', SOll'ctall, November 10, 
19X6, 
<40 Interview with Dorcas Nomsa Mokoena by the author, KaNyamazane. Nelspruit, Mpumalanga 











MK colleagues in the area541 . There is also no record of this meeting 
having taken place in Swaziland. He continued to be a double agent for 
the two greatest Nemeses of the South African liberation history. 
Malaza attended a meeting in which a decision had been taken by the 
police in Nelspruit that Phosa was supposed to be arrested and eventually 
killed. After this tip-off to Phosa, Malaza suspected that because he was 
the only black member of the security police present when Phosa's fate 
was decided in Nelspruit, he was likely to be suspected of leaking the 
information to Phosa's contacts542 . Malaza too, escaped from the security 
police in Swaziland, where he had been taken after having been 
discovered to be an ANC contact within the security police; the police 
wanted to arrest, and possibly kill him. While in Swaziland, Malaza was 
ordered to make contacts with his handler, ANC intelligence labulani 
Sidney Msibi who at some point had been a bodyguard of Oliver Tambo 
while in exile.543 Msibi was abducted and taken to South Africa by the 
security police and has never been seen again. In his application for 
pardon during the TRC, Alexander Eugene de Kock of the South African 
security police and a commander of the Vlakplaas (a farm near Pretoria 
that was used by the security police hit squads) told the commission, 
"And I just want to tell you that his dignity and his integrity, his faith and 
his loyalty in the ANC, remained unscathed consistently and that is how 
he died. ,,544 De Kock was referring to Msibi who died for his refusal to 
join the security police as an askari. Malaza escaped the police while on 
that mission in Swaziland and remained in exile with the ANC until he 
,41 Interview with Malaza Vincent Siphithi, by the author, Sunnyside. Pretoria. Gauteng Province. 18 
January 2005 
,42 Ibid. 18 January 2005. 
;43 Truth and Reconciliation Commission Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Afi'ica Report 
Volume Six. Gp. Cit .. p. 222. 











returned in 1994. His former colleagues in the security police felt that he 
had betrayed them by joining MK and continued to harass him before the 
dawn of the new political dispensation until he was sent to Lesotho by the 
ANC till he returned to join the South African Police Services (SAPS) 
Crime Intelligence Service (CIS).545 
The persecution of underground MK activists like Ephraim Mogale, since 
the late 1970s, in the form of police harassment, imprisonment on 
Robben Island and the burning of his parent's home to a frazzle at 
Uitvlught on 8 February, 1986 are some of the examples that depict South 
Africa's past.546 No one was safe unless ones' political persuasions were 
clearly visible and inclined towards the apartheid state policies. The 
history of the liberation struggle is littered with examples. When MK 
cadres attacked Sibasa police station in August 1981 in the Republic of 
Venda, the 28-year-old Lutheran lay preacher Tshifiwa Muotbe was 
arrested and eventually died at the hands of the Venda security police. 
True to form, the Venda security police, like their counterparts in the 
neighbouring South Africa (in the logic of Bantustan politics), issued a 
statement in which they alleged that Muotbe died when he leapt from the 
truck in an attempt to escape or commit suicide. The objective of these 
acts of maiming and killing was to discourage political activists from 
opposing the government's racial policies. 
,~, Interview with Malaza Vincent Siphithi, by the author, Sunnyside, Pretoria. Gauteng Province, 18 
January 2005 












The cherry on top of state repression - the state of emergency 
Addressing the President's Council on 9 June 1988, the South African 
Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok, told the Council that the 
ANC/SACP alliance had managed to establish some 1 000 organisations 
inside the country since 1984.547 The assessment of the political situation 
like this was not only wild but it also influenced government policies with 
regard to the threat posed to the state security. How was it possible for the 
ANC to establish close to 1 000 organisations in a State of Emergency 
intermittently declared since 1985? The trepidation with which the ANC 
was viewed by the government, the aura that the ANC had created for 
itself and the general aversion that the populace had meted out against the 
government policies resulted in government trying various methods to 
remain in power, such as the extra judiciary powers that ensured 
continuance of the government's power. This necessitated the elevation 
of the police to new heights. The state of emergency was adopted to 
contain the political situation that was already out of control. 
The state of emergency had three major effects on the liberation politics 
in South Africa. It allowed the security police, described by Alan Brooks 
and Jeremy Brickhill as "the 'front line' troops of apartheid",54R and 
soldiers, as well as prison officials, to arrest and detain any person 
suspected of tampering with the security of the state. The security police 
and soldiers were not obliged to apply for a warrant of arrest in a court of 
law. The State of Emergency affected the freedom of expression in the 
sense that any comment against the country's political situation would be 
'~7 Answer to Terrorism, RSA Policy Review Vol. I , No. I, October 1988, p. 59. 
5~~ Alan Brooks and Jeremy BrickhiJl, Whirlwind Before the Storm, (London, International Defence and 











deemed subversive. It affected the freedom of movement in the sense that 
it proscribed what people were permitted to do. In the height of political 
unrest that gripped the country since 1984 the government decided to ban 
mass funerals (which were used as means of protest, political rallies 
already banned) under the cloak of the state of emergency.549 It was under 
these conditions that known and suspected political activists were 
kidnapped and thrown into police custody without proper channels of 
arrests being followed. Individuals political activists were arrested in the 
rural Northern Transvaal for example, and be blindfolded until handed 
over to security police in Natal. It also affected the people's choice of 
clothes since any clothing with a political message, such as political T-
shirts, was deemed to be unlawful. It was illegal to wear aT-shirt that 
promoted the objectives of a banned political movement. The level of 
education in the police force compounded the situation in the sense that 
any writing on a t-shirt could be declared unlawful. Emergency 
regulations empowered the police to run the state with impunity: namely, 
the maintenance of order, arrest and detention of persons, and powers of 
entry, search and seizure. The failure of the State of Emergency to 
extirpate underground political activities was glaringly conspicuous. The 
Sunday Star reported that if the government thought that the State of 
Emergency would provide "a psychological climate locally and abroad 
for severe security action, including curfews and mass detentions in 
which a total of nearly 8 000 were detained", then, it failed badly.550 Did 
the government really think that these security measures would contain a 
high level of political upsurge? What was the subterfuge in the 
declaration of the state of emergency? 
5-1'! Kecsing '.I' Volumc XXXI, Africa South of the Sahara, South Africa - Economic Situation-
Continued Unrest under the State of Emergency- Relations with International Community, October 
1985, p 33894. 











In a normal society the emergency regulations must have been 
necessitated by actual or imminent danger to the state. 55 1 To state that the 
life of the majority of South Africans was under extreme threat is an 
understatement, because of the racial policies that separated them from 
their white counterparts. The states of emergency during the 1980s were 
not meant to correct that anomaly. Mostly, it is argued that the 
government created the conditions that led it to declare the state of 
emergency in the first place. Andre Brink, in his open letter to the then 
State President of South Africa, P. W. Botha, concurs with that opinion: 
In this country that is tom apart by violence your white minority regime 
and its agents have, through their arrogance, intransigence and organised 
campaigns of terror against the oppressed, created the circumstances you 
required for the declaration of a State of Emergency. 552 
Brink's message to the President was ignored, as usual. The government 
never attempted to ameliorate the situation that led to the declaration of 
the emergency regulations in the first place. The misdiagnosis of the 
situation accounted for the approach that the government adopted. The 
South African government's 'hold' on power seemed to slip through its 
hands considerably after the early 1980s. The reasons were quite obvious 
because the internally based organisations recruited every sector of the 
society. In Alexander in the mid-1980s, the Alex Funeral Coordinating 
Committee politicised funerals to such an extent that the government 
"stole" eleven corpses that were going to be buried at mass funerals. 553 
These were victims of unrest resulting from the declaration of the state of 
emergency. The state did not want the repeat of a mass funeral attended 
"I Nel. F and Bezuidenhout, J, Policing and Human Rights, (Cape Town, Juta & CO.), pp. 434-435. 
,,2 Andre Brink, Reinventing a Continent: Writing and Politics in South Afi-ica 1982 - 1995, (London, 
Seeker & Warburg, 1996), p. 20. 











by close to sixty thousand people when seven victims of unrest were 
buried in Alexander in March 1986.554 In the case of the victims of state 
repression, it was clear that the ANC was unbanned in their eyes. This 
was usually demonstrated at mass funerals where victims' coffins were 
draped with ANC flags,555 overt actions undertaken with the police and 
soldiers in armoured cars overlooking the gravesides. The state had 
resorted to repression of political aspirations for freedom yet there were 
always means of obviating the effects of these extraordinary measures. In 
the final analysis, it is crucial put into perspective the effects that the state 
of emergency had on the political events in the rural Northern Transvaal. 
The following statement puts it more aptly, "It is important to understand 
that the state of emergency has not stopped the revolution - it has merely 
placed a lid on it for the period that the restrictions remain in force,,,556 
The government was assisted by the pliable judiciary that was at all times 
ready to convict suspected political opponents on spurious grounds. 
When an MK cadre, Tlokwe Maserumule was arrested in 1984 for MK 
activities in Dennilton, the magistrate, at Groblersdal magistrate's court 
to which Tlokwe was eventually taken, was prepared to go to his office to 
charge him despite it being during the night when he was, apparently, 
supposed to have been off duty.557 Fearing that he would be murdered by 
the security police who had arrested him for allegedly concealing some of 
the weapons he was suspected of withholding, Tlokwe implicated his 
elder brother, Maserumule Kgoputso. A helicopter was then dispatched 
from Middleburg to Tzaneen where Kgoputso was working for a bus 
"4 Ihid 16 March 1986. 
,<, Sunday Star, 18 May 1986. 
jji> Donald S. McAlvany, Revolution and Betrayal, The Accelerating Onslaught against South Africa, 
The Nell· American, August 11, 1986. 











company. Tlokwe did not want to "disappear", as so many people had, in 
the throes of the liberation struggle. Eventually, the security police 
satisfied themselves that indeed Tlokwe's brother knew nothing about his 
younger brother's political activities, only after Kgoputso had been 
severely assaulted. Tlokwe was eventually sentenced to a lengthy period 
of imprisonment on Robben Island without having produced the weapons 
he was suspected of concealing from the police. 
The government's disregard for the rule of international law and calls for 
clemency when MK cadres were arrested went unheeded. Mthetheleli 
Zephaniah Ncube and Mzondeleli Euclid Nondula's case serve as an 
example. Mthetheleli left the country in 1980 at the age of 20 to join the 
ANC. Mzondeleli left in 1982 at the age of 19 with the same mission as 
his comrade in arms. Mthetheleli underwent military training for three of 
his six years in exile before being sent back to the country on a mission to 
plant bombs at the border posts in the rural far Northern Transvaal around 
Mussina (previously Messina). The white farming communities adjacent 
to the borders were perceived as extensions of the state security network, 
thus the extreme measures taken against them were influenced by that 
perception. Mthetheleli and Nondula's mission in 1985 and 1986, 
amongst others, was to cross the Zimbabwean-South African border into 
the Messina area of the Soutpansberg Military region, to lay landmines.558 
Some people were later maimed and killed and this led to their arrest. 
Notwithstanding the torture they endured at the hands of the security 
police when they were eventually arrested in the Messina area, the fact 
that the South African government refused to recognise them as soldiers 
of war, added to the woes of their plight. They were not the only ones to 
"x John Dugard. 'Soldiers or Terrorists'? The ANC and the SADF Compared', South African Journal 











be refused the prisoner-of-war status by the South African government. 
The government never recognised the ANC's liberation war was as being 
legitimate, yet, it was always misconstrued as terrorist and communist 
inspired. This explains why almost all politically-related cases were 
classified as criminal. 
The point is that by refusing to recognise MK soldiers as soldiers-of-war 
under the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War of 1949, the government deprived MK cadres of the status that they 
should have enjoyed under the Geneva Convention. Mthetheleli and 
Nondula could have been spared police brutality when they were 'lucky' 
to be arrested. They could have enjoyed the prisoner-of-war status 
advocated by John Dugard and Tom Lodge during their treason trial in 
1988.559 Despite international calls for their clemency, they were 
eventually sentenced to death in 1988, which was never carried out due to 
the major political changes that took place in 1990.560 
Conclusion 
The South African government's 'hold' onto power began to display 
some cracks in the 1980s when political upsurges became daily 
occurrences. The government then decided to use draconian measures to 
remain in power. This was after a spectacular failure in the effectiveness 
«'i John Dugard, then Director of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies at the University of the 
Witwatersrand argued in favour of the declaration of the prisoner-or·war status on Mthetheleli and 
Ncube. Tom Lodge of the University of the Witwatersrand's Department of Political Studies gave 
evidence in mitigation in State versus Ncube and Nondula, Messina Regional Court, 27 April 1988, 
Tom Lodge's Personal Letters, University of the Witwatersrand. 
<W The famous 2 February 1990 President F. W. de Klerk' speech unbanned the ANC and other 
liberation organisation and set in motion the process that culminated in the release of political 











of the legislations that were intended to appease apolitical citizens. Had it 
been heeded, Tambo's 1977 aphorism could have saved the government 
notoriety. Tambo cautioned that that the South African people wanted an 
all representative parliament and not laws that are based on racism. 561 The 
year 1984 seemed to be a turning point in the political fortunes of the 
liberation movement when sporadic and coordinated community based 
organisations daringly started to challenge the government upfront. This 
challenge of the government racial policies demonstrated that the military 
airbases the government had built in the rural far Northern Transvaal 
were not obstacles in the quest for freedom. It also proved that cross 
border raids into neighbouring countries, allegedly in "hot pursuit" of 
MK cadres deemed to have committed terrorist activities inside South 
Africa, were counterproductive measures. The government's shift of 
responsibility to the Bantustans (in this case the KaNgwane 
Administration), also seemed to be worthless as the people of KaNgwane 
were able to see through the prism of a hopeless ruse that the idea of 
incorporating KaNgwane and some parts of Ingwavuma, into Swaziland 
were mere subterfuges of delaying their freedom. 
The concentration of security forces and police in the rural far Northern 
Transvaal and some parts of the Eastern Transvaal proved the 
expectations that MK would emerge from the borders marching 
southwards, were misguided. The truth was that individual batches of 
three to four MK cadres were sent into the country carrying minimal arms 
save for those specifically intended for self protection in case they were 
intercepted en route. The large arsenal of weapons was sent long before 
these batches of MK cadres were dispatched to carry out various 











assignments. No amount of military preparedness was sufficient to stop 
the march to freedom and it was futile for the South African government 
to cross the border into the neighbouring countries as MK was deeply 
entrenched in the masses within South Africa. The underground political 
activities were beginning to be well coordinated, although, at times, lack 
of proper leadership as a result of a vacuum created by the state 
persecution of seasoned leadership, caused the underground initiatives to 
562 go astray. 
The state of emergency was a great inconvenience and hindrance to the 
underground political activities. It gave the security police the 
uncontrollable powers to arrest and detain suspects indefinitely. It limited 
the people's freedom of speech as the police could arrest and detain 
people for stating their opinions regarding prevailing conditions inside 
the country. The government's argument was that it wanted to curb 
"subversive statements" from being made that could have a bearing on 
the prevailing explosive political situation. The free flow of information 
was stifled, since electronic and print media, for example, were 
prohibited from reporting on the state of emergency situation. Newspaper 
reporters witnessing police harassments could not report on them without 
contacting the police for approval and acknowledgement that the 
incidents had indeed taken place, to which there would have been a 
standard response of denial and rejection. This explains the scarcity of 
written historical accounts of what actually happened during the state of 
emergency. The censorship laws, which stunted the political activities 
that were beginning to emerge in the 1980s, were attained with the 
j(,c The state of emergency managed to bring about this temporary dislocation in the crusade against 












assistance of the judiciary that was ready to give a stamp of legitimacy to 
laws that were legally and morally unjustifiable. Incidentally, the state of 
emergency and other forms of harassment, gave the predominantly black 
political organisations like the UDF a legitimacy that they might not have 
themselves earned.563 
It was not historically conjectural; therefore, to conclude that when the 
State President, F.W. de Klerk, decided to unban the political 
organisations on 2 February, 1990 and to lift the state of emergency, 
except in Natal, he had no option but to accede to the majority political 
aspirations. It is equally an exaggeration to suggest that de Klerk 
conceded to level the political field because of MK inspired political 
uprisings. A multiplicity of factors led to the 'surrender' of power by the 
apartheid South African government. The state of the economy, the 
international balance of forces due to the collapse of the Communist 
block and therefore the end of the Cold War, and a host of other factors, 
caused the de Klerk government to rethink its policy of apartheid. De 
Klerk took tentative steps to undo the harm that the policy of apartheid 
had caused, by instituting commissions of inquiries into the conduct of 
his security police during political turmoi1.564 The commissions were 
inaugurated in response to the overwhelming rumour that a "third force" 
was behind the violence that was gripping the country. The rumour was 
reinforced by the startling allegations that were made by Butana Almond 
Nofomela who was imprisoned for killing a white farmer. Nofomela, a 
security police officer, disclosed that there was a policy of the systematic 
assassination of the government's opponents by the South African 
,"3 South Afioican Foundation, UDF Changes Tactics, May 1985, p. 3. 
,(, .. Like in the past the Harmse and Hiemstra commissions government were exculpated from any 











security police.565 These "third forces" included the SAP Unit C 1 and the 
Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) of the SADF. The white-controlled 
media attributed the violence to a "black on black" phenomenon. In 
December 1989, when the demand for a judicial commission of inquiry 
became unbearable, it was authorised by the Minister of Justice under the 
de Klerk government, Kobie Coetzee. Justice Louis Harmse's 
commission was fundamentally flawed in both proposition and 
preparation.566 The commission was mandated to an enquiry about violent 
acts committed within the borders of South Africa despite the fact that 
there was an overwhelming welter of evidence that the government's 
agents were dispatched on evil missions the world over. By and large, the 
CCB was disbanded and everybody was exculpated. The commission was 
conceived as a whitewash by the opposition. The persistent demand for 
justice led to the establishment of the Hiemstra Commission in April 
1990, headed by Justice V. G. Hiemstra It was also prompted by the 
Johannesburg City Council's (lCC) espionage network, the "Security 
Department" which tracked down government opponents. Both the 
Harmse and Hiemstra Commissions pointed out that there were indeed 
indications that a "third force" was operating both within South Africa 
and internationally. It is also noteworthy to mention that the "third force" 
theory was also disputed by those who argued that the legitimate right of 
the majority to fight for the liberation struggle through "ungovernability 
and a people's war" was a subset of the "third force" theory.567 
5(,5 For a detailed discussion on Nofomela's disclosures see Paulos Zulu's 'Third Force' Operations in 
South Africa in The Hidden Hand, Covert Operations in South AIi-ica: Second Editioll by Chari 
Schutte. Ian Liebenberg and Anthony Minnaar, (eds.), Pretoria, Human Sciences Research Council, 
1998), the entire chapter. 
5hh An Africa Watch Report, 'The Killings in South Africa. The Role of the Security Forces & the 
Response of the State', Ali-ica Watch, 1991. p. 11. 
567 John Kane-Berman. 'Political Violence in South Africa.' (Johannesburg, South African Institute of 











In conclusion, the pressure that was brought to bear on the government 
throughout the years of the liberation struggle in South Africa bore fruit 
in 1990 when de Klerk unbanned the liberation movements and ordered 
the release of political prisoners. The rural Northern Transvaal's role in 
the national liberation struggle was interlinked with that of the entire 
country. The region's peculiarities and uniqueness has provided an 
invaluable lesson, proven by this study, that it was profitably utilised by 
MK. The Zimbabwean infiltration routes, particularly in the 1980s, have 
proven that, contrary to the expectations of the SADF military 
preparedness, the MK reliance on public transport and contacts inside 













Writers on MK history such as Howard Barre1l568 , Tom Lodge569 and 
Thomas G. Karis and Gail M. Gerhart570 have tended to suggest that the 
struggle for liberation in South Africa was predominantly an urban one. 
This study has shown that the armed struggle in the rural Northern 
Transvaal was significant, especially after the release from jail of those 
incarcerated in the 1960s. But the changing political landscape of the 
1970s and 1980s made the veterans of the 1960s such as Nelson Diale, 
Petrus Nchabeleng and many others wiser and more cautious when 
conducting the underground liberation struggle. This study has 
emphasized that MK never sought to engage the South African 
government in conventional warfare but rather, employed a myriad of 
tactics to destabilise the state and ultimately seize power. Various forms 
of revolutionary rural warfare models influenced the MK's thinking but 
were never really pursued. The postulation behind the rural warfare 
models was that guerrilla warfare waged in the countryside would 
surround and swallow the cities.571 The leading theorists of these 
revolutionary rural warfare models are Mao Tse-tung, General Vo 
,r,X See Howard Barrell, 'Conscripts of their Age: African National Congress Operational strategy, 1976 
- 1989', PhD Thesis, University of Oxford, 1993 and MK; The ANC's Armed Struggle, London, 
Penguin, 1990. 
W) See Tom Lodge's (amongst others) 'The African National Congress in South Africa, 1976 - 1983: 
Guerrilla War and Armed Propaganda', Journal of Contemporary A/i'ican Studies 3, I &2, October 
1983, and The State of Exile: The African National Congress of South Africa, 1976 - 1986, Third 
World Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. I, January 1987. 
,711 See Thomas G. Karis and Gail M. Gerhart, From Protest to Challenge, A Documental)' Historv of 
African Politics in South Afi'ica, 1882- 1990, Vol. 5, Nadir and Resurgence 1964- 1979, (Bloomington, 
Indiana University Press, 1997). 











Nguyen Giap and Ernesto "Che" Guevara.572 The ANC always argued 
that it had learnt from these proponents of guerrilla warfare and that it 
was not obliged to follow them mechanically despite criticisms that, 
" ... the same literature [on guerrilla warfare as advanced by the afore-
mentioned guerrilla warfare theorists] was being cleared from 
bookshelves in Umkhonto we Sizwe camps.,,573 Affirming this notion and 
directly confirming the initial contemplation of launching the armed 
struggle from the rural areas, the MK' Operation Mayibuye found by the 
police at Rivonia on 11 July, 1963 declares: 
In the rural areas which become the main theatre of guerrilla operations in 
the initial phase, the overwhelming majority of the people will protect and 
safeguard the guerrillas and this fact will to some measure negative the 
d· d 574 Isa vantages. 
In the Northern Transvaal a seminal role was played by individual 
students of the I970s at the University of the North: Ngoako Ramatlhodi, 
Thabo Makunyane, Joyce and George Mashamba (before their arrest and 
after their underground operations had been uncovered), and countless 
others who either graduated from the university and became political 
activists in their respective fields, or were dismissed from the university 
for their political activities and went into exile. That Makunyane and 
Ramatlhodi were able to travel to Botswana and Lesotho to be briefed 
and debriefed by their political underground commanders as early as the 
late I970s is a clear indication of the intricate nature of the liberation 
struggle that unfolded in the region. The Mashambas were former 
572 For details on these revolutionary rural warfare models see W. J. Booyse, 'The Concept "People's 
War" in the 'Revolutionary Strategy of the ANC and the PAC: A Comparative Analysis', PhD Thesis, 
University of Potchefstroom 1990, pp: 40-43. 
573 Stephen Ellis and Tsepo Sechaba, Comrades against Apartheid: the ANC and the South Ali'jc-an 
Communist Part)' ill Exile, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1991), p. 45. 
m Visit bQLJ: ,,\> Wi". bcllWTI.nu_lit~ratur~. A'I(,005 .html, "OPERATION MA YIBUYE", "AFRICAN 










colleagues of S 'bu Ndebele who strategically relocated to the University 
of Swaziland. Ndebele's position in Swaziland allowed him to interact 
with his former colleagues in the rural Northern Transvaal and to 
communicate with his contacts in Botswana and Lesotho and those from 
his home town of Natal. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland countries 
connected their university's programmes and students would move from 
one country to the next and therefore passed on information. 
Students at the University of the North had contacts with political 
activists outside the university, who would later escape imprisonment and 
join the ANC in exile, such as Nwedamutswu "Mumsy" Mamabolo 
Phillip. Nwedamutswu became very influential in the ANC/MK military 
and political operations as he knew the area of Venda and Lebowa quite 
well and were able to provide deployed MK cadres with contacts that 
were underground inside the country.575 Nwedamutswu's membership of 
the Transvaal Rural Machinery of MK was very valuable on that score. 
The arrival in exile of such people changed the texture of the 
underground struggle within South Africa, as they were able to return and 
recruit more and more people, particularly in civic and trade union 
movements in the 1980s.576 Recruits brought fresh information and ideas 
that eventually shaped new approaches and tactics that were adopted by 
the ANC. These events occurred coincidentally with the arrival of exiled 
political refugees after the dawn of the historic epoch of the 1976 Soweto 
student uprising. The avalanche of people into exile contributed to the 
rise of political activities inside the country. The intricate nature of the 
MK operations and how they dovetailed with the popular struggles 
575 Interview with Nwedamutswu "Mumsy" Mamabolo Philip by the author, SADET Offices, Pretoria, 
Gauteng Province, 23 March 2005, provides details of this. 
'7(, Interview with Frans Mohlala, Polokwane, Limpopo Province, 22 June 2004. He became influential 











against the government in the rural Northern Transvaal did not 
fundamentally differ from those that were carried out in other parts of the 
country. 
The liberation struggle waged by MK underwent numerous changes 
throughout the years, a process that affected both rural and urban 
environments and invariably had an impact on the struggle's direction 
and efficacy. Reference to the early 1970s as a period of reorganisation 
and gradual move towards the establishment of infiltration routes and 
contacts with internal membership to the late 1980s when the country was 
engulfed with the liberation flame were some of the salient points that 
marked the changing nature of the liberation struggle throughout the 
years. This study has been able to expose the surreptitious connections 
and contacts established across this theoretical political divide of rural 
and urban settings, as well as how the two dovetailed one with the other. 
The reliance of MK cadres on rural based people, such as Dick Ralushai 
in Venda, to receive 'gifts' from Mudimu Refiloe in Zimbabwe and 
distribute them in the entire region and beyond, was a practical decision 
rather than a confirmation of a rural struggle as opposed to an urban 
struggle. The same type of 'gifts' were also received in the urban areas of 
Johannesburg by Kenny Fihla's unit from Refiloe in Zimbabwe.577 
Evidently, the argument of the struggle's locality being mainly in the 
urban areas is indisputable but rural MK activities during years of 
struggle also took place. Rural areas (as well as urban ones) produced 
MK cadres who also swelled the ranks of the ANC. These rural areas also 
served as entry points for infiltration of arms and ammunition that were 
either stored in the region or were sent somewhere else. 
,17 Interview with Reliloe Mudimu, by the author, South African Navy Headquarters. Pretoria. Gauteng 











It has also been demonstrated how the borders of the regIOn were 
populated by a strong Afrikaner community that sought interaction with 
the country's security forces. s78 The misconception that MK was based in 
the north of the region made this locality a suitable field of study. The 
construction of military bases in the region was also (mis)informed by the 
supposed entry point of MK in its attempt to fight the South African 
government, the study demonstrated. The ANC acknowledged in its 
report many years later that, "The region (rural Northern Transvaal) is 
also the stronghold of the white, right-wing lunatic fringe, who have 
made organising a dangerous task for ANC comrades, particularly 
amongst the farm workers."s79 Of course, the ANC document cited above 
refers to the post-ANC unbanning of 1990, but it also highlights the 
historic fertile and strategic nature of the region, further confirming why 
the region proffers an ideal setting for this study of the liberation struggle. 
Notwithstanding the debates of rural versus urban struggles, both the 
communities came to venerate MK very highly in the 1980s. The 
ANC/MK managed to circumvent the concentration of security forces in 
the region towards the border with Zimbabwe by sending unarmed MK 
cadres into the country who were then, after their infiltration inside the 
country, reunited with their weapons for military and political missions. 
The route that was followed from exile to the target (which could include 
identified individuals or a police station), was theoretically supposed to 
be monitored and directed with the assistance of others. Tlokwe 
Maserumule's trail of infiltration in the early 1980s into the country 
confirms the point. The arrest of Tlokwe by the South African security 
m The fact that these Afrikaner communities formed themselves into commandos attests to this 
assertion. 
)79 African National Congress, 'From resistance to reconstructioll & national-huilding: Afh"can 
Natio/lal COllgress 49'" National Conference, Bloemfontein 17-21 Decemher, (Marshalltown: ANC 











police in 1984 was a result of a collapse in the communication line. 
Tlokwe was supposed to be hosted for a week at GaMampuru in the 
Burgersfort area after leaving Swaziland. It is essential to dilate on this 
point for a while. The choice of GaMampuru (the royal family was 
chosen as a host) for Tlokwe was recommended by Ramphelane 
Mampuru who was a member of the Mampuru royal family based in 
exile. He had contacts with his relatives from the royal family and it was 
through those contacts that Tlokwe's infiltration and subsequent 
deployment was discussed. The point is that infiltrations were thoroughly 
planned in exile and the exiled leadership of MK responsible for 
infiltration missions had no control over unforeseen circumstances inside 
the country as Tlokwe's case demonstrates. After spending a week at 
GaMampuru Tlokwe received instructions that took him to Motetema to 
be hosted by the Maepa family. Unbeknown to those who were 
responsible for his 'diary', the Maepa family that was supposed to host 
him had already relocated to Dennilton. It was left to Tlokwe to trace the 
family to Dennilton and by the time he succeeded to track the family 
down, Maepa (Ike Maepa, the head of the homestead) had already moved 
to Johannesburg. It is possible that Maepa suspected that his clandestine 
connection with the ANC deployees was perhaps under scrutiny and he 
felt that he should move about to evade the government's surveillance 
mechanisms. In the process, Maepa lost contact with those he was 
supposed to assist in the execution of their MK duties. 580 This example 
symbolizes the extent to which MK operations kept on shifting from the 
original plans. This example also indirectly responds to the criticisms 
leveled by writers such as Barrell that no reception committees were put 
in place by the ANC before MK cadres were deployed inside the country. 
,xu Ike Maepa shuttled between Swaziland and South Africa servicing various units that were operating 












It also highlights the difficulties experienced by MK cadres in striking a 
delicate balance between sticking to your planned mission (as 
communicated to you by people who are part of your mission without 
your knowledge) and conditions inside the country that kept on changing 
and affecting the original plan on which the mission was crafted in exile. 
Tlokwe was informed from Swaziland and Mozambique that he was 
supposed to meet with Tito Manthata (another MK cadre on the same 
mission but from a different angle) at some point in their mission in 
South Africa. Tito was arrested first after entering the country from 
southern Swaziland into northern KwaZulu. This very intricate and highly 
organised process did not involve (in most cases) MK cadres who were 
supposed to carry these missions through to fruition. The MK High 
Command relied on sophisticated networks of individuals who carried out 
similar missions without even knowing one another. Tlokwe's example 
showed that people sent to transport him from one point to another did 
not know each other nor were they supposed to discuss anything other 
than transport from GaMampuru to Motetema. The reliance of internal 
networks was essential and the ANC always knew that: 
An assemblage of rebel resources outside South Africa could mean little, 
however, without a formidable underground inside the Republic. Guerrillas, 
couriers and communications had to flow into South Africa from foreign 
bases for insurrection to grow, and indeed the Congress's exile bureaucracy 
had made much of that possible. But success would have to depend most of 
all on the ANC's ability to build a foundation of public confidence inside the 
country. If apartheid was to be toppled, it could not be done by any external 
force but by the one rooted at home. 581 











Ellis puts it more eloquently and convincingly in his explanation of the 
need for mutual dependence between guerrillas and communities based 
inside the country. He avers: 
... unless a guerrilla force directs all its efforts to maintaining close links 
with the people it can have little chance of eventual victory. Guerrilla 
warfare is the war of the whole people, and as such demands that the 
closest attention be paid to those matters which concern the people most. 
Anyone organizing such a struggle must always realize that military 
considerations are secondary to political, social and economic policies. 
In the end the confrontation will be on the purely military level, but the 
guerrilla'S capacity to be adequately equipped for that confrontation is a 
direct function of the duration and intensity of their political effort. 
Power may grow out of the barrel of a gun, but one must first persuade 
people to take up that gun, care for it, hump it around for years in the 
most desolate regions, and then to stand firm and pull the trigger. To do 
h d h h '1' . 58
7 
t at nee s muc more t an mere mt ttary expertIse. ~ 
This reliance on local communities has been pinpointed by the feats of 
various individual MK cadres. Failure to rely on communities (or some 
members within the communities) would have resulted in the perception 
that MK cadres were just "robbers and brigands" that could not 
"otherwise subsist than by rapine". 583 The disputation is generally 
reflected in the following phrase, "In the absence of concrete knowledge 
of a concrete and different situation, and particularly if the differences 
themselves are not understood, it is dangerous to import organizational 
formulas, even if they are based on a known theory.,,584 It is also caused 
by the narrow attribution of the struggle to political movements. The ruse 
at the height of the liberation struggle and the government repression was 
to 'divert' perceptible political actions and masquerade them as religious 
or theatrical. Ngoako Ramatlhodi, an underground ANC/MK activist in 
'Xc John Ellis, From the Barrel of' a Gun. A HistOl~v of' Guerrilla. Revolutionarl' and Counter-
Insurgency Ww/cu·e. From the Romans to the Present. (London, Greenhill Books, 1995). p. 243. 
'x, R. S. Brownlee. Gray Ghosts of'the Conf'ederacy, (Baton Rouge. Louisiana State University Press, 
1958). p. 78. 
,X-l Regis Debray, Revolutioll in the Revolution? Armed Struggle alld Political Struggle in Latill 











the late 1970s at the University of the North, argues that there should be 
an acknowledgement that agitprop (agitation and propaganda) theatre 
played a part in the liberation struggle as a subterfuge for conspicuous 
political activities.585 The study has been able to highlight some of the 
community 'organisations' that were used as camouflages to distract 
government attention from their activities. Through such innovative 
thinking that MK cadres were able to evade arrests and harassment from 
the security forces. There were however, setbacks and hiccups on the way 
to liberation. Like the proverbial Phoenix bird, the ANC and MK were 
"temporarily anguished" as the political journalist, John Pilger would 
argue in his reference to the 'vanquished' communities of the world.586 
The role of armed struggle as adopted by MK in the national liberation 
struggle in South Africa has never been thoroughly researched. Critics of 
that leg of the liberation struggle harp on it at the expense of other 
terrains of the struggle for freedom in South Africa. The four pillars of 
the liberation struggle adopted by the ANC in the early 1960s included: a 
campaign of mass political education; agitation from the underground; 
international isolation of the South African regime spearheaded by the 
ANC mission abroad; the formation of MK armed struggle; and the 
creation of a network of underground resistance structures; both in and 
outside the country.587 Luli Callinicos aptly captures the conception of the 
ANC of the four pillars of the struggle when she states that MK's armed 
propaganda struggle versus negotiations was crafted into a bow of many 
,x, Interview with Ngoako Ramatlhodi by the author, Polokwane, Limpopo Province, 24 February 2004 
,XI, Visit The Ghost of Glen eagles, John Pilger, II July 2005 at 
bltp: \\ \\ \\. 1,111npil!.!ac:om p;:Ule.35p·' parti d-3 70. 
,X7 African National Congress, Strategy and Tactics as adopted at the 49,h National Conference, ANC 
Department of Information and Publicity, (Marshalltown, December 1994), pA. For a detailed report 
see A/i"ican National Congress. Report on the 491h ANC National Conference, Johannesburg: ANC 











cords. 588 This study has been able to demonstrate that armed propaganda 
warfare was can-ied out as initially conceived. 
The study has obliquely refen-ed to the guen-illa warfare theories that 
were adopted in other parts of the world where liberation struggles were 
waged. The ANC had been blamed that it never took these theories 
seriously when it undertook its own liberation struggle. The engagement 
of MK in the freedom struggle is also often juxtaposed with other 
national liberation struggle operations where armed guen-illa warfare 
liberation theories were pursued, and the conclusion is usually that 
guen-illa warfare was bound to fail in South Africa. Reasons are attributed 
to various factors in cases that range from conformity with material 
conditions (in the case of Tom Lodge)589 to the dislocation of the military 
and political operational structures (in the case of Howard Ban-ell).590 
Implicitly, this argument advances the view that theories of guen-illa 
warfare have been exhausted and there is no room for new innovations. 
There will, however, always be room for new ways of resistance, and past 
I 
guen-illa warfare theories should not always be points of reference. The 
cun-ent modalities of waging an armed propaganda warfare taking place 
in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq and occupied Palestine in the 
Middle East show that there is still room for new theories regarding 
armed guen-illa propaganda warfare. Suicide bombs, widely seen as 
instruments of self-immolation to those on the periphery, are new forms 
of armed propaganda resistance. This study has shown that MK was able 
to adjust and survive under extremely difficult conditions imposed by the 
apartheid system. 
,xx Luli Callinicos. Oliver Tambo: Beyond the Engeli Mountains. Op. Cit., p. 536. 
'X'! Tom Lodge. Black Politics in South A/i-iea since 1945, Op. Cit., p. 296. 
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MK operations were mainly propagandistic and not intended to trounce 
the South African government militarily. 591. Mahmood Mamdani argued 
that the ANC, despite its immense stature (his contention) acted more as a 
"symbol than an organisation of resistance in South Africa".592 The study 
showed that the "stature" in itself was necessary for the successful 
prosecution of the liberation struggle. This explains why emphasis was 
placed on the concept of armed propaganda warfare and not on open 
conventional combat. The disintegration of oppressive regImes 
throughout human history occurs in various ways. The duration of these 
repressive establishments differs markedly for one reason or another. 
Conversely, these differences determine the nature of opposition that each 
country faces internally. In apartheid- plagued South Africa, for instance, 
institutionalised repression lasted for over 46 years (1948 - 1994), 
whereupon, the collapse of the apartheid government took place after a 
negotiated settlement of political disputes on 27 April, 1994. The 
disintegration of apartheid was a process that unfolded after many years 
of vain attempts at its sustenance. It also happened after decades of long-
drawn-out efforts of its eradication by the liberation movement through 
various intertwined strategies. The attack of the apartheid system became 
multifaceted and was sustained throughout all those difficult years. The 
struggle for liberation in South Africa was "multifrontal in nature" as 
Maishe Maponya puts it.593 International forums such as the UN were 
used by the ANC to internationally publicise the plight of black South 
Africans. Political measures taken by the South African government that 
entrenched apartheid, such as the clampdown on political opponents and 
the 1983 tricameral constitution, further obliquely assisted in this regard. 
5')1 Peter Delius. Mpumalanga: HistOlY and Heritage. Op. Cit .. p. 273. 
592 Mahmood Mamdani. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary A/i'ica and the Legacy oj' Late 
Colonialism. (London. James Currey. 1986). p. 273. 
5<)) Quoted in Okwui Enwezor. The Short Century. Independellce and Liheration Movements in Aj'rica 











The ANC was supplied with ammunitions to expose the fraud of 
apartheid on the international stage, through campaigns of international 
isolation of the South African government. Addressing the UN General 
Assembly on the 18 November, 1983, the Director of the International 
Department of the ANC, Mfanafuthi Makhathini informed the Assembly: 
The facts before us are that the so-called new constitution does not deal 
with the fundamental issue confronting South Africa, namely, the need to 
transfer power from the minority to the entire population regardless of 
race. What we have witnessed these last few weeks and months has been a 
glaring example of the pattern of apartheid political process in which 
Whites proposed, Whites debated, Whites differed, Whites consulted and 
Whites decided. However, we refuse to dignify the monstrous subject 
matter of the racist referendum with the term 'new constitution' and a 
discussion of its provisions. For throughout history new constitutions have 
embodied the spirit of liberty and a new socio-economic order expressing 
the hard-won sovereignty of people liberated from bondage.
594 
It was on liberated foreign soil that the ANC was able to meet 
underground ANC/MK operatives for briefings and debriefings.595 As an 
example an internally based MK activist in the far Northern Transvaal, 
Cassell Mathale, would legally cross the border from time to time (in the 
1980s) to meet with Refiloe outside the Beit Bridge border post in 
Zimbabwe. Isaac Maepa held the same responsibility of liaising with MK 
leadership in Swaziland on behalf of cadres who were deployed 
underground for MK related activities such as Tlokwe Maserumule and 
Tito Manthata. Unlike previous times, the ANC was able to make 
informed decisions about the latest events unfolding within South Africa 
brought to its camp by political cadres who were able to come out of the 
country and return undetected. 596 
,94 'International. ANC Representative Addresses the United Nations', June 1984, Sechaha, p. 7. 
,9, Ray Esther Simons, All my Life and All my Strength, (Johannesburg, STE Publishing, 2004), p. 329. 
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The South African government was not oblivious to the fact that these 
countries were posing a threat to its racial policies by harbouring its 
outlawed enemies. The government's supporters used to argue that the 
failure of the policy of detente towards its neighbours in the 1970s, left 
South Africa with no option but to confront her neighbours head on. This 
unleashed a barrage of criticisms and inadvertently exposed the racial 
policies of apartheid to the international communities. The Frontline 
States also condemned, with added vigour, the internal policies of the 
South African government and its policy of destabilisation of the 
neighbouring countries.597 These condemnations did not bring the South 
African government to its knees, neither did they happen overnight, nor 
were they unanimous. The condemnation of the South African racial 
policies by the neighbouring countries indirectly assisted the ANC's 
quest of isolating the government on the international stage. It also 
exposed the South African government's belligerent attitude towards its 
neighbours on allegations that they were using their territories for MK to 
launch attacks against government installations. These neighbouring 
countries were initially reluctant to tolerate the presence of ANC 
members on their shores. ANC and MK members who took refuge in 
neighbouring countries did not enjoy carte blanche freedom and 
hospitality. This impacted negatively on the MK operations that were 
supposedly organised from the Front Line states. Several MK cadres 
interviewed allude to this fact (towards the mid-1980s) that the instability 
in neighbouring countries as a result of the South African government's 
confrontational and bellicose foreign policy destabilised MK operations 
in countries that hosted them. The ANC turned its attention particularly in 
of Conditions in Umkhonto we Sizwes Angolan Camps.' BA Honours, University of Cape Town, 
January 1998. p. 14. 
597 'Peace is Incompatible with Racism and Colonialism. Final Communique of the Front Line States 











the mid 1980s to internal civil was such as those in Angola because it 
could not focus on her own liberation obligations.598 
This study has been able to highlight some of the advantages that were 
explored by the ANC in friendly countries such as Mozambique (before 
the 1984 Nkomati Accord), Zimbabwe,s99 and to a limited extent, 
Swaziland. Pretoria spoiled their hospitality. Several MK cadres who 
were based in Mozambique alluded to the difficulties that they 
experienced after the signing of the Nkomati Accord by Mozambique and 
South Africa. MK activists such as Frank Thabane, Lord Matsane and 
many others complained that after the signing of the Accord they were no 
longer able to receive instructions on time because of the dislocation of 
underground political activities emanating from the neighbouring 
countries. These activists were based near the borders of Mozambique 
and Swaziland. The non-aggression pacts signed by Pretoria with 
Swaziland (1982) and Mozambique (1984) also impacted negatively on 
the liberation crusade. Commenting on the negative effects of the 
Mozambican non-aggression pact (Nkomati Accord) with the South 
African government, Dan O'Meara avers that the ANC's presence in 
Mozambique was reduced to a "small, very tightly supervised diplomatic 
. . ,,600 
mISSIOn. 
The infiltration routes (called pipelines) used by some of the cadres of 
MK from these neighbouring countries were known to the governments 
but officially not sanctioned for fear of reprisals from the South African 
regime. The arrest of Mudimu Refiloe (in Zimbabwe), some members of 
5'iS Interview with Sam Mkhabela, by the author, Acornhoek, Limpopo Province,S October 2002. 
5')<) Interview with Mudimu RefiIoe, South African Navy Headquarters, Pretoria, Gauteng Province, 21 
January 2005, has proved this point. 











his unit and those arrested in Swaziland, deported to Mozambique and 
later to Angola serve as examples of these government sanctions.601 The 
opposite is also true that if the host neighbouring governments were as 
hostile to the liberation movements as the South African governments 
wished, those arrested could have been repatriated to South Africa.602 
There has always been such a request from the South African government 
for the repatriation of those arrested in neighbouring countries back to 
South Africa. The request was made by the representatives of the SAP 
when they went to Swaziland after 1976 to ask the Swazi government to 
repatriate a group of youth that left Mhluzi Township in Middleburg for 
exile in Swaziland. When Mudimu's claim that he was Zimbabwean was 
shattered because of his inability to tell the court the names of his 
"parents" whom he had brought to court to bear witness that they were 
his "parents", the Zimbabwean government deported him. Although the 
ruling was made in court, he was allowed to stay in the country under 
sufferance and continue infiltrating MK cadres and weapons into the 
north of the country. These pipelines were very porous, particularly 
towards the late 1980s. The story of Sam Ditshego from Moutse in the 
former Lebowa, described in the body of this study, clearly indicated that 
the Pitsane-Molopo routes into Botswana were utilised legally and 
maximally for the benefit of recruits and those who reinfiltrated the 
country to fulfill various missions.603 
When Oliver Tambo called confidently in his speech on the 7ih 
anniversary of the ANC existence (January 8 message) that the pace of 
6111 Interview with Mudimu Retiloe, by the author, South African Navy Headquarters, Pretoria, Gauteng 
Province, 18 January 2005. 
We Interview with Vuvu MndebeIe, by the author, SANDF Provincial Headquarters. Middleburg, 
Mpumalanga Province. 26 February 2003. 
6113 For details of Sam Ditshego contribution to the underground struggle see Marepo Lesetja, 'The 
incorporation of Moutse into the KwaNdebele Bantustan, 1985-1987: MK's Military Testing Ground', 











victory should be quickened, he had the insight that apartheid was 
gasping for survival as it was being attacked on all fronts. 604 The knotty 
question that this study has tried to answer is how that confidence of 
declaring the 1980s a Decade of Liberation and the collapse of the 
government transpired in the rural Northern Transvaal. In trying to 
answer pertinent questions like those on regimes' collapse, Regis Debray 
sagely advises: 
... an insurrection that is begun but not carried through, or a military semi-
putsch, [does not have] the faintest chance of succeeding, and there is not a 
single historical instance to suggest that it might. No battle is ever won in 
advance, but a battle that is only half-engaged is certainly lost in 
605 advance. 
It took the ANC over 80 years to realise the dream of liberation. The 
reasons for such a lengthy period of time spent on engaging the South 
African government and ultimately forcing it to capitulate and come to 
the negotiating table as an equal partner, have nothing to do with 
Debray's contentions. It has everything to do with an arduous and 
meticulous process of building a revolution that culminated in the 
formation of the UDP inside the country, described as, " ... a plethora of 
political and community groups joined in a nearly uncontrollable 
grassroots expansion, growing as ifby cellular division".606 
The delayed revolutionary victory had everything to do with the vicious 
enemy in the South African security forces that had an "eleventh 
commandment" as enunciated by Craig Williamson during the TRC 
6114 African National Congress, ANC Speaks: Statement ol the National Executive Committee ol the 
Afi-ican National Congress on the Occasion olthe 77lh Anniverswy olthe ANC, (Dar es Salaam?, ANC, 
1989), p. I Visit for details http: W\\\V.:.hlK.oru:.ZLl ancdocs, hist()[\ janil-il').html. 
605 Regis Debray, The Revolution on Trial. A Critique ol Arms, (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 
1978), p. 45. 












hearings. Williamson's TRC testimony largely refers to the clandestine 
character and government's denial of its proclivity to assassinate its 
opponents on condition that thou shalt not be found out.607 This "eleventh 
commandment" splintered families; imprisoned people on flimsy grounds 
like possessing "banned" literature of the ANC, harbouring terrorists or 
just being suspected of complicity in the ANC underground activities. 
Most of the suspicions were not easy to validate in a court of law and 
therefore they served the apartheid regime well to persecute political 
suspects by indefinite detentions, detentions that were legalized by Acts 
of parliament and the stae of emergency in the 1980s. The South African 
government's dependence on what Farisani calls "Captain Above-the-
Law" held up the liberation of the disenfranchised majority for many 
decades in which many people paid dearly for liberation. 60S These are 
some of the factors that delayed the liberation struggle in South Africa for 
many decades. All these negative measures contributed towards the delay 
of the emancipation of the black majority and prolonged the lifespan of 
the apartheid South African government. 
Individual accounts ofMK cadres that were sourced from interviews (not 
necessarily carried out by the author) provided the backbone of the study. 
These personal accounts also provide the weaknesses of plans that were 
hatched faraway from the theater of the struggle for liberation. Some of 
individual braveries need repetition here. Mthetheleli Mncube and 
Mzondeleli Nondula's case provides a riveting account of the liberation 
struggle in South Africa.609 They were MK cadres sent into the country 
on various missions in the late 1980s ending up in the hands of the 
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security police who tortured them into 'submission'. This study further 
highlights problems that were experienced by deployed cadres despite the 
fact that they were trained in topography and other related subjects. 
Mncube and Mzondeleli's case proved the limitations of such training 
where they were unable to intermingle with communities in Mussina 
(Messina, then) near the border with Zimbabwe.6lO Their inability to 
speak neither isiZonga nor isiVhenda (two languages predominant III 
Mussina) made them feel outcast and the communities were unable to 
hide them for the full duration of their hiding there because the security 
police had launched an intensive search for them. The study has examples 
of this nature and the case of Cassius Motsoaledi's arrest in the lightening 
episode and subsequent release in Bushbuckridge in the early 1980s 
comes to mind. 
The 1980s brought about that coordinating body in the form of the UDF. 
The countrywide upsurge of political activities remained subdued and 
'untapped' by the liberation movements. These political upsurges 
manifested sporadically and spontaneously in demonstrations and strikes, 
particularly in the 1980s, and in most cases, national leaders never really 
succeeded in capturing and channeling these events into a meaningful 
direction until the formation of the UDF in 1983. The necessity to confine 
and guide the pent-up anger of the oppressed African majority into an 
organised structure in the 1980s was not a new phenomenon. Naledi 
Tsiki, an MK cadre captured after a series of underground military and 
political activities in the late 1970s in the rural villages of the Northern 
Transvaal, concluded, during his trial that, "I should also mention that at 
the time I left, there was a great need for a sense of discipline and 
(dO A chapter titled 'Guerrillas are to People What Fish are to Water' in Umkhonto wc Si::H'c: Fighting 
trw a Dividcd Peoplc, (Alberton, Galago, 2005), by Thula Bopela and Daluxolo Luthuli captures the 











responsibility so as to control the bursting anger of the black youth and to 
avoid terrorism in the true sense of the word.,,611 There was nothing new 
in Tsiki's sentiments. Nelson Mandela had the same feeling in the early 
1960s that was echoed in his statement during the famous Rivonia Trial. 
He felt that, " ... unless responsible leadership were given to canalise and 
control the feelings of the people, there would be outbreaks of terrorism 
which would produce an intensity of bitterness and hostility between the 
various races of the country.,,612 It was especially in the 1980s that 
conscious efforts were made to integrate the "professional" guerrillas of 
MK with the main force of the masses as a "political army" in protracted 
liberation struggles. 613 
Contrary to obvious expectations of the ANC to take advantage of the 
internal political agitations within the country after September 1984, the 
Vaal triangle uprisings externally engulfed the ANC, the protracted 
internal turmoil in Angola (1984), and the effects of the Nkomati Accord 
in Mozambique left the ANC tottering on the brink of disorganisation.614 
Ellis mistakenly argues that the ANC was provided with a lifetime 
opportunity of military breakthrough by these internal uprisings that 
started in the Vaal but the organisation was ill prepared and failed to take 
up the opportunity.615 The objective behind MK operations was to cause 
instability and ungovernability such as the one described above so that 
the political impasse that plagued South Africa could be overcome. In the 
context of the regional historiography that this study has in mind it is 
611 Francis Meli. A HistOlY of the ANC: South Afi-iea Belongs to us. (London, James Currey. 1988). p. 
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wrong to conclude by assertions that the ANC/MK were in exile and 
therefore unable to take the advantages that were provided by the political 
upsurges of the 1980s. The current study argues that there were two 
groups of the same family, one based in exile and another inside the 
country. The constant change of positions and obligations throughout the 
years were calculated at the overthrow of the government and there was 
that natural replacement of individuals from generations to generations. 
First generation of MK cadres from the rural Northern Transvaal had the 
obligation to bequeath the baton of liberation to future generations. These 
people were able to link up with the young generation of liberation 
fighters such Aleck Nchabeleng, Mathabatha Stan, Tlokwe Maserumule, 
Ngoako Ramatlhodi and countless others. 616 These emerging political 
activists in the underground world of MK were able to replenish the older 
generations of Nelson Diale, Peter Nchabeleng, Joel Ntsoane, John Phala 
and the exiled generation of John Nkadimeng and countless others who 
hailed from the rural areas of the Northern Transvaal. Their efforts were 
beginning to emerge not only as a trickle but as an avalanche of political 
torrents that were unstoppable. Lodge points out: 
Though it is possible that press restrictions have distorted the picture, it is 
conceivable that the infrequency of gun battles in rural areas since 1980 may 
reflect the successful establishment of secure lines of infiltration and supply 
for the guerrillas, as well as the completion of some of the major logistical 
tasks. For example, since 1980 announcements of the discovery of major 
arms caches have decreased markedly.617 
In the final analysis, the study has attempted to highlight the importance 
of the rural Northern Transvaal region in the context of guerrilla warfare 
61(, Ineke van Kessel, "Beyond Our Wildest Dreams" The United Democratic Front and the 
Transformation of South Africa, Op, Cit, p, 12, 
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that was waged by MK. Visceral critic of MK, erstwhile member of the 
ANC, and the first Chief Minister of the Lebowa Bantustan (it was in the 
rural Northern Transvaal), Chief M.M. Matlala recognised the strategic 
significance of the rural Northern Transvaal. He stated that, "We of the 
Northern Transvaal would welcome any moves to bring about a peaceful 
settlement of disputes as this area would most likely be combat ground in 
the event of confrontation because we are but a staggering distance from 
the fangs of the terrorists ... ,,618 Infiltrated MK cadres were not 
necessarily supposed to be armed and ready for military conventional 
combat. There is no historical evidence that MK ever thought of 
confronting the SADF in a full-frontal conventional warfare. The 
strategies adopted in pursuance of the liberation ideology created the 
misconceptions and misinterpretations that MK was not ready for a 
protracted war with the SADF. Some of these historical analysts and 
observers attribute these strategies or lack of them to " ... the absence of a 
prolonged tradition of military resistance in South Africa and the ANC's 
life-long commitment to political mobilisation,,619 and that the ANC's 
armed struggle was calculated to satisfy its political base in South 
Africa.620 John S. Saul maintains that it aimed at "neutralising the state's 
repressive apparatus and to heightening the saliency of resistance both at 
home and abroad".621 In counteracting the state's repression the ANC did 
not engage in terrorism, randomly killing civilians and securing the 
compliance of the people whose cause it claimed to serve by means of 
coercion, as claimed by Keith Campbel1.622 The ANC based itself on 
61X Homeland Leaders Reject Independence, Lebowa, December 13, 1974, p. 29. 
61'1 John D. Brewer, Black Strategies For Change in a Constrained Socie(r. (Cape Town, Institute for 
the Study of Public Policy, 1989), p.6. 
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conscIOUS and organised involvement of the masses of the people, to 
build a strong and disciplined revolutionary movement, as Oliver Tambo 
'd 623 sal . 
The role that MK played in the national liberation struggle with special 
reference to the rural areas of the Northern Transvaal shows the intricate 
nature of that struggle, one that was not exclusive rural or urban, but was 
an arduous and complex process that needed thorough and constant 
planning and execution. The changing political landscape of southern 
Africa in the mid-1970s, the altering patterns of internal resistance in the 
1980s, and the waning political and economic fortunes of the South 
African government together saved the country from greater violence and 
self destruction. But the role of MK foot soldiers in the Northern 
Transvaal must not be forgotten. 
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